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FBIS-SOV-96-106 CONTENTS *31 May 1996*

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PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION ISSUES

Russia: Yeltsin Tells Perm Voters Prosperous Life 'Not Far Off' *[Radio Rossii]* 1
Russia: Yeltsin Outlines Main Provisions of Platform in Perm *[Moscow RTV]* 1
Russia: Yeltsin Says Inflation Must Drop to 5% per Year by 2000 *[INTERFAX]* 2
Russia: Main Points of Yeltsin's Action Program Outlined *[IZVESTIYA 31 May]* 2
Russia: Military Aspects of Yeltsin's Electoral Program Viewed *[SEGODNYA 31 May]* 3
Russia: Yeltsin Says Foreign Policy To Help Solve Domestic Issues *[INTERFAX]* 4
Russia: Yeltsin Comments on Chechen Peace Agreement in Ufa *[Moscow NTV]* 4
Russia: Yeltsin Said To Receive Death Threat From 'Idiot' in Perm *[ITAR-TASS]* 5
Russia: Yeltsin Ends Campaign Tour to Bashkiria, Perm *[ITAR-TASS]* 5
Russia: Over Half of Regional Leaders Said To Favor Yeltsin *[INTERFAX]* 5
Russia: Oil Industry Choses Yeltsin as Stability Guarantor *[SEGODNYA 30 May]* 6
Russia: Yeltsin Supporters Still in Majority in Kremlin Mailbag *[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 30 May]* 6
Russia: Zyuganov Criticizes Yeltsin's Army Reform *[Moscow Radio]* 7
Russia: Zyuganov Comments on Uniting 'Third Force' Candidates *[INTERFAX]* 8
Russia: Professor Sees 'Paranoia' in Zyuganov *[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI 29 May]* 8
Russia: Price of Yeltsin's Futures Exceed Zyuganov's by 8 Percent *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 30 May]* 9
Russia: Poll Says Yeltsin, Zyuganov Remain Top Runners for Presidency *[INTERFAX]* 10

INTERREGIONAL AFFAIRS

CIS: ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 31 May 11
CIS: Geneva Conference Handling CIS Migration Problem *[ITAR-TASS]* 12
CIS: Integration Tendencies in CIS Examined *[MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA 15 May]* 12

RUSSIA INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Russia: Russia's 'Vital Interests' at Stake in EU Shift *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 28 May]* 16
Russia: Council of Europe Official Pleased With Chechen Accord *[INTERFAX]* 16
Russia: NATO Approach To Depend on How Post-Election Russia Acts *[ITAR-TASS]* 17
Russia: UN Head Views CIS Peacekeeping Role *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 15 May]* 17
Russia: Primakov's Talks in Rome Focus on Karadzic's Fate *[KOMMERSANT-DAILY 30 May]* 18
Russia: ITAR-TASS Reports Primakov Talks in Belgrade With Milosevic 19
Russia: Primakov on 'One-Sided Position' of West in Bosnia *[INTERFAX]* 20
Russia: Primakov Questions U.S. Resumption of Sanctions Against FRY *[ITAR-TASS]* 20
Russia: Baturin, Serb Defense Minister Discuss Dayton *[Belgrade SRNA]* 21
Russia: Moscow Ready for Joint Exercises With U.S. *[ITAR-TASS]* 21
Russia: Air Force Official Says No Delivery of MiG-29s to DPRK *[ITAR-TASS]* 21
Russia: Moscow May Build Nuclear Power Station in China *[INTERFAX]* 22
Russia: 'Clean Fusion' Bomb Could Be 'Ideal' for Terrorists *[IZVESTIYA 25 May]* 22
Russia: Russia 'Downplayed' Iraqi Success Because of U.S. Concerns *[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA 30 May]* 23
Russia: Integration, Caspian Pipeline Deal Linked *[SEGODNYA 30 Apr]* 23

RUSSIA NATIONAL AFFAIRS

Political Issues

Russia: Satarov: Communists Could Provoke State of Emergency *[IZVESTIYA 31 May]* 25

Russia: Protection Directorate Renamed, Subordinated to President *[MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS 30 May]* 25
Russia: Edict, Statute on Law Enforcement Agencies Published *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 5 May]* 25

Military Issues

Russia: Yeltsin, Pak, Kokoshin Address Defense Industry Conference *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 30 May]* 28
Russia: Text of Yeltsin Speech to Army, Navy Leadership *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 31 May]* ... 29
Russia: Grachev Launches 'Counterattack' Against 'Ill-Wishers' *[SEGODNYA 30 May]* 32
Russia: Grachev Remarks to Army Leaders Viewed *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 30 May]* 33
Russia: Grachev Again 'Triumphs' Over Those Awaiting His Dismissal *[SEGODNYA 30 May]* 34
Russia: Presidential Aide Kuzyk Cited on Arms Trade *[KOMMERSANT-DAILY 30 May]* 34
Russia: Edict Seeks To Enhance Status of Civil Defense Troops *[MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS 30 May]* 35

Regional Affairs

Russia: Text of Yeltsin Edict on Chechnya Treaty Draft *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 31 May]* .. 35
Russia: Text of Chechnya Draft Treaty Published *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 31 May]* 36
Russia: Army Paper Cites Yeltsin Remarks in Chechnya *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 30 May]* 41
Russia: Chernomyrdin Names Negotiators for Chechnya Talks *[ITAR-TASS]* 42
Russia: Negotiator Expects Treaty on Wide-Ranging Chechen Autonomy *[MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS 30 May]* 43
Russia: Kulikov Says Chechen Rebel Units Number 4,000 Members *[INTERFAX]* 44
Russia: Yeltsin Signs 'Powers-Sharing' Agreement With Perm Region *[ITAR-TASS]* 44

Economic Issues

Russia: Chernomyrdin: Government To Decree Indexation of Capital *[ITAR-TASS]* 45
Russia: Central Bank Seeks To Enhance Reliability of Banks *[OBSHCHAYA GAZETA 30 May]* 45
Russia: Consumer Price Movement Suggests Promising Outlook *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 29 May]* 46
Russia: Budget Arrears To Be Covered by Selling Blue Chips *[SEGODNYA 30 May]* 46
Russia: Government Extends Siberian Regions' Loan Repayments *[ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA 29 May]* 46

UKRAINE

International Affairs

Ukraine: 'Orthodox Zone' Proposed To Counter NATO, Russia *[HOLOS UKRAYINY 24 May]* 48
Ukraine: Parliament Chairman on NATO Expansion *[ITAR-TASS]* 49
Ukraine: Recent Turns in Relations With Russia Viewed *[ZERKALO NEDELI 25-31 May]* 49
Ukraine: Kuchma Meets Visiting Austrian Parliamentary Delegation *[UNIAN]* 51
Ukraine: Japanese Companies Cooperation Plans Cited *[INFOBANK]* 52

National Affairs

Ukraine: Udovenko, Rumored To Be on Way Out, Hails New Premier *[NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA 30 May]* 52
Ukraine: Marchuk Dismissal Seen Based on Rivalry With Kuchma *[PRAVDA 30 May]* 52
Ukraine: Dismissals of Top Security Officials 'Expected Soon' *[INTELNEWS]* 53
Ukraine: Constitutional Democrats Urge Kuchma To Head Cabinet *[INTERFAX]* 53
Ukraine: PM Sets 'Bail Out' for Coal Mining; 'First' Major Problem *[INTELNEWS]* 53
Ukraine: Government Budgets Funds To Pay Miners' Wages *[Kiev TV]* 54

Economic Issues

Ukraine: Kuchma Expects Increased Investments After New Constitution *[INTERFAX]* 54

Ukraine: President Gives More Powers to Payments Crisis Commission *[UNIAN]* 55
Ukraine: Commercial Banks Engaged To Pay Miners Wages *[INFOBANK]* 55

WESTERN REGION

Belarus

Belarus: Minister: NATO-Seekers 'Splitting', Not 'Uniting' Europe *[INTERFAX]* 56
Belarus: Minsk Radio Cites Syanko Warning in Riga on NATO Expansion *[Minsk Radio]* 56
Belarus: Syanko: Belarus Policy Not 'Mechanical Copy' of Russia *[Minsk TV]* 56
Belarus: Lukashenka Tries To Increase State Influence on Economy *[INTERFAX]* 56
Belarus: Lukashenka Bodyguards To Allegedly Punish Paper for Report *[BELORUSSKAYA DELOVAYA GAZETA 27 May]* 57
Belarus: 'Radical' Anti-Lukashenka Mood Said Growing in Provinces *[SVABODA 28 May]* .. 57
Belarus: 'Tension' Between KGB, Interior Ministry *[SVABODA 28 May]* 58
Belarus: Official Denounces Opposition Rally in Minsk *[INTERFAX]* 58
Belarus: SupSov Sets Up Commission To Examine Clashes in Minsk *[Minsk Radio]* 59

CENTRAL ASIA

Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan: President Lauds CIS Interparliamentary Assembly *[INTERFAX]* 60
Kyrgyzstan: Representatives to CIS Antimonopoly Council Announced *[Bishkek Radio]* 60
Kyrgyzstan: Deputy Minister Outlines Government's Main Goals *[INTERFAX]* 60

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan: President Karimov Calls Germany Priority Partner in Europe *[INTERFAX]* 61
Uzbekistan: German Foreign Minister Supports Uzbek Reform *[Tashkent TV]* 61

CAUCASUS

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan: Gasanov Views Meeting With Russia, Georgia, Armenia *[INTERFAX]* 63
Azerbaijan: Milli Mejlis Speaker Views Economic Integration With CIS *[TURAN]* 63
Azerbaijan: Azerbaijani, Armenian Presidential Advisors Hold Dialogue *[TURAN]* 63
Azerbaijan: Border Agreement With Russia Criticized *[TURAN]* 63
Azerbaijan: Repercussions of Communist Resurgence in Russia Viewed *[TURAN]* 64

Georgia

Georgia: Shevardnadze Views Chechen Accord *[BGI]* 64
Georgia: 'Zviadists' Declare 'Complete Solidarity' With Chechens *[AKHALGAZRDA IVERIELI 23-29 May]* 64
Georgia: Tbilisi Granted Special Status at Council of Europe *[ITAR-TASS]* 65
Georgia: Russian Passports Smuggled to Abkhazia To Rig Elections *[CONTACT INFORMATION AGENCY]* 65
Georgia: Defense Minister Discusses Army's Development *[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA 29 May]* .. 66
Georgia: Human Rights Group Says Police Regime 'Raging' in Country *[AKHALGAZRDA IVERIELI 23-29 May]* 67
Georgia: Tbilisi Police on 'Red Alert' Because of Crime Wave *[ITAR-TASS]* 67
Georgia: NDP Parliamentary Faction Announces 'Split' From Party *[KAVKASIONI 22 May]* . 68

BALTIC STATES

Estonia

Estonia: Foreign Minister Addresses Parliament on Ties With Russia *[Tallinn TV]* 69

Estonia: President Discusses Baltic Policies With U.S. Ambassador *[BNS]* 69
Estonia: President Addresses Nordic-Baltic Defense Meeting *[ETA]* 69
Estonia: Foreign Minister on European Aspirations *[Tallinn Radio]* 70
Estonia: Foreign Minister Views 'Russian Question' *[PRAVDA 25 May]* 70
Estonia: Vahi Satisfied With Handling of Paramilitary Incident *[Tallinn Radio]* 72

Latvia

Latvia: Belarusian Foreign Minister Arrives for Two-Day Visit *[Riga Radio]* 72
Latvia: Belarus FM: Integration Should Not Concern Neighboring States *[BNS]* 73
Latvia: Birkavs, Belarusian Counterpart Give News Conference *[Riga Radio]* 73
Latvia: Polish Senate Speaker Urges 'More Active' Relations *[Riga Radio]* 74

Lithuania

Lithuania: Supporters of Chechnya Say New Peace Deal 'Just a Show' *[Vilnius Radio]* 74
Lithuania: Baltic, Nordic Leaders View Defense, Security Cooperation *[Tallinn Radio]* 74
Lithuania: Baltic, Nordic Defense Ministers Give News Conference *[Vilnius Radio]* 75
Lithuania: Belarusian Foreign Minister Pays Brief, Unofficial Visit *[Vilnius Radio]* 75
Lithuania: Joint Lithuanian-Polish Document To Be Presented to EU *[ELTA]* 75

Russia: Yeltsin Tells Perm Voters Prosperous Life 'Not Far Off'

LD3105084496 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0700 GMT 31 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Russian President Boris Yeltsin's visit to Perm is continuing. This morning the head of state signed an agreement with local leaders demarcating the areas of jurisdiction between the authorities of the Russian Federation, Perm Region, and the Komi-Permyak Autonomous Area.

At a meeting with voters today, Boris Yeltsin briefly set out the main tenets of his election program and also dwelt on the results of the work done during his five years in the post of head of state. This is how Boris Yeltsin assesses Russia's present situation:

[Begin Yeltsin recording] The shoots of normal life are already beginning to appear throughout Russia. A firm foundation has been laid for a fast economic upswing. The slump in production has ended in a number of industries and gradual growth has begun. Growth has begun for the first time this year, and in the first four months it was 3 percent. This is not only in the industries connected with exports. It is first and foremost in housing construction directed at meeting internal demand. There has been an upswing in this area for two years now. Others sectors of the economy are also approaching this. Output is up in ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgy. For instance, many plants, including your Perm plants, are operating in a stable way. Joint-stock companies and indeed various forms of organization in industry, construction, and other sectors are developing vigorously. Nor are these isolated examples. It is a fact that a prosperous life is not far off. [end recording]

Russia: Yeltsin Outlines Main Provisions of Platform in Perm

LD3105094696 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 0700 GMT 31 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] After completing and signing his election program, Russian President Boris Yeltsin outlined its main provisions at a public meeting held at a cultural and business center in Perm today.

[Begin recording] [Correspondent] Boris Yeltsin's program does not contain unfulfillable promises of a glorious future or attractive slogans. It is a plan of action for the next four years. Each provision is supported by concrete legislative acts with the source of financing specified.

[Yeltsin] The principal aim of my program is a normal life for every individual, every family for our society and our state. Just a normal, comfortable life with no revolutions, upheavals and coups. The task seems clear and simple, but it is very difficult to solve. And to solve it, we need your support.

[Correspondent] Yeltsin did not conceal the fact that good life is within reach. The president also recalled that when he took over there was not a single ruble in reserve. At the same time not a single 'wooden' ruble has been printed in the last five years. Now the main task is to solve social problems.

[Yeltsin] ..We did not have the opportunity to do this before. The first issue is to carry out the policy of increasing citizens' real incomes. Regrettably, in the past few years the incomes have been in decline. In the past few years we have managed to fill shop counters. The consumer market is now full. Now we must fill the people's purses. This is not a simple task.

Above all, I am speaking about pensioners, veterans and people on low incomes. We have nearly completed the work on measures to securely protect people's incomes from inflation and fraudulent financial pyramids. From 10 June we shall begin to restore the savings accounts for pensioners who lost their savings in 1992 because of the price liberalisation policy.

[Correspondent] The president spoke about Chechnya and the army reform.

[Yeltsin] During these extremely difficult years, we managed to preserve peace almost throughout the Russia's territory. The only conflagration which we could not avoid was Chechnya. Today, as never before, we have practically quenched it. Peace has come to Chechnya. The Chechen events have given rise to the question of military reform. As you know, by the year 2000 we should have a professional army in Russia, which will be mobile, combat-ready and equipped with the latest military hardware. A number of urgent decrees, a whole package of them, were adopted in May. The aim of these decrees is to withdraw all the conscripts from Chechnya before the end of the year so that there, as well as in other trouble spots, people will serve only on a voluntary basis and only on contracts.

From the spring of the year 2000, the armed forces and other forces of the Russian Federation will become fully professional. They will be manned by servicemen only on voluntary and contract basis. There will be no conscription for military service. From the spring of the year 2000, it is to be abolished. [applause] [end recording]

Russia: Yeltsin Says Inflation Must Drop to 5% per Year by 2000

LD3105070796 Moscow INTERFAX in English
0627 GMT 31 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] PERM, May 31 (Interfax) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin said in Perm Friday that while in recent years the Russians have started forgetting how empty shelves in stores look like, they will forget the feel of empty purses soon.

Inflation must drop to 5 percent a year by 2000, he said at a meeting. This will curb price rises and improve the living standards. The ruble will become a hard currency and the economy will grow at an annual rate of over 4 percent, he said.

"We will continue work on improving the management of state property. Factories, land, the mineral and other resources should be managed so that the country, the region and the enterprise gain," he said.

The industries will embrace high technologies and the domestic producer will be given most of the government support while the domestic market will be closed to substandard import, Yeltsin said.

Steps are under consideration "to protect people from inflation and fraud by the builders of financial pyramids," he said.

"Minimal hourly wages will be introduced shortly" as a social guarantee, Yeltsin promised. This will be important for those who do outside work, he said.

Russia: Main Points of Yeltsin's Action Program Outlined

MM3005152396 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
31 May 96 p 1

[Report by O.L.: "Yeltsin: I Am Responsible for Everything. Action Program for 1996-2000"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The action program, which the president intends to submit during his speech to voters in Perm 31 May, consists of a 250-page computer printout. It contains three sections: "Choice of Path," "The Priorities of the New Policy," "The President's Responsibility." The the bulk of the program is taken up by Section Two, which contains several chapters entitled "Freedom," "Spirituality," "Health," "Economic Prosperity," "Social Justice," "Legal Order," "Ensuring Defense and Foreign Policy Interests."

In shaping his policy for the next four years the president and presidential candidate is guided by the following main values: Man, Family, Society, and State. Measures for the support of a civil society are elaborated in detail, among which the broadening of glasnost in the work of organs of power, the strengthening of the multiparty system, and the protection of freedom of the mass media are notable. Noting the imperfect nature of electoral legislation, the president pledges, in particular, to reinforce guarantees of the principle of representation and protection of voters' rights.

Among the main priorities are defense of culture, education, and science. The need for in-depth reform of the sphere of science and technology is noted, which, alongside great achievements in individual areas, is suffering from a lag in certain most promising areas of expertise, an inability to "introduce" the results that have been obtained, isolation from world science, and rigid administrative diktat. The president intends to pursue a scientific policy, which will assign the main role not to departments and offices but directly to the people developing the new achievements.

Broaching the prospects for the development of the health service, Boris Yeltsin believes that the system's financial stability should be ensured primarily by budget and enterprise funds as well as by the population's funds. It is planned to switch to the provision of medical aid on the family doctor principle. Provision of psychological aid is particularly highlighted since dramatic changes in the world around us have generated an atmosphere of uncertainty and tension. The task is raised of protecting adolescents from the downside of the sexual revolution.

The economic section begins by referring to the fact that in late 1991 it was a question of saving the economy from total collapse and the country from starvation. The crisis in the system has been overcome and market reform has opened up vast reserves for development, but experience of mistakes has also been acquired.

The program notes that new means of transferring wealth to the elite have appeared — the resale of budget resources and soft centralized loans, evasion of taxes and customs duties, appropriation of money belonging to others by means of nonpayments, seizure of federally-owned blocks of shares. Many of these mistakes are mine, the president says, but I know how to rectify them and I am already doing so. We must adjust the mechanism for the implementation of the budget, organize a new system for the management of state property, protect people's incomes against inflation and unscrupulous commercial structures, ensure compliance with labor legislation, and implement tax reform. The investment program, industrial policy, the development of small business, and agrarian reform — all these topics are covered extensively in the program. The task of providing support for the production of national foodstuffs and protection for the domestic market is particularly highlighted.

The section devoted to social justice notes the success of the "offensive" on inflation. It then makes provision for the ratification this year of minimum state social standards and state social guarantees for the population in the sphere of consumption, health, education, and culture. Measures to ensure employment, restore savings, and create a three-tier pension system (basic, labor, and nonstate pensions) are given much space.

Readers will undoubtedly pay attention to the section devoted to the restoration of constitutional order in Chechnya, which is incorporated in the chapter entitled "Legal Order." "By the end of the year Chechnya will become a peaceful territory of the Russian Federation — that is my main task," Boris Yeltsin says at the end of this section, which contains specific measures for a settlement. It notes that there is only one limit to our readiness for compromise on the question of Chechnya's status — the Russian Constitution and its avowed principle of the country's integrity.

Touching on the problem of defense and foreign policy, the president states his determination to firmly uphold Russia's national interests in the multiparty world that is taking shape. He particularly singles out the task of developing CIS integration. The program for military reform and the creation by the year 2000 of a professional army provided with modern arms is revealed in detail.

"I am responsible for everything," Boris Yeltsin writes in conclusion, "that the country's former rulers did to it over the previous 70 years, for what they were unable to achieve, and for what they are preventing us from doing now. The next four years are necessary to finish the main transformations that have been started in previous years and to put the country on track for steady dynamic development."

Russia: Military Aspects of Yeltsin's Electoral Program Viewed

MK3105115996 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 31 May 96 p 2

[Report by Pavel Felgengauer under the "Military" rubric: "The President Promises Servicemen Reform and Popular Respect. The Military-Industrial Sector Is To Be Ready To Equip Troops With State-of-the-Art Hardware by the Year 2000"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Undoubtedly, a majority of Russian citizens would like to see their national armed forces combat-ready, professional, disciplined, well-equipped, content, and eating their fill. It is easy to like such an army. Boris Yeltsin is no exception, as he promises in his electoral program that "military reform will be completed in four years' time, and we will have a formidable professional army equipped with state-of-the-art weapons," which, on top of that, will "enjoy popular support and respect," while its maintenance will not be beyond the country's strength. Mr. Yeltsin promises that he will task the General Staff with "bringing regular and combined units on the key axes up to full strength" at the expense of reducing "redundant units that operate under strength and that make little contribution to the country's actual defense might." The idea is fairly reasonable in itself, albeit not a new one. Back in 1992 President Yeltsin said, addressing a conference of the armed forces' top command personnel: "It would be a good idea not to create a surplus of garrisons with undermanned regular and combined units, but to bring a certain number of units up to full strength." But this turned out to be easier said than done.

The experience of ineffectual army reform in 1992-1996 has shown that professional servicemen are unable to reform themselves drastically without effective and continuing civilian control. In his current electoral program Boris Yeltsin emphasizes yet again the need "to increase the role of both state and civilian control over the armed forces," but reduces this control only to "increasingly effective cooperation with other institutions that ensure national security, a more rational use of resources, and so forth."

High-ranking sources in the presidential staff have reported that a statute is being drawn up on a new, fairly effective agency on interdepartmental control over the armed forces, "other troops," and paramilitary agencies — whose number has already reached 22. At the same time, the General Staff, as follows from the electoral program of presidential candidate Mr. Yeltsin, will become an executive agency for "coordinating, forming, and planning the uses of all the types of troops of the Russian Federation in time of peace," as well as operational command and control in wartime. Yet, the promise to appoint a civilian to the post of defense minister, which Boris Yeltsin gave four years ago, has for some reason disappeared from the program. And that despite the fact that many high-ranking generals recognize even now that they need a civilian defense minister so as to better represent the military in the government, parliament, and before society and to lobby for their interests more successfully than the generals themselves have done so far.

However, even if a professional serviceman — but one who is more competent than the current minister — is placed at the head of the Defense Ministry once again, the structure of the armed forces could in principle be optimized and the military's social status could be somewhat improved by the year 2000. But then the current weapons in service with the army and the navy will for the most part become obsolete and there will be no funds yet to procure new ones. In what appears to be a mixture of genres — an electoral program and a message to parliament — the presidential staff urges the domestic military-industrial sector "to lay the scientific-technical and technological groundwork for rearming" the armed forces by the year 2000, correspondingly promising to increase the percentage of appropriations for research and development, not massive arms purchases. In the meantime, while the military budget will inevitably be extremely lean, the country's defense will rely first of all on its nuclear deterrence potential regardless of who, after all, wins the election.

Russia: Yeltsin Says Foreign Policy To Help Solve Domestic Issues

LD3105083996 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0743 GMT 31 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 31 (Interfax) — Russia's foreign policy should provide a level of security and an international climate in which the country could, at last, concentrate its tremendous potential on tackling its internal problems and improving the living standards, Russian President Boris Yeltsin said in his program for his next term as president.

The closest possible voluntary and mutually beneficial integration of CIS member nations is a priority of Russian foreign policy, the program says. Yeltsin believes that the Russian-proposed concept of different rates of integration for different countries has worked.

The closest integration has been achieved with Belarus, Yeltsin thinks. Under a treaty on the setting up of a community with that country Russia and Belarus will have the same standards and conditions for economic activities and social benefits. Integration under an agreement between Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan is at a different level.

Yeltsin is confident that the difficult issues in relations with Ukraine will be resolved. "Once the Black Sea Fleet problem is resolved in the interests of the two countries and a (Friendship and Cooperation) Treaty is signed, the age-old brotherhood of the Russians and Ukrainians will have a second wind," the program says.

"Active protection of the rights and interests of ethnic Russians" inside and outside the former Soviet Union is another foreign policy priority and "Russia's relations with CIS member nations and the Baltic countries will develop accordingly," says the program.

The other foreign policy priorities include:

— building relations with partners in the West and East on the basis of equality;

— the setting up of an all-European security system and formation of a united and democratic Europe;

— expansion of all kinds of links with Russia's neighbors in Asia such as China, India and Japan;

— providing favorable conditions for Russian commodities to enter new markets and consolidate their hold on the old markets;

— Russia meeting modern human rights standards and honoring the commitments which ensue from its membership in the Council of Europe.

"As far as the eastward enlargement of NATO is concerned, Russia's position is principled. While it has no veto right over other countries joining NATO, Russia has a full right to protect its vital interests. Double standards in treating the security interests of Russia and alliance member nations are unacceptable," the program says.

Yeltsin believes that "the escalation of local and regional conflict in the world compels Russia to step up its peacemaking efforts, above all in the CIS. It is chiefly thanks to Russia's peacemaking efforts that hostilities in the Transdniestr region, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh have been brought to an end. It is necessary now to upgrade the ceasefire to a lasting political settlement," he said.

Russia: Yeltsin Comments on Chechen Peace Agreement in Ufa

LD3005221296 Moscow NTV in Russian 1800 GMT 30 May 96

[Video report by Vadim Glusker in Ufa; from the "Segodnya" newscast]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The distinguishing feature of this preelection trip by Boris Yeltsin may be considered to be the many-thousand-strong crowd of people of Ufa, who continually followed the presidential cortege on the streets of the city — even though it was a work day.

No other preelection trip by the Russian president has experienced such a thing. People were full of good wishes to such an extent that this likely influenced the schedule of Boris Yeltsin, who decided to spend today talking directly to people on the streets of the town.

In connection with this, the program of the stay of the Russian president in Ufa was subjected to several changes. Boris Yeltsin did not show up at the Ufa oil refinery. Boris Yeltsin himself was at that time at the friendship monument where he took part in a spectacle called "The Ambassadors of the Urals," which was to symbolize, I quote, Bashkiria's voluntary annexation to the Russian state.

Listening to the song "I Am Not a Russian Citizen But I Am a Man of Russia," which gives orders to strengthen friendship between the peoples, Boris Yeltsin made the following comments on what he had seen:

[Begin Yeltsin recording] We will never renounce the friendship of the peoples that is laid down in this memorial which is dedicated to the 400th anniversary of that friendship. That friendship of the peoples is so evident in Bashkortostan and it must be developed. Substantial peace has come to Chechnya now and on the whole, all of Russia is living in peace now. [end recording]

The president stressed frequently that it was namely the experience of Bashkortostan, where national problems are being resolved successfully, which should be studied in other regions of the country.

As for preelection slogans, they were less striking than in the stadium the day before, but no less convincing.

[Begin Yeltsin recording] Russia is being reborn. There is no turning back any more. It depends upon you on 16 June to ensure that there is no turning back the reforms, that we continue! That depends upon how each of you votes! [end recording]

[passage omitted] To all appearances, the president was satisfied. Indeed, a gentle respite from the preelection battle has never done anyone any harm.

Russia: Yeltsin Said To Receive Death Threat From 'Idiot' in Perm

LD3105095996 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0950 GMT 31 May 96

[By Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] PERM, May 31 (Itar-Tass) — President Boris Yeltsin received an assassination threat during his visit to the Ural town of Perm, but his security service played down the danger saying the caller had been identified as a mentally-sick person.

A source in Yeltsin's personal security service told Tass on Friday that the anonymous caller, who had informed the federal security agency in Perm about an alleged assassination bid planned against visiting president, had been promptly identified and detained.

The officer branded the threat as "idiot's stupidity" as it turned out that the man was registered as mentally-sick by a local hospital.

The officer stressed that "no real danger for president's life existed" and added that during the Perm trip Yeltsin's "security is 100 per cent proof, like it was during his all other working trips".

Russia: Yeltsin Ends Campaign Tour to Bashkiria, Perm

LD3105111296 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1051 GMT 31 May 96

[By Leonid Bagdatyev and Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] PERM, May 31 (Itar-Tass) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin ended his visit to Bashkiria and Perm and left for Moscow at about 13:00 Moscow time (09:00 GMT) on Friday [31 May]. During the visit, president outlined his election programme.

In Bashkiria, he met local leaders, visited a farmstead and met students and professors of the University of Ufa. He also laid flowers to a monument to friendship and spoke to the public.

In Perm, he signed a power-sharing agreement with local leaders, laid flowers to a monument to fallen soldiers and spoke for a local television company.

Russia: Over Half of Regional Leaders Said To Favor Yeltsin

LD3105120296 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1105 GMT 31 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 31 (Interfax) — The heads of 49 of Russia's 89 regions have announced their support for incumbent Boris Yeltsin in the upcoming presidential elections, Valeriy Khomyakov, director of an association of Yeltsin's regional supporters, told a Friday press conference.

Only 22 had done so as of February, he said.

Khomyakov did not name anyone specific, but said he has given Head of the Presidential Administration Nikolay Yegorov the latest information on the situation in the regions.

The best thing for Yeltsin would be "to lose by 3 points in the first round to Communist leader Gennadiy Zyuganov," he said. This would cause "the heads of regional administrations to step up their activity in support of Yeltsin," he said, whereas a large loss (10 points or more) could mean the regional elite would support Zyuganov in the second round.

Further, a victory for Yeltsin in the first round could "relax" the electorate, "lowering its turnout in the second round [because they] think Yeltsin will win automatically."

The Association of the Democratic Party of Russia "In Support of Boris Yeltsin" holds public opinion polls in 78 Russian regions, on which it basis its prognoses.

Russia: Oil Industry Choses Yeltsin as Stability Guarantor

MK3005132096 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 30 May 96 p 2

[Report by Olga Romanova: "Oil Workers Will Not Accept a Revision of Reforms. The Fuel and Energy Complex Has Chosen Yeltsin as a Guarantor of Stability"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Aleksandr Putilov, head of the Rosneft oil company, being "Boris Yeltsin's proxy for the election campaign in the fuel and energy complex," explained at a press conference yesterday why the oil industry workers would not accept economic programs of other candidates for president. "The common feature of the programs of other contenders is a course to the revision of privatization results. This will take us back at least to the early 1990's, and the progressive development will be stopped," Mr. Putilov said. Let us note that the privatization of Rosneft itself has not been started yet (only its plan has been coordinated), whereas the economic program of Boris Yeltsin has not been made public. The proxies, therefore, seem to be much better informed about this program than the general public.

The Russian oil industry "is at a stage of its development where the fruit of its labors can start to be reaped." For this, it "needs clarity, stability, and predictability of rules of the game, which was and is being guaranteed by the president."

Let us recall that a couple of months ago the oil establishment took very much to heart the signing of the agreement between the Government and the IMF, in which the fuel and energy complex utterly disliked Russia's obligation to abolish export duties. The economic program of Gennadiy Zyuganov does promise that the agreement with the IMF will be revised, but, first, the oil industry has already reconciled itself to its terms by having introduced differential excise taxes on oil and, second, the Zyuganov program is feared to bring the whole sector to a total collapse. In addition, the oil industry workers are still anxious to learn the whereabouts of the money from the exportation of oil, for instance, in the 1980's, when Russia was exporting oil in much greater amounts than now.

Russia: Yeltsin Supporters Still in Majority in Kremlin Mailbag

MM3005132796 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 30 May 96 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Contents of Kremlin Mailbag: Signs of President's Personal Attention Are Crucial Factor in People's Choice"]

[FBIS Translated Text] An exclusive report given to ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI by the Russian Federation Presidential Staff's Human Rights Administration says that in the period 20-25 May the country's leadership received 460 letters from Russian citizens directly pertaining to the upcoming election.

The prospect of Boris Yeltsin's reelection for a second term was discussed in 382 letters. A positive view of that is expressed by 294 writers. While 44 letters voice a negative opinion and the rest are wavering at the moment.

Of the other candidates references were made to G. Yavlinskiy (62 letters), G. Zyuganov (16 letters, nine of them in support of his candidacy), and M. Gorbachev (one negative view).

A distinguishing feature of the week's mailbag is the response from Great Patriotic War veterans to the Russian president's personal congratulations on Victory Day. Participants in the war not only thank him for his attention, but also announce their readiness to vote for B.N. Yeltsin once again. In a number of cases they stress that this sign of the president's personal attention was a crucial factor in making up their minds.

It is worthy of note that, as during the stage when the presidential candidates were being nominated, it is not only individual citizens but labor collectives that are coming out in favor of B.N. Yeltsin.

For instance, representatives of Kemerovo's highway construction organizations say: "The president's 'Highways of Russia' Program has changed the appearance of the Kuzbass highways. And although payment arrears are affecting the intensity of our work, we are confident that this shortcoming will be eliminated with the economic upturn. Therefore we support the policy of economic transformations and believe that a change of course is inadmissible."

The Human Rights Administration notes a certain increase in disquiet in the mailbag among supporters of the president's reelection over what the writers consider the poor campaign being conducted for the president and the fact that it is being obstructed in a number of places by both overt and covert supporters of the opposition.

"Try to publish the president's campaign material in a rayon newspaper and what a hullabaloo there will be, saying that the independent 'fourth estate' is being pressured," V. Kravtsov writes from Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk. "There is no one to reason with the editors who receive budget funds. Zyuganov is being given the green light...."

Writers are also alarmed about a possible "move to the left" among that section of the population which has not yet finally made up its mind. These letters mainly talk about the position of those collectives for whom, contrary to hopes and expectations, the era of market relations has meant a protracted slump in production, a decline in incomes, and a reduction in jobs. Ye. Dremina, a former worker at the Kranovshchik plant (Chelyabinsk Oblast), who campaigned for democratic change at the enterprise in past elections, writes that "since then the number of workers has dropped by two-thirds and depression and bewilderment reign in their families." The writer concludes that many of them, who are intellectually opposed to turning back the clock, will nonetheless vote in favor of this as a result of their "empty billfolds."

Ye. Khudenko, head of a peasant farm (Krasnoyarsk Kray), makes broader generalizations. Based on dealings with people from his area he claims that "in 70 years the Communists excelled in creating a society of inert consumers, who got their share without effectively doing anything. A return to that system is more important for such consumers than all the democratic changes. That is why they will subconsciously choose a different path from the one that Russia needs."

Russia: Zyuganov Criticizes Yeltsin's Army Reform

LD3005154196 Moscow Radiostantsiya Ekho Moskvy in Russian 1022 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Here is Gennadiy Zyuganov who will speak on the subject of the army.

[Begin recording] [Zyuganov] The army — in fact not only the army but also the militia and intelligence — has been dragged into this dirt and bloodshed by the Moscow and Groznyy mafia clans. A very high price is now being paid by everybody. As for the army, it must have a doctrine of development. At present the use of the army inside the country has been put on a level with the use of it abroad. The function of the army is to defend its own state and to have a clear purpose and commanders who have prestige. Then the army itself will also have prestige. At present however it is being destroyed, just like everything else.

Now on the question whether we should have army service. If people do not want to feed their own army, it is clear that they will have to feed a foreign one. Therefore, I advocate that the army should be respected and honored and that it should be well-equipped and well-trained. To achieve this, we must conduct an appropriate state policy.

[Correspondent] Are you talking about army reform?

[Zyuganov] As soon as I hear the word reform from you, I immediately associate it with Yeltsin's policy. Everything that he termed "reform" has turned into genocide and destruction; the economy, culture and education. If, by reform, he means this sort of destruction, then they'd better not embark upon it. For it takes years to harmonize and refine army institutions. By destroying them you will lose not only the army but also security. Colossal resources will be needed to restore this security.

He has just signed a decree about some sort of professional army. He did not tell the tax payers that this army will be 500 percent more expensive. He did not tell them that our enormous land needs a qualitatively different army. Nor did he tell them that Sweden, for instance, which has not seen war for 200 years, has compulsory military service, and that everybody there is obliged to undergo appropriate training. He failed to mention that almost the whole of our submarine fleet is even now manned by professionals.

Not a single warship is currently being built at the shipyards of the Russian state. The newest warship in the Black Sea Fleet is 14 years old. It will be of no use soon. The only submarine which can still carry out combat tasks [word indistinct] is 17 years old. He failed to mention that all of our professionals are effectively in the air force. But the pilots have not got the necessary number of flying hours because of the kerosene shortage. Training centers are winding up. And as a result they are loosing their professional qualifications. I do not know what he meant by professionalism but in order to resolve these problems, they have to be at least submitted for a nation-wide debate.

[Correspondent] Is it better to build the army from conscripts or to set it up according to the U.S. pattern?

[Zyuganov] In Russia we will have Russian patterns. Everything related to U.S. patterns which they were trying to develop here, from monetarism to liberalism, has led to ugly outcomes. This attempt to parody one-seventh of the world has led to genocide and unprecedented banditism which may have consequences for the whole planet. [end recording]

Russia: Zyuganov Comments on Uniting 'Third Force' Candidates

LD3005115996 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1137 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] NALCHIK, May 30 (Interfax) — Russian Communists Party leader and presidential candidate Gennadiy Zyuganov, who is currently in Nalchik within the framework of his election campaign, has told Interfax that he will hold consultations with the so-called "third force" candidates for presidency in Russia, upon his arrival in Moscow on Friday.

"The 'third force' members are competent people and we hope that we can unite our efforts," said Zyuganov and added that some provisions of his program coincide with views held by candidate and eye-surgeon Svyatoslav Fedorov.

The "third force" also includes Yabloko leader Grigoriy Yavlinskiy and Duma deputy Aleksandr Lebed. These three politicians have so far failed to agree on the creation of a single coalition in the upcoming presidential elections.

Answering an Interfax question about the idea advanced by Liberal Democrat leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy to create a Zyuganov-Zhirinovskiy-Lebed coalition, the Zyuganov said that he "had heard about this proposal but we have not discussed it yet at an expanded council." He said that the "peculiarity of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy is that any understandings with him lasts for only two hours."

Speaking about possible cooperation with other candidates for presidency, Zyuganov said that he is a supporter of the broadest coalition because "there are no winners in a ruined and humiliated country."

"Our doors are open for everyone running for the presidency today," said Zyuganov.

He said that the Popular-Patriotic Bloc led by him "stands for the signing by the candidates for the Russian presidency of an agreement to hold honest democratic elections on June 16. It is necessary to reiterate to everyone that democratic processes, the multi-party system, freedom of speech will be guaranteed in Russia. On these conditions we are prepared to cooperate with everyone who does not want war in Russia, who wants to work peacefully and honestly."

He began his visit to Nalchik, the capital of Kabardino-Balkaria on Thursday, by laying flowers on the Eternal Flame monument in memory of those killed in the years of World War II and to the monument to those killed in the civil war.

At one of the central squares in Nalchik Zyuganov laid flowers to the monument in honor of the 400th anniversary of the republic's joining Russia.

At the republic's Communist party committee, Zyuganov met with party activists of Kabardino-Balkaria and North Ossetia.

Later in the day he is to meet local voters at the auditorium of the Kuliyev Drama Theater (the former building of political education).

Russia: Professor Sees 'Paranoia' in Zyuganov

MM3005122096 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI ("Political Wednesday" section) in Russian 29 May 96 p II

[Report by Vitaliy Aminov: "Zyuganov's 'Wave' Does Not Coincide With Vector of World Development"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Professor Pavel Semenovich Gurevich, vice president of the Academy of Humanitarian Studies and a doctor of philosophy and philology, speaks of the possible outcome of the elections: "I shall not return to slavery." And he believes that he can give clinical diagnoses of present-day politicians. Actually, his great predecessor Bekhterov gave a diagnosis of Stalin. We remember the result....

[Gurevich] At our institute we decided to create a psychoanalytical portrait of Zyuganov. In our view he is a paradoxical type, which in general is very effective in politics, we can recall not only historical examples but also Zhirinovskiy. And that effectiveness contains the secret of Zyuganov's extraordinary career, which has transformed him from an ordinary apparatchik into a public leader. Zyuganov's ordinariness is borne out not only by his standard communist behavior but also by his scientific works. In politics there is madness, risk, and adventure, but usually they are based on something. Zyuganov is not a theorist, not a practical expert, not even a man who can rapidly "cotton on" with the aid of his consciousness' response activity. In him you can sense a separation from reality, a desire to live in the virtual world.

Judge for yourselves. After all, from the viewpoint of political calculation it is better if Gennadiy Andreyevich does not become president. His subconscious goal is not to his advantage! By remaining in the opposition he retains influence and social backing without being responsible for specific matters. In Italy the Communists did everything to avoid taking power and here Berlinguer was more influential than any premier. But Zyuganov is prepared to take on the fate of the country at a critical moment when he does not have to! And without having a realistic program or a constructive strategy.

Yeltsin would seem to have been in this situation five years ago. But he simply rode the crest of a wave. The fundamental difference is that then there was a real historical advance — the collapse of totalitarianism. And totalitarianism is the other side of mob rule. And that advance was no accident, it continued the political efforts begun in the pragmatic elite by Beriya, Kosygin, and Gorbachev and the dissident movement. And this wave simply coincided with the vector of all world development! So Yeltsin used populist methods to reveal the antihumane essence of totalitarianism, speaking of the dachas, special rations, and other benefits. That was how Walesa acted too.

Yeltsin's conduct fits into the framework of political science from Niccolo Machiavelli to Vilfredo Pareto. And now from the viewpoint of a psychoanalyst he has a normal and honest motive for his conduct — remaining in his post as long as he is able and he has a political goal. It is no accident that the West believes that Yeltsin belongs in the circle of pragmatist politicians. The vagaries and eccentricity of such a major personality are simply highlighted by his post: The conduct of Churchill, de Gaulle, and even Thatcher did not always coincide with ordinary people's ideas.

Zyuganov is another matter. He can be imagined on an armored personnel carrier (like Yeltsin at a proper time found himself on a tank) but not conducting an orchestra. His image is one of being humanly closed, he displays not his personality but his function. Any human type is revealed in politics. Yeltsin plays the tough guy, Zyuganov conceals his features. For us specialists complexes and subconscious problems are revealed in this concealment. He does not react like a man to questions but uses them to express whatever he has thought up, he conducts propaganda, not dialogue.

A normal picture when I receive someone in my office. I ask a question, a very simple question: "Do you have children?" And the patient avoids answering. "Do you have a lover?" There are many versions — he can joke, reply directly, break off contact, reply evasively, these are all normal human reactions. But Zyuganov gives an unpersonified reaction. To a question about his attitude toward one newspaper, for instance, he replied: "The power structures should have dealt with it long ago." I would be unable to help such a client if he wanted to be cured but did not want to unburden himself.

One more important sign of paranoia is total criticism. An example is when instead of describing the poor work of the canteen, boiler house, or ventilation, a functionary immediately generalizes: "The students are starving, dying of cold, stifling." Zyuganov also suffers from this, structuring a world of nightmares and imposing it on us: "They have destroyed everything and killed and corrupted everyone." Persecution mania — that is the diagnosis I would make and I would spend a long time with him. The Communist Zyuganov calls for everything to be changed — from economic mechanisms to school textbooks — in advance without having familiarized himself with the complete state of affairs and without even having come to power. Catastrophic thinking — that is the diagnosis. The following train of thought would be normal: "When we come to power we shall do such and such."

There is a very great deal of literature not yet translated into Russian which studies the problems of the link between a person's sex life and totalitarianism. Marcuse, Adorno, Reich, and others. I take a broader view, following the example of the "new philosophers'" school in France: Totalitarianism is the idea of psychic trouble. That can be seen in communist leaders: the desire to rule, first to create an idea and then to drive people to it in crowds. And Marxists are not worried about whether their idea accords with human nature. Marx simply declared private ownership a sin. That was because a paranoiac knows no other motivation for action except his own: "Do as I do. Human nature is like my nature. If in the sphere of thought I have proved its logical uncontradictoriness then anyone who does not follow the recommendations stemming from my thinking is an idiot." Hence the desire to control who writes and reads what books and disregard for the diversity of practical and value premises in life.

So that paranoia is the oppression of Marxist dogma and it is hard to separate it in Zyuganov from long-standing features of his character. After all, the main statement in his teaching is that philosophers in the past wanted to explain the world but we want to change it — and that is a call to violence. So Communism now declares that its main enemy is liberalism, which is tolerant of any individuality and exclusiveness.

Russia: Price of Yeltsin's Futures Exceed Zyuganov's by 8 Percent

MK3005130796 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 30 May 96 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Stock Exchange Ratings of Presidential Candidates"]

[FBIS Translated Text] On Tuesday [28 May], President Boris Yeltsin's price in futures contracts that brokers of the Russian Exchange conclude on the expected results of the first round of the presidential election exceeded that of CPRF leader Gennadiy Zyuganov by 8 percent. The results of the trading held at the exchange prove that brokers expect Boris Yeltsin to win 35 percent of the votes in the first round (up 3 percent compared to Monday's trading), whereas the CPRF leader's rating slipped by 2 percent. The ratings of the other candidates did not exceed 10 percent throughout last week. Aleksandr Lebed is the front-runner in the group of outsiders with 9.5 percent of the votes, followed by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy (7.5 percent); Grigoriy Yavlinskiy (5 percent); Mikhail Gorbachev (3.6 percent); and Svyatoslav Fedorov (3.5 percent).

Russia: Poll Says Yeltsin, Zyuganov Remain Top Runners for Presidency

LD3005120296 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1141 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 30 (Interfax) — President Boris Yeltsin and leader of the Communist Party of Russia Gennadiy Zyuganov remain the major contenders for the Russian presidency less than a month before the elections.

A total of 33 percent of those respondents who intend to participate in the elections are ready to vote for Yeltsin, while Zyuganov has the support of 26 percent in accordance with an opinion poll of 1,600 adult Russian citizens organized by the All-Russian Public Opinion Research Center (VTsIOM) in mid-May.

Yeltsin's popularity was more noticeable in a consideration of voters' intentions in the second round of elections, to be held if no one candidate gains more than 50 percent of the vote in the first round.

If Russians have to choose between Yeltsin and Zyuganov in a second round, about 50 percent of respondents are ready to vote for the current president and 37 percent for the Communist leader. A total of 7 percent are against both candidates. A total of 69 percent of respondents expressed readiness to participate in the second round of elections.

Only 24 percent of respondents believe that the situation in Russia will improve if Yeltsin remains Russian president, whereas 26 percent of respondents pin their hopes on Zyuganov.

About 44 percent of respondents backing Yeltsin believe that the situation of Russian citizens will not improve if he is elected. Fourteen percent of Zyuganov's supporters hold this view.

A total of 23 percent believe that the economic situation will worsen if Yeltsin comes to power, while 36 percent think that this will happen if Zyuganov wins the elections.

CIS: ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 31 May

LD3105092596 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0706 GMT 31 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 31 (Itar-Tass) — Follows a review of Friday's Moscow-based Russian newspapers dated May 31. The press highlights Russia's forthcoming presidential elections, due to be held on June 16.

IZVESTIYA frontpages an article headlined "What are you, President Yeltsin, a politician or statesman?"

"Russia's first President this week displays activity which beats all records — a trip to Chechnya, an address to the soldiers, the May 29 speeches at the All-Russia meeting of Defence-industry workers and at a meeting of the top brass of the Defence Ministry. A natural question arises whether Yeltsin acts as a politician or a statesman," the newspaper writes.

Friday's IZVESTIYA covers President Boris Yeltsin's Action Programme for the years 1996-2000. The programme is expected to be unveiled by the President during his stay in Perm today.

"Shaping a policy for the next four years, the President, who runs for the second term, orients himself towards the following basic values: the individual, the family, society, and the State," the newspaper writes.

"Worked out in detail are measures to support civil society. Noteworthy among them are attention to ensuring greater publicity in the functioning of power bodies, the strenghtning of the multi-party system, and protection of the freedom of mass media.

"While noting the imperfection of the electoral legislation, the President undertakes, in particular, to enhance guarantees of the representation principle, and protect the rigths of the electorate.

"The next four years are needed for the finalisation of the basic reforms launched in the previous years to take the country out to the path of a steady dynamic development," Yeltsin points out in the Programme.

IZVESTIYA on next Sunday's second round of mayoral elections in St. Petersburg.

The newspaper carries an article headlined "The election of St. Petersburg governor smacks of oil and gas".

"Scarcely had the results of the first round of election become know when the incumbent Mayor Anatoliy Sobchak stated : 'Our city is being threatened in earnest with a reversion to the Communsit past'. The mayor meant the unexpectedly high polling results achieved by First Deputy Mayor Vladimir Yakovlev: while being 5 percent behind Sobchak in the first round, Yakovlev, analysts estimate, stands all chances to win. The more so as Yakovlev allocates funds for the election campaign immeasurably.

"The origin of the funds is an open secret. It is known that they have been provided by Moscow-based entities which would like to have their own man as Mayor in St. Petersburg, who would do everything that Moscow would order him", Sobchak says.

ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI carries an article on Russia's Caucasian policy which is analysed by Professor Vladimir Pechnev, Deputy Head of the Main Programme Analytical Board of the President of the Russian Federation.

PROMYSHLENNAYA GAZETA (Industrial Gazette), a supplement to Rossiiskiye Vesti, runs an account of President Boris Yeltsin's trip to Vorkuta, his meetings with coalminers and his specific decisions aimed at settling the most difficutl problems of the region and its inhabitants.

While in Vorkuta, Yeltsin signed two Decrees: on the establishment of special railway tariffs for the transportaiton of coal produced at the Pechora Coal Fields, and on first-priority measures to remove social strain in the Pechora coal-mining area.

"The President instilled confidence in people," the newspaper writes. "The Arctic region accounts for a half of Russia. If there is no future for the Arctic region, there would be no future for Russia," Yeltsin stated.

KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA on the President's security service.

The newspaper carries an article headlined "Is the all-powerful service becoming still stronger?" "The activites of the President's security service, just as, incidentally, any other 'special' service, are always shrouded in secrecy. Legends are told and yarns are spun about the Service activities in an attempt to penetrate the veil of secrecy".

The newspaper's correspondent became the first journalist to visit the new residence of the President of Russia. The visit is described in an article headlined "Presi'dence (Presidential residence)".

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA frontpages remarks made by President Boris Yeltsin at a meeting with the commanding personnel of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation.

The newspaper also runs an article by Colonel General Viktor Barynkin, Dr. of military sciences, Head of the Main Operations Division of the General Staff, about Marshal Georgy Zhukov at the time when he held top military posts — First Deputy Minister and then the Minister of Defence of the Soviet Union.

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA on Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin's trip to Chelyabinsk region.

The article is headlined "The Premier believes in the team's success". The Premier has expressed the conviction that "We shall bring the current reforms to fruition with President Boris Yeltsin at the head."

CIS: Geneva Conference Handling CIS Migration Problem

LD3005204996 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2013 GMT 30 May 96

[By Konstantin Pribytkov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] GENEVA, May 31 (Itar-Tass) — A conference on problems of refugees and displaced persons in the CIS is working in Geneva.

The conference's decisions "are bound to strengthen the stability factor in Europe," the leader of the Russian delegation, Tatyana Regent, said in her report.

Regent is the director of the Russian Federal Migration Service.

She said in her address that "without adequate international support to the efforts of the CIS states, which are experiencing a serious migration pressure, the situation can prove critical in many respects and to be of extremely negative consequence, primarily in the field of security."

She said Russia had opened its doors wide for former Soviet citizens who want to come back to Russia which they see as their motherland.

However, everything has a cost, and sometimes the cost is above possibilities.

Russia's readiness to accept newcomers should be backed by readiness of former Soviet republics to help Russian-speakers integrate in them. This requires respect for human rights and a lack of discrimination, Regent said.

All parties benefit from this, she added.

The absence of ethnic discomfort will motivate more people to stay where they are, the migration official said.

Regent said Moscow highly appraises the efforts of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees, International Migration Organisation and the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe, who convened the conference.

Russia reaffirms its commitment to good neighbourly relations with the CIS members, she said.

Palliation of the migration problem in the CIS region is a priority task of European cooperation, Regent said, calling for backing to an action plan which the conference is to adopt.

CIS: Integration Tendencies in CIS Examined

964F2274A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 15 May 96 p 12

[Article by Professor Nabi Ziyadullayev, expert of the State Duma of the Russian Federation: "The Union of Peoples Is Indestructible, Politics Is Politics, and the Peoples Should Find Ways Toward One Another"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The idea of the unity of the peoples has always been a most striking and attractive force of mankind. For this reason the steps toward more in-depth integration that have been taken as of late, not entirely practicable, perhaps, but outwardly impressive, have encountered, despite the undue pomposity and counteraction of certain politicians, the understanding and approval of the people's masses.

The tragic nature of the new geopolitical situation that has come about as a result of the lightning disintegration of the USSR is that a historically evolved real community of people—the Soviet people—has found itself artificially divided along national and territorial lines. Not only the Russian but also all other peoples of the former Union have found themselves divided. Approximately 60 million persons, among whom there are 25 million Russians, 7 million Ukrainians, and hundreds of thousands of Belarusians, Armenians, Azerbaijanis, Georgians, Kazakhs, Tajiks, and others, live in "other" republics. They all now live in different states, which have different official languages, different laws, different currencies, and different textbooks. The younger generation is being raised, and the older generation reoriented, toward other moral, social, and cultural values. The field and possibilities of communication even of people who are closely related are narrowing. Economic motives for people's estrangement have become more forbidding than the "iron curtain" in Soviet times. Travel costs several times more than the subsistence level. Relatives have stopped flying not only for visits but even for the funerals of those near and dear to them. Nonetheless, very many persons feel themselves to be a unified people and have close family ties on the scale of the former Union and preserve strong integration stereotypes. After all, every second family in Russia has relatives in the CIS.

A people and a nation are not identical. Our people are a particular psychological, historical, spiritual, and territorial community with deeper roots than, for example, such multinational and multiethnic peoples as the Americans and the Swiss.

Nostalgic recollections of the society in which we lived, if not richly, then peacefully and amicably, looking to the future with optimism, are still strong.

Extended reintegration, therefore, is not only an economic expedient but also a perfectly necessary condition of spiritual and psychological stability.

All peoples are suffering from the disintegration, but mostly the Russian-speaking population, which has been forced to flee in the thousands from the former republics. The majority of the immigrants are composed of highly skilled specialists, who used to work not only in industry but also in research, medicine, and education. This is having a negative impact on the industrial engineering base of the new states, leading at times to the shutdown of high-technology shops and bays, and lowering productivity and product quality and competitiveness. A situation where these same specialists have to be invited to work at the same enterprises and organizations, but on contract, with payment in foreign currency, could arise in the not-too-distant future.

The loss of this component is depriving integration of its powerful social base. The national elites, having imbibed Russian culture and West European and Asiatic cultures, could be the social and intellectual support of the unity of the peoples and the in-depth integration of the post-Soviet states, not a reinforcement of the brain drain from the near abroad.

Whence arises a most important task of the authoritative political, legislative, and executive structures—the creation of conditions for the adaptation of the Russian-speaking population and its normal activity where it resides at this time. And not only from considerations of economic expediency. Russians who were born or who spent the greater part of their lives in national republics are no longer the Russians who live in Russia. They have intuited a great deal from the peoples to whose lives they have adapted. They are kinder and more hospitable, drink less, and work harder and better.

For the success of integration we should break with the isolationist language constructs in the republics and the short-sightedness of Russian policy in respect to Russian. To the extent that its role was earlier popularized and enhanced, to the same extent, particularly in the first years of sovereignization, it has been downgraded. Only in Belarus and Kyrgyzstan has Russian acquired the status of state language.

Imparting to Russian the status of official language for interstate structures and of a language equal with the native language in all the post-Soviet republics, where the national languages are the state languages de jure, and Russian, de facto, would be a practicable step of an extension of integration. Russian was and has remained a unifying factor. The language of interethnic communication is not played out!

Russian is needed by the titular nations today more than the Russians themselves. They have by means of Russian reached world science and technology, literature and culture. Political leaders and the scientific-technological intelligentsia acquired their education in Russian. They were introduced to the European way of life and thought, albeit sometimes modified by national specifics. The introduction of the national languages to the consciousness of Russians, however, is an extraordinarily complex process which is not being realized in practice. Language is mentality. Russian was introduced into the consciousness and customs of all peoples of the post-Soviet territory for centuries, and not everyone assimilated it completely. The new sovereign states have allotted five to 10 years for the compulsory knowledge of the state languages. Recognition of the impracticability of this and, most important, the subsiding of the national mood thanks to the more balanced policy of the leaders has prompted a number of countries to take practicable steps to accommodate the Russian-speaking population.

By the treaty on an intensification of integration in the economic and humanitarian spheres Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan undertook to create "the conditions for the preservation and strengthening of the common cultural space based on the historically evolved ties and business contacts between artistic unions and associations and figures of culture, literature, and art and the preservation of the ethnic and linguistic distinctiveness of the peoples." It provides for equal rights for the citizens of these states when obtaining an education, the introduction of uniform educational standards and joint programs of the tuition of students and the training and retraining of specialists, and recognition as being of equal value of the diplomas of higher educational institutions and documents on the awarding of degrees and the conferment of academic titles which are very attractive for other post-Soviet states.

Such a direction of humanitarian policy would naturally and painlessly dispose of many problems of the social tension of the peoples of each state.

Study of the question of common citizenship for all countries of the CIS with retention of the newly acquired citizenship of the sovereign state merits attention. Thus far only Turkmenistan and Tajikistan have concluded dual-citizenship treaties with Russia. Although the efficacy of these acts is perceived in extremely inadequate and contradictory fashion.

Encouraging agreements on freedom of choice and a simplified procedure of the acquisition of citizenship and on unrestricted entry and exit, the introduction of common standards of social protection, and equalization of the conditions of pensions and the levels of allowances and privileges for war and labor veterans, the handicapped, and needy families have been reached by Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan.

The adoption of a convention of the legal status of citizens of states of the CIS throughout the Commonwealth is essential for real assistance to be rendered our compatriots who have found themselves to be separated peoples against their wishes.

Human rights and the dignity of the personality cannot be reliably protected without a well-conceived policy in the sphere of citizenship in each new state. A heavy blow was delivered all peoples of the former USSR, the Russian people included, by the totalitarian system, the punitive measures, the deportations, and the disregard for national cultural values. The Bolshevik policy of standardization and centralization blunted and suppressed the natural aspiration of the peoples to self-expression and engendered the present contradictions.

The tendency connected with self-determination, however, assumed after the collapse of the USSR such an all-encompassing and all-embracing nature that it began to dominate the just as natural tendency of the peoples toward internationalization and integration.

The Russian state, just as formerly Soviet-party power, was unable to find the optimum harmony between the unity and struggle of these opposites.

National sovereignty is the pride and dignity of each people. It cannot be a subject of speculation in the political struggle. The peoples must not suffer from a differing understanding of the nationality question and the desires and ambitions of political leaders. Of course, each new independent state has its own model of political system, its own level of understanding of democracy and economic liberties, its own path toward the market and of entry into the world community. There is no doubt that national-state interests take precedence for each country, and account has to be taken of this. And the political goals which the CIS states are pursuing are very different, contradictory at times, with elements of a double policy. Which is why the question of the optimum combination of the attributes of the new statehood, recognized increasingly clearly by the day, and the will of the peoples of the Commonwealth arises in all seriousness.

The tumultuous integration pressure, aroused to a large extent by the infamous decisions of the State Duma, has switched to the practical plane, and a multi-tier structure of interaction of the new states has clearly emerged.

I. Russia, Belarus—the deepest form of community with common supranational, including political, structures of government;

II. Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan—intensified, primarily economic, integration based on customs and payments unions;

III. CIS countries—an interstate association of 12 former republics that took shape after the disintegration of the USSR;

IV. The CIS and the Baltic states—the territory of the former Soviet Union.

It is extraordinarily important that each of these systems be declared open to unrestricted withdrawal, the admittance of new members, and contacts with other international and world transnational formations.

It is profoundly symbolic that it is Russia and Belarus that were the first to take real steps toward each other. The two states have common Slav roots and a common history of many centuries, and there are not many peoples in the world whose human destiny has been so closely intertwined.

The second level of integration incorporating additionally Asiatic countries—Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan—is geopolitically no less important than the first inasmuch as it unites peoples of different faiths, blood, and culture.

Of course, neither the Russo-Belarusian Community nor the four-country treaty can serve as standard models acceptable to the other post-Soviet states, especially since there are no specific mechanisms of their realization. They are merely statements of intent requiring a tremendous number of additional and not always attainable agreements.

Possible attempts at forcible, hasty involvement or the economic compulsion of other participants in the CIS or the former CEMA could not only discredit the very idea of reintegration but also produce the reverse result. Thus immediately following the ceremonial signing by the leaders of the four of the joint documents, their rash, unguarded, and emotional remarks and the variant reading and differing understanding and, most important, multi-directionality of interests characteristic of each president perfectly reasonably pushed Kazakhstan away from the Russo-Belarusian alliance, and Uzbekistan, from the treaty of the four.

The extremely negative reaction to the accords that were achieved on the part of Ukraine, which together with the states of the Baltic has stepped up its hypocritical flirting with NATO, is well known. In turn, the West regards Ukraine strategically as a most serious counterweight to Russia's magisterial ambitions in the post-Soviet space and is for this reason encouraging the confrontation of the political leaders of the two fraternal Slav peoples in every possible way.

Turkmenistan, Moldova, and the Transcaucasus states have fenced themselves off from extended reintegration, although the celebrated "zero option," which established forgiveness for debts in exchange for political loyalty and support in the presidential race, loomed before the latter. It was the leaders of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan, incidentally, who condemned first and most sharply the State Duma's decisions on denunciation of the Belovezhskaya Agreements primarily in the interests of preservation of their own regimes, which are today not that firm.

Besides Belarus, one further state is prepared to integrate with Russia in accordance with any scenario—this is warring Tajikistan, which is rent by internal contradictions and which has long been living on Russian credit. But it is hardly likely that it will be admitted even to the Customs Union as easily as Belarus or Kyrgyzstan. Closer association with Tajikistan in deference to opportunist considerations holds for Russia the promise of it becoming bogged down in a second local conflict after Chechnya.

Thus the convergence that has begun to take shape is far less impetuous and less intensive than the disintegration that preceded it. But it is perfectly obvious that the CIS is starting to be transformed into a qualitatively new geopolitical, socioeconomic, and national-cultural infrastructure, to which there have been no counterparts in world history.

While the political sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state have been preserved, the will and actions of politicians notwithstanding, a natural transition to a revival of the historically evolved spiritual-civilization space of the artificially separated peoples as the sole possible mode of self- preservation of the new sovereign states has emerged in hitherto unknown forms and configurations.

Under today's conditions the results of the presidential elections in Russia are the catalyst which could sharply accelerate either negative or positive trends in the CIS countries.

Any political cataclysm in Moscow could instantly be echoed in other states.

The scale and speed of the reintegration processes will be determined to a considerable extent by which political forces come to be in power and by which tendencies prevail in the policy of Russia. But the mutual gravitation and will of the peoples to unity, whatever the result of the presidential elections, cannot be stopped. And the new Russian authorities will have not to rake up the past but to initiate the consistent, voluntary, mutually profitable, and deideologized development of partner relations on an equal basis, which would correspond to the fundamental interests of the peoples of both Russia and the other countries of the CIS. Such an approach would preclude a repetition of the Soviet, Bolshevik experience with its alienation and inordinate standardization and even animosity toward the national formations and would contribute to the restoration of firm political, social, and economic stability and the harmonization of interethnic relations throughout the post-Soviet space, inspired by a genuine commonwealth of peoples.

Russia: Russia's 'Vital Interests' at Stake in EU Shift

MM3005133896 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 28 May 96 p 7

["Opinion" column by Aleksandr Droban: "Subtle Policy With False Bottom"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Paris — Europe Week, which has just been celebrated in Paris, showed that the West does not intend to give up the use of different standards, notably in its approach to Russia. [passage omitted]

One or two participants in Europe Week noted that the future, strengthened EU will be faced with a choice not only in foreign policy but also in internal policy. France's C. Lalumiere, general secretary of the Council of Europe from 1989 to 1994, stated in a special publication timed to coincide with France and Germany Day: "For over 40 years the Community gave preference to decisions imbued with the spirit of liberalism and geared toward competition and free movement for the purposes of the Common Market. This was useful, but now the time has come when the Union should be focused more on social problems, on problems of solidarity. This consideration for people's everyday concerns is necessary if we want the public to support the Union." But judging by its current practice, the EU is not only a long way away from such a shift in policy, but movement has been recorded in precisely the opposite direction.

It is no secret that some people want to take advantage of the moment to openly infringe Russia's interests. The extreme example of this is, of course, NATO's eastward expansion. Active propaganda to promote this idea is continuing. In particular, the idea is being bandied about that Russia has no right to veto the decisions of other countries to join NATO. Of course there is no question of any Russian veto.

Another factor cannot help attracting attention. France and Germany Day, like all the other events, was ostentatiously held in the name of promoting the ideas of reconciliation and cooperation with France and EU unity. In principle this can only be welcomed. European integration is a positive, unstoppable historical process. But it is being driven today by definite interests.

It is from the viewpoint of these interests that reconciliation and cooperation are being stimulated in every way in the West of the continent, whereas in the East the same forces do their utmost to encourage division. Some people, for example, are assiduously driving wedges into relations between Russia and Ukraine. A campaign is being waged to intimidate the Poles and turn them against Russia. On the eve of France and Germany Day M. Stolpe, prime minister of Brandenburg Land, called for the recreation of "the historical Paris-Berlin-Warsaw axis." At the same time, the false idea of a threat to Poland from the East is being fostered and Western powers are energetically installing their agents in the executive structures of the Baltic states. At the same time, issues of Russian-Baltic relations in which the correctness of Russia's stance is recognized by a number of European organs remain unresolved.

Finally, it is impossible to ignore the fact that the blatant suppression of those who do not agree with various aspects of European policy is going on under the flag of the European right to intervene in the splintered parts of Yugoslavia. Certain West European representatives have even appropriated the right to decide which of the leaders of the local structures should be deemed lawful and which unlawful and liable to censure. However, such claims can be seen not only in small Balkan countries but also in large countries a long way from the Balkans.

It is perfectly obvious that the Western mass media are assiduously trying to drown out the voices of those citizens of East Europe (and they are possibly the majority of the population) who, having freed themselves from the Brezhnev doctrine, do not now wish their countries to be dependent on NATO, preferring to preserve their current status.

Will the peoples of the Western countries themselves, where they cannot resolve the problem of providing work for 20 million unemployed, agree to the hasty "expansion" of Europe? Sir Mallaby [as published], the British ambassador in Paris, noting that the results of referenda on the Maastricht Treaty highlighted concern and doubt in France and other countries over certain aspects of European integration, stressed: "The time has come to remember that governments must be attentive to the concerns of those whom they represent."

Russia, it seems to me, should not be indifferent to these complex and sometimes alarming phenomena that concern our vital interests.

Russia: Council of Europe Official Pleased With Chechen Accord

LD3105093496 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0845 GMT 31 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 31 (Interfax) — Chairman of the Council of Europe's Commission on Chechnya Ernst Mulemann has voiced satisfaction with the localization of the conflict in Chechnya.

Briefing Russian Interior Ministry officials on the commission's policy, he noted that it has been coordinated by the Council of Europe in contact with the Guldimann-led OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] special mission. As the body attends more to humanitarian issues and less to military matters, it wants to help the sides solve their problems precisely in the field of human rights defense, Mulemann said.

Russian Interior Minister Anatoliy Kulikov told his guest that Chechen separatists are now forcibly holding nearly 190 Russian construction workers and over 130 servicemen. Mulemann promised to help secure the hostages' release.

Russia: NATO Approach To Depend on How Post-Election Russia Acts

LD3005175096 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1611 GMT 30 May 96

[By Yuriy Kozlov and Aleksandr Mineyev]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BRUSSELS, May 30 (Itar-Tass) — NATO will judge on the outcome of Russia's presidential election not by declarations but by how Russia acts toward the world community and NATO, the alliance's Secretary-General Javier Solana said here on Thursday.

The outcome is dependent only on Russian voters, he said, adding that it is hoped that Russia will continue its reform and integration into the democratic community by showing respect for principles of democracy and of an open economy.

He went on to say that it is difficult to imagine what would happen with Russia if it isolates itself politically and economically from the outside world.

Asked whether NATO will speed its eastward enlargement with change of Russia's political leadership, Solana stressed that NATO will expand regardless of Russia's political developments, but will pragmatically react to how the situation changes.

Russia: UN Head Views CIS Peacekeeping Role

964F2268A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 15 May 96 p 4

[Interview with UN Secretary General Butrus-Ghali by Boris Dmitriyevich Pyadyshev, chief editor of the journal MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN; place and date not given: "Threat to the Existence of the United Nations: On the Eve of His Visit to Moscow, Butrus-Ghali Gives Another Reminder of States' Debts to the Organization's Coffers"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Pyadyshev] Mr. Secretary General, what is your assessment of the efforts of Russia and its CIS partners geared to the settlement of conflicts at flash points of the Commonwealth?

[Butrus-Ghali] Russia and its CIS partners have been drawn into complex situations on the territory of the members of the Commonwealth. In the majority of cases we are talking about problems involving attempts by ethnic and national groups to determine their position in the changed political situation. Whence the demand for a new form of peacekeeping operations, where the presence of peacekeepers in situ is combined with the application of instruments of preventive diplomacy for forestalling the growth of conflicts and with intensive diplomatic efforts aimed at a settlement of conflicts that have already arisen. It is extremely important to regard the conflicts in the CIS members as a short-term effect of adaptation to the new political situation. The real problems, whether humanitarian, of development, or environmental, are considerably more complex, and their resolution will, in my opinion, take considerably longer.

It will be necessary in this connection to broaden cooperation among the states of the CIS, the United Nations, and specialized institutions. It is already being pursued actively, but there is a great deal that has still to be done.

Cooperation between the CIS and the United Nations has been of a very positive and constructive nature. The CIS peacekeeping force has cooperated very closely with the UN Observer Mission in Georgia. In respect to the problem of a settlement of the conflict in Tajikistan the cooperation has been simply exemplary. This applies not only to the small observer mission but also to the inter-Tajik negotiations on the underlying political and organizational issues and a strengthening of the statehood of Tajikistan that are being held.

But cooperation among united nations should encompass something more than simply questions of peacekeeping and diplomacy. It is extremely important to go beyond the short-term outlook and to involve ourselves in the serious social and economic problems of our time.

Cooperation between the CIS and the UN system includes together with this the implementation of wide-ranging programs in conjunction with the Bretton Woods institutions: the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. An example of this close cooperation is the reserve credit recently made available to the Russian Federation by the IMF. This is also testimony to the confidence in the future economy of the Russian Federation.

[Pyadyshev] Are you of a mood to revise the role of the UN secretary general in international affairs and to extend his authority?

[Butrus-Ghali] Peacekeeping questions should be regarded as a short-term phenomenon, the growth of the scale of which has to do with difficulties of the stage of transition from a world of bipolar conflicts to a world based on the principles of multilateral cooperation. It is such a vision that defines my approach to performance of the duties of secretary general.

First, the mission of the secretary general is to ensure that all areas where there are humanitarian needs be objects of equal attention. This mission is connected with my conception of "neglected conflicts." Conflicts, particularly in Africa, in Liberia, for example, or in Afghanistan, Asia, are covered inadequately by the news media. My task in such cases is to adjust the focus and to call attention to the "neglected conflicts" and their severe humanitarian consequences.

The second mission is to prevent humanitarian operations becoming bogged down in the phase of emergency assistance to the unfortunate population. Refugees and displaced persons, as, equally, the population that has been the victim of this disaster or the other, should be encouraged with the aid of multilateral cooperation to switch from a surmounting of the consequences of the disaster to the development stage. The emergency assistance of the international community should be of a short-term nature, that is, it is essential to limit it in time in order to reduce to a minimum the burden on the international community, which has in recent years been demonstrating symptoms of compassion fatigue. After all, ultimately the resources channeled into emergency assistance limit the possibilities of support for long-term efforts for development purposes.

The third mission of the secretary general is to ensure the increased knowledgeability of the world community about current and future global problems.

The secretary general should orient the United Nations toward a vision of the future and take charge of its efforts geared to finding a solution of future global problems of the environment, social development, and the fight against the growing illicit traffic in narcotics, national crime, and terrorism.

[Pyadyshev] In speeches as of late you have been mentioning serious interrelated problems confronting the United Nations.

[Butrus-Ghali] The United Nations is experiencing two crises. First, a budgetary crisis, under the conditions of which the organization, with its enlarged mandate, is continuing its work based on a zero-growth budget for the current two-year period. This already complex task is further complicated by the fact that, according to a decision of the General Assembly, the United Nations must strive to secure a further budget savings of the order of $154 million in the current two-year period, making no changes to its program of work here.

To overcome this budgetary crisis we have urgently adopted certain measures that will have long-term consequences for the United Nations. First, I have asked department and division chiefs to revise their programs and to find ways of securing further savings. It is perfectly obvious that this will entail personnel cuts and reduced nonpersonnel spending. Both will influence the activity and services available to the members. I will always endeavor to ensure that all this have the minimum consequences for the members.

The second crisis is of a far more serious nature. It is the financial crisis. It has been caused by the nonpayment of contributions. The arrears of UN members today constitute $3 billion.

I have up to now attempted to keep to a minimum the consequences of the nonpayments or delayed payment of contributions to the regular budget by using funds from the budget for peacekeeping operations. This means that the countries that have made their troops and equipment available have not received compensation or have received it belatedly. But even this method cannot be employed forever. Members' debts to the budget for peacekeeping operations already amount to $1 billion. In the absence of sufficient payments to the regular budget, the performance of all the mandated types of activity will no longer be possible. The very existence of the United Nations will be in jeopardy.

I would like in this connection to make special mention of the plan for the payment of contributions proposed by the Russian Federation. Forward planning would make it possible to alleviate the financial crisis.

Russia: Primakov's Talks in Rome Focus on Karadzic's Fate

MK3105074396 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 30 May 96 p 4

[Report by Valeriya Sycheva from Rome under the "Yevgeniy Primakov's Italian Visit" rubric: "Radovan Karadzic Either To Go on Trial or To Be Forgotten"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] In the 24 hours he stayed on the Tiber Hills, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov paid visits to the key politicians of two states, had a lunch with the UN high commissioner for Bosnia, and held thorough conversations with his counterparts from the European Union's "trio." The most picturesque event was his "pilgrimage" to Vatican City; and the most intriguing one, his talks with Carl Bildt, which, as some believe, could influence the fate of Dr. Radovan Karadzic. [passage omitted]

Just before his departure for Belgrade, Primakov held talks with the European Union's "trio" (the former, current, and future EU chairmen). Precisely these talks provided grounds for a miniscandal, that broke out after a number of media reports about Primakov's alleged planning "to turn Karadzic in to the West." The Russian Foreign Ministry branded these suggestions as unethical and groundless, emphasizing that the foreign minister was invited to attend this meeting back in March to discuss the whole range of issues concerning Russian relations with the EU, including such burning matter as European quotas on textile imports from Russia (Russia has been insisting on increasing them, but to no avail so far).

As for the head of the Bosnian Serbs, Dr. Karadzic, his fate was the centerpiece of Primakov's meeting with Bildt, head of the mediator mission in Bosnia. Russian diplomats have been careful not to disclose the content of their conversation, citing the formula "the sides discussed implementation of the Dayton accords" and avoiding to comment on the problem that threatens to stall the peace process: the International Tribunal's intention to arrest Karadzic (it is well known that Belgrade has so far refused to extradite him and Ratko Mladic, commander of the Bosnian Serbs' armed forces, while Washington is threatening to impose sanctions on Yugoslavia). The situation is all the more sensitive because Yugoslav President [as published] Milosevic clearly wants to avoid heightening tensions in relations with the Americans (on Tuesday [28 May] he held — under U.S. pressure — secret talks with representatives of the Bosnian Serbs regarding the extradition of Karadzic and Mladic); yet it is not even so much the feelings of Serb solidarity that prevent him from "turning in" Karadzic than the inevitable outburst of indignation from the opposition camp. Karadzic's move to hand some of his powers over to Bilyana Plafsic has not resolved the problem. It is well known that Moscow has repeatedly attempted to bring judges in The Hague to reason, hinting at their biased attitude to the Bosnian Serbs. What tactics could Moscow adopt to resolve this problem? Despite the thick veil of secrecy, something could still be clarified. To all appearances, it will be attempted quietly to soft-pedal the issue. The view of the problem from the windows on Smolenskaya Square [Foreign Ministry seat] is as follows: No "obstruction of Dayton" should be allowed, but efforts should be concentrated on preparations for elections, the liberation of POW's, the settlement of the problems of refugees and foreign mercenaries, and the shutting down of channels of arms delivery to the region. At the same time, Moscow intends to draw the international peacekeepers' attention to the Serbs' having followed the letter of the agreement more conscientiously than many other parties to the conflict. Moreover, it will insist that the entire peace process should not be reduced to such a painful problem as the extradition of "war criminals," which can only create yet another threat to the fragile peace in Bosnia. To all appearances, it is this line that Primakov defended during his talks with Bildt. It is not clear yet whether he managed to convince him. After the meeting Bildt himself stepped forward with a call or a threat regarding Karadzic, that comes down to the following formula: "Step down, or you'll be sorry" (it is Milosevic who will be sorry in the first place). He added that Moscow equally wants Karadzic's "removal," while he would continue insisting that the Bosnian Serb leader be extradited to the international tribunal in The Hague. Yet, a removal and an extradition to the tribunal are different things. Bildt would not elaborate on his chances of success in his persistent campaign for the extradition of Karadzic and Mladic. A high-ranking Russian diplomat remarked straightforwardly that the process of resolving this problem would surely be hidden from journalists, given its special sensitivity. But, as the saying goes, hope dies last, and probably something can be clarified during Primakov's visit to Belgrade, where he arrived yesterday. By some accounts, Karadzic and Mladic are also staying there.

Russia: ITAR-TASS Reports Primakov Talks in Belgrade With Milosevic

LD3005174496 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1605 GMT 30 May 96

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Ivan Ivanov and Aleksandr Kondrashov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade, 30 May — "Russia and Yugoslavia have stable friendly ties based on equality, confidence, and traditional closeness of our peoples," Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov and Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic stated at the talks which took place here today.

During the talks, the sides expressed their mutual interest in developing bilateral cooperation, primarily in the economic field especially since the economic systems of the two countries are complementary, an official press release from the Serbian president's office said. In this connection, the clearing of Russia's debt to Yugoslavia was also discussed.

Primakov and Milosevic discussed the progress of peace in the Balkans and stated that mutual recognition of the states which have emerged on the territory of the former Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia is of paramount importance for the elimination of the consequences of the Balkan crisis.

Milosevic noted the importance of a continuing political dialogue between Moscow and Belgrade and asked the Russian foreign minister to convey heartfelt greetings to Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

Russia: Primakov on 'One-Sided Position' of West in Bosnia

LD3005183196 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1757 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 30 (Interfax) — Russia's participation in regulating the Bosnian crisis is a crucial counter-weight to the "one-sided position" of the West, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov told journalists Thursday upon his return from Belgrade.

"Belgrade understands this well, too," he said.

The execution of the Dayton Accords, he explained, is being carried out "under pressure from certain Western forces which still think that only one side is responsible for all the delays in realizing the agreements, as well as for the difficulties and barriers in the way of resolution."

The Dayton Accords, he said, "can be carried out only under absolute partiality toward all sides."

Demands for Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic to be given up to an international tribunal are counterproductive, he said.

"Karadzic is leaving the political scene," Primakov said. "He has given up all the responsibilities of the (Bosnian) Serb Republic presidency to his successor, and himself does not appear in public or make official statements."

Moscow agrees with Belgrade that this sort of conduct by Karadzic is "the best solution to this problem," he said.

If Karadzic is arrested and put before the International Tribunal in The Hague, as the West is demanding, this could have a negative effect on the peace process by increasing tensions in the Bosnian Serb Republic.

Deputy Foreign Minister Nikolay Afanasievskiy met with Bosnian Serb foreign representative Aleksa Buha during the Primakov team's visit to Belgrade, a delegation official told Interfax. The two discussed the realization of the Dayton Accords, as well as bilateral relations and perspectives for the economic renewal of the republic.

Russia: Primakov Questions U.S. Resumption of Sanctions Against FRY

LD3005190696 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1715 GMT 30 May 96

[By ITAR-TASS special correspondent Aleksandr Kondrashov]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 30 May — Russia's position in the peace process is respected and valued in Yugoslavia, where they can see how its constructive nature counterbalances the West's one-sided approach and attempts to place all the blame on the Serbs, Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov told ITAR-TASS today following his visit to Belgrade.

He said it was "counterproductive" to inflame passions over Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic.

Karadzic is leaving the political arena. His successor has already emerged, he has stopped making political statements, and he no longer appears in public, Primakov continued. The FRY leadership believes that the problem has thus solved itself. Some in the West, however, want to see Karadzic arrested and turned over to the international tribunal in The Hague. "I think that line is counterproductive, because it could bring additional complications and even break off the peace process."

Anyway, Primakov said, Karadzic is by no means the most important issue. Forces are now at work in Bosnia, and especially in the Muslim-Croat Federation, that are trying to undermine any elections. It is essential to hold elections to restore stability and also to help get the UN sanctions on Yugoslavia finally and fully lifted and bring that country into various international organizations.

Asked how realistic was the U.S. threat to reimpose sanctions on Yugoslavia due to the failure to hand Karadzic over to The Hague tribunal, Primakov hinted that he considered it an attempt to blackmail Belgrade.

"It is not in the West's interests to reimpose the sanctions," he continued. "There has been no fighting in Bosnia for six months now, there is progress toward a settlement and the international force there is reasonably safe. Much of the credit for that goes to President Milosevic and Yugoslavia. Reimposing sanctions would wreck the peace progress with all the ensuing consequences and risk and danger for Western troops, and would devalue their political and diplomatic efforts."

Russia: Baturin, Serb Defense Minister Discuss Dayton

LD3005224696 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 2215 GMT 30 May 96

[Received by fax]

[FBIS Translated Text] Moscow, 30 May (SRNA) — Milan Ninkovic, defense minister of the Serb Republic, and a delegation of the main headquarters of the Serb army discussed in Moscow today the implementation of the Dayton Agreement and the development of the Serb Republic armed forces with the Russian Federation president's aide for national security, Yuriy Mikhaylovich Baturin.

Baturin presented to the Serb Republic representatives Russia's stances on the problems encountered so far in the implementation of the Dayton Agreement.

Baturin showed special interest in plans for the development of the Serb Republic, about which Minister Ninkovic informed him.

The main headquarters of the Serb Republic army were represented by General Radivoje Miletic and Colonel Spasoje Orasanin.

The Serb Republic delegation will continue its visit to Moscow tomorrow with a series of official meetings.

Russia: Moscow Ready for Joint Exercises With U.S.

LD3005210596 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 2043 GMT 30 May 96

[By Anatoliy Yurkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 31 (Itar-Tass) - Russia is ready for joint Russian-American exercises aimed at working out coordinated actions in repelling missile attacks, the main department of the international military cooperation of the Russian army's General Staff told Itar-Tass on Thursday.

A group of Russian highly qualified specialists from the Headquarters of the Air Defence Force are to fly to the United States on Saturday. They have an experience in the exploitation and combat use of the latest samples of anti-aircraft weapons, including different modifications of the ZRK S-300.

The Russian delegation will be headed by General Viktor Niruk, who is considered to be one of the best organisers of combat operations on covering objects and troops from air and missile strikes of the enemy.

The five-day exercises of Russian and American air forces will start in the United States on June 3 at the Falcon [as received] military base. According to the specialists, coordinated operations at repelling missile attacks will dominate military exercises in the near future.

The combat situation will be computer imitated. The efficiency of computer results will be then analysed at military analytical centres in Russia and the United States. The optimum models of repelling attacks will then be used as a basis for coordinated actions in air defence.

During the exercises, the specialists and scientist will compare the professional levels of Russian and American specialists representing two different schools which until recently used to be secret.

It is not ruled out that the American side will compare the combat possibilities of its Patriot missile complex with its Russian S-300 analogue. It may then use the results in working out new battlefield anti-missile systems.

Russia: Air Force Official Says No Delivery of MiG-29s to DPRK

LD3105105396 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1046 GMT 31 May 96

[By Anatoliy Yurkin]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 31 (Itar-Tass) — "MiG-29 fighter planes were not delivered to North Korea," an Air Force general, spokesman for the Russian Air Force, told Tass today. He added that in Soviet times MiG-29 planes had been supplied only to units of the Soviet Air Force and had not been delivered to other countries, even friendly ones.

Specialists from the Rosvooruzhenie company did not confirm either the fact of MiG-29 deliveries to North Korea. A representative of the company, who worked in the sphere of aircraft exports for a long time, told Tass that "there were no planned deliveries of planes of this class."

Reports saying that North Korea possesses the most up-to-date combat planes began to appear in the foreign press after "revelations" of a North Korean defector who hijacked to South Korea an old MiG-29 plane this month.

Air Force pilots do not rule out a possibility that a few Mig planes could be assembled at North Korean aircraft building plants, using parts and units of Soviet make. Specialists from the Air Force Staff believe one or two fighter planes of this type might be assembled in this way, but, in their opinion, North Korea would need its own pilots trained in Russia for handling them. According to a high-ranking representative of the

Russian Air Force, no pilots from North Korea were trained at the Russian Air Force training centres over the past several years.

Russia: Moscow May Build Nuclear Power Station in China

LD3005152096 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1236 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 30 (Interfax) — Russia and China may sign a contract before the end of 1996 on the construction of a nuclear power station in the northwestern Chinese Province of Liaoning, Viktor Kozlov, director general of the state-owned Atomenergoeksport company, told Interfax.

The two sides are now negotiating details of the contract, in particular the financing of the project.

An agreement on construction was signed by the Russian and Chinese governments in December 1992. If the construction starts in 1996, one power unit could be commissioned in 2002 with another following two years later. VVER-1000 double-hull reactors will be used in both units.

The St. Petersburg-based Atomenergoproyekt research institute will design the station, the Izhorskiye Zavody works will manufacture the reactors, the Elektrosila works will make the generators and the Leningrad Metal Works will produce the turbines. Nuclear Control, a joint venture between Siemens and the Russian Nuclear Energy Ministry, will make the automatic control system under a Siemens license.

If the contract is signed, the Russian Government will make a $2.5 billion credit available to China at a 4 percent annual interest rate. The credit will be repaid in 13 years after the commissioning of the first power unit. Part of the credit has already been made available for the feasibility study.

The construction site was approved in China in 1995, Kozlov said. It was chosen by Russian engineers working under a $5 million contract.

Russia: 'Clean Fusion' Bomb Could Be 'Ideal' for Terrorists

MM3005102096 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 25 May 96 p 3

[Report by Vladimir Skosyrev: "U.S. and Russian Nuclear Scientists Could Inadvertently Hand Terrorists the Bomb"]

[FBIS Translated Text] London — Recently U.S. and Russian scientists started work on a joint project to create cheap fusion energy, using technology that is fundamentally different from what has been used before. But the end result could be a model miniature neutron bomb — an ideal weapon for terrorists.

The new approach calls for a modest quantity of explosive — approximately 45 kg — to turn chemical energy into an extremely intense electrical pulse. This pulse should generate a powerful magnetic field, which, in turn, would compress a mixture of deuterium and tritium (heavy isotopes of hydrogen), thus causing a thermonuclear fusion reaction. The tests of this very sophisticated equipment will cost approximately $250,000.

Around 16 experiments of this kind were carried out approximately a year ago at the U.S. nuclear research complex in Los Alamos and at Arzamas-165 in Russia. The amount of fusion energy obtained in these experiments was millions of times less than is required for a significant nuclear explosion. But the experiments were successful in another respect: The process of thermonuclear "combustion" turned out to be the same as in a neutron bomb, in which the combustion of a mixture of deuterium and tritium leads to the release of lethal neutrons.

In other words, it will probably be years before the object of these experiments — to obtain a source of abundant and cheap energy — is achieved. Meanwhile Russian and U.S. scientists have invented a device which could be used in battle and in terrorist acts.

What was successfully tested bears all the hallmarks of a "clean fusion" neutron bomb. A device of this type does not require plutonium or other fissionable materials, unlike the traditional neutron weapons developed in the United States. The latter could not be very small, since a great deal of fissionable material was required for the explosion. But the new "clean fusion" device can be extremely small. This creates the horrific prospect of the appearance of miniature neutron bombs.

At the moment the devices being tested are relatively cumbersome, but then the first atom bombs were like that. Ten years later a warhead the size of a football was developed. Presumably similar miniaturization will take place in the case of the new neutron bombs. So initially they will be carried in vehicles, and then in suitcases. It would take only one explosion of this kind near the White House to knock out nearly all electronic equipment, and government would cease to exist.

What is to be done, then? Stop work on the project or continue work, but make it top-secret? The United States has invested too much political capital and money into cooperation with Russia to freeze the project.

Russia: Russia 'Downplayed' Iraqi Success Because of U.S. Concerns

MM3005153996 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 30 May 96 p 5

[Report by correspondent Dmitriy Kulik under the rubric "What Will It Mean to Us?": "Oil Drop by Drop for Saddam Husayn"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Damascus — So the United Nations has given Iraq permission to sell oil in exchange for food and medicines. This means that every 30 days Baghdad will be able to export "black gold" worth a sum of $1 billion.

But the world press is for some reason keeping quiet about Russia's role in the adoption of this decision, which is vitally important to the Iraqis. However, it was Moscow that last year worked for the appearance of UN Resolution 986, which was immediately dubbed "oil for food." True, at that time not only the Americans but also Saddam Husayn himself opposed its implementation. The Iraqi leader hoped to be able to remove the embargo on his country entirely, but that, as is well known, did not happen.

The disastrous economic situation in Iraq made the "unbending Saddam" agree to the UN resolution after all. However, Baghdad is confident that the present exports of oil in exchange for food and medicine are only the first stage on the road to the total lifting of the sanctions that have been in force since 1990 as punishment for the occupation of Kuwait. The oil industry must at last be revived after heavy years of isolation.

In the opinion of Iraqi experts, to bring oil extraction back up to the prewar level will take the country three years and cost $25 billion. The main problem at the moment is spare parts. And here Iraq's oil men are looking toward Russia, with which they are linked by old and strong economic ties.

Our industrialists, in turn, have wasted no time and are already prepared, if the Kremlin gives the "go-ahead," to begin deliveries of essential output. Our country could do with the extra money and jobs. Russia's major oil companies have been engaged in successful talks on cooperation with Iraq for some years. The obvious leader in this respect is "Lukoil," which won a tender last year for the development of a vast oil deposit in western Iraq.

At first glance the situation now looks surprising: Moscow has as much of an interest as Baghdad does in alleviating and then totally lifting the embargo. The Iraqis are promising gradually to repay to Russia the debt of $7 billion, and Iraq's promises are most likely not just a political move. People nowadays try to forget a certain fact from the history of our relations. But Iraq, unlike the majority of "third world" countries, used to pay the Soviet Union and Russia the money due under contracts and deliveries on time and meticulously. This practice, advantageous to Moscow, continued right up to 1991.

Our diplomats' successes on the "Iraqi front" are now being deliberately downplayed. Before the elections, the Kremlin does not want to complicate relations with the Americans, for whom the "Iraqi question" remains very painful. At the same time, at diplomatic level, far from the public gaze, the problem of Iraq has already become a bone of contention between the mighty powers.

This became clear, in particular, during the work of UN "committee 661," which monitors the fulfillment of the resolution on Iraq. This oversight body includes representatives of 15 states. True, two camps have emerged in the "neutral" "committee 661": opponents and supporters of alleviating sanctions. The first camp is headed by the Americans and the British, and in the second the Russians and French are particularly active. Paris, like Moscow, is making serious efforts to gain a foothold on the Iraqi market. Even at the height of the embargo the French oil giants continued to cooperate with the Iraqis. Incidentally, the Italians were not far behind. [passage omitted]

The main thing for Iraq now is to establish itself on the oil market and attract investors. In Moscow wise businessmen do not forget that Iraq remains one of the few countries in the world where doors behind which there lie profits amounting to billions are still open to Russians....

Russia: Integration, Caspian Pipeline Deal Linked

964F2268B Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 30 Apr 96 p 1

[Article by Olga Romanova: "Troubadours of Integration"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The indestructible union of the peoples of Russia and Kazakhstan and also certain other interested peoples will henceforward have a substantial material foundation. This foundation is long-term and inexhaustible and is not dependent on a possible change of political predilections, authorities, and regimes—it is being fed continuously by a large quantity of oil. It is called the KTK—the Caspian Pipeline Consortium.

The signing of documents on the reorganization of the KTK on Saturday in the course of Boris Yeltsin's visit to Kazakhstan is undoubtedly a historic event. Everything is filed away in the folder containing these papers—confirmation of Russia's influence in the Caspian region, the strengthening of its status as a world oil exporter, recognition of the Russian and foreign oil companies as full partners in the "project of the century," and an end to the insinuations, as Nursultan Nazarbayev put it, in respect to the routes of the delivery of Caspian oil for export to Europe. Generally, friendship multiplied by export earnings and a pumping tariff.

Three years ago, at the time of the creation of the KTK, only two states—Kazakhstan and Oman—were taking part in the project. And it was not known in what such friendship might end for Russia: The pipeline could perfectly well have detoured its way to Europe, via Ukraine and Turkey, for example, which would have hit Russian exports very hard. Russia joined the consortium a month after it was formed, though, and the three partners acquired equal 33.3 percent shares in the project. There was then a hitch: Russia and Kazakhstan contributed their share to the installations proper, Oman was responsible for the actual money—the attraction of investments to the project worth more than $1 billion. Oman failed to cope with its task, and the shares were adjusted: 25 percent each for the participants, and it was proposed that the American Chevron fund a large part of the project for 25 percent participation. Chevron gave thanks for the confidence and declined. As a result, after three years of continuous negotiations, the parties reached an agreement which suits all: Russia gets 24 percent, Kazakhstan, 19 percent, and Oman, 7 percent. The remaining share has been divided among the oil companies that have become participants in and potential shareholders of the KTK: Russian (LUKoil and Rosneft), Kazakhstani, and American (including Chevron, which acquired 15 percent) and also British and Italian.

"Russia for a long time disagreed with the distribution of the shares in the KTK, but we are now satisfied with the share that we have obtained," Boris Yeltsin declared in Almaty. Immediately following the signing of the protocol, he emphasized that "there are no political, economic, financial, or international problems" in the relations of Russia and Kazakhstan. Which is perfectly natural: friendship with Kazakhstan is not friendship with Belarus, which is based mainly on Mr. Lukashenka's heightened springtime attraction to his "big brother."

This, generally, is probably what normal integration should look like. Construction of the pipeline is a solution both of present and future problems of both Russia and Kazakhstan and also of Azerbaijan and Georgia inasmuch as Azerbaijani oil will flow via the pipeline to Europe, and one route will run via Georgia. In addition, Russia's oil companies, which will take part in the development of the deposits of the Caspian, whose oil reserves could exceed all expectations, particularly if account is taken of the Caspian shelf, acquire a new field of activity, which is interesting in all respects. Besides, there are no swamps, winter, or permafrost in these places. Naturally, the companies will be followed (or preceded) by banks, which, under certain conditions, are typified by a gravitation toward many interesting things, iron and steel and chemical industry, for example.

These are signs of developed integration. Elections, the factor of which is determining an intensification of the "better wait a while" mood, particularly among business representatives, stand in its way as yet. But this factor is not operating in respect to the KTK, it would seem. The KTK Production Committee will have been formed by the end of May, and potential shareholders will become actual shareholders in the latter half of July. As a participant in the signing of the historic protocol told SEGODNYA, "oil is a perpetual category, and it is not pumped without pipes. Both democrats and Communists need oil."

The pipe is calling, more precisely, constraining both to integration. The Communists, even were they greatly to so desire, cannot bring back the USSR, even by denouncing the Belovezhskaya Agreements thrice. Invisible borders can be abolished and phantom interstate financial and industrial groups established, but the Minsk demonstrators will still chant "long live independent Belarus," all the same. That which is unwilling and cannot unite cannot be compelled to unite. And there is no friendship stronger or more sincere than friendship kneaded in mutual economic interest.

Political Issues

Russia: Satarov: Communists Could Provoke State of Emergency

MM3005142296 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 31 May 96 p 1

[Report by Anatoliy Stepovoy: "Communists Preparing for Strong-Arm Confrontation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A danger of serious political destabilization, menacing the country with civil war, is linked not only with the Communists' possible victory in the election, but also with their defeat, Georgiy Satarov, the Russian Federation president's aide, stated at a news conference 30 May. He reported that the Communists are preparing a scenario for launching a campaign to discredit the results of the election following their defeat. This campaign, Satarov believes, will result in the "coronation" of Zyuganov as the "genuine" winning candidate, and his being set against the candidate announced by the Central Electoral Commission. According to this scenario, the Communists will provoke the authorities to take retaliatory measures, prompting the introduction of a state of emergency in the country. According to available information, the opposition's combat detachments will be ready for action even before 16 June, our correspondent Anatoliy Stepovoy reports.

Russia: Protection Directorate Renamed, Subordinated to President

MK3005130196 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 30 May 96 p 1

[Unattributed report: "President Will Take Personal Charge of Top Officials' Protection"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The Main Protection Directorate will in the near future be renamed the Russian Federation Federal Protection Service [FSO — Federalnaya sluzhba okhrany]. However, no repeat efficiency ratings or reappointment of the staff will be carried out.

The fact is that Boris Yeltsin signed a federal law "On State Protection" the other day. Under the new law, eight top state positions are subject to state protection. These are the positions of president; prime minister; speakers of both houses of the Russian parliament; chairmen of the Constitutional Court, Supreme Court, and Higher Court of Arbitration; and general prosecutor.

The federal state protection bodies shall be controlled by the president. Also within his competence is the reorganization, abolition, and creation (!) of state protection subunits.

SBP [Presidential Security Service] and FSO operatives are permitted to use physical force, special assets, and weapons in repulsing attacks or attempted attacks on those subject to state protection. They are prohibited from the use of special assets and weapons against women, disabled persons, and minors excepting cases where the latter offer armed resistance. Operatives of state protection organs shall not be responsible for moral, material, and physical damages done by them in repulsing an attack. The head of their subunit shall inform the prosecutor of all cases of the death of or wounds sustained by attackers.

Russia: Edict, Statute on Law Enforcement Agencies Published

964F2272A Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 5 May 96 p 7

[Edict and Statute of the President of the Russian Federation: "On Coordination of the Activity of Law Enforcement Agencies in Fighting Crime"]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Edict of the President of the Russian Federation "On Coordination of the Activity of Law Enforcement Agencies in Fighting Crime"

In compliance with Article 8 of the Federal Law "On the Procuracy of the Russian Federation" I decree:

The appended Statute on Coordination of the Activity of Law Enforcement Agencies in Fighting Crime shall be approved.

[signed] President of the Russian Federation B. Yeltsin

[dated] Moscow, the Kremlin, 18 April 1996
No. 567

Statute "On Coordination of the Activity of Law Enforcement Agencies in Fighting Crime"

I. General Provisions

1. Coordination of the activity of internal affairs agencies of the Russian Federation, agencies of the Federal Security Service, federal agencies of the Tax Police, customs agencies of the Russian Federation, and other law enforcement agencies shall be provided for purposes of increasing the effectiveness of the fight against organized crime through the development and implementation by these agencies of coordinated actions for promptly discovering, solving, interrupting, and preventing crimes and eliminating causes and conditions contributing to their commission.

2. Coordination of the activity of law enforcement agencies for fighting crime shall be provided in compliance

with the Constitution of the Russian Federation, federal laws, and also the present Statute.

3. In compliance with Part 1 of Article 8 of the federal law "On the Procuracy of the Russian Federation," the activity of law enforcement agencies for fighting crime shall be coordinated by the general procurator of the Russian Federation, procurators of components of the Russian Federation, cities and rayons, and other territorial procurators and also by military and other specialized procurators on an equal footing with them.

Coordination of the activity of law enforcement agencies, taking the crime situation into account, may be provided at an interregional level on instructions from managers of federal law enforcement agencies or in coordination with them.

4. Coordination of the activity of law enforcement agencies in fighting crime shall be provided on the basis of:

compliance with the law;

equality of all participants in the coordination activity when raising questions, making suggestions, and developing recommendations and measures;

independence of each law enforcement agency within the authority granted to it by legislation of the Russian Federation when making coordinated decisions and recommendations and conducting measures;

public access to the extent that it does not contradict the requirements of legislation of the Russian Federation concerning protection of the rights and freedoms of the individual and the citizen or state or other secrets protected by law;

responsibility of the manager of each law enforcement agency for the execution of coordinated decisions.

II. Basic Areas of Coordinated Activity

5. Law enforcement agencies shall carry out:

joint analysis of the condition of crime, its structure and dynamics, prognostication of tendencies toward development, study of the practice of disclosing, investigating, solving, preventing and interdicting crimes;

implementation of federal and regional programs for fighting crime;

development in conjunction with other state agencies and also scholarly institutions of proposals for preventing crime;

development and, when necessary, forwarding of information materials on questions of fighting crime to the president of the Russian Federation, the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Russian Federation, agencies of state power of components of the Russian Federation, and also local self-government agencies;

generalization of the practice of the application of laws on fighting crime and preparation of proposals for improving law enforcement activity;

development of proposals for improving legal regulation of the activity for fighting crime;

generalization of the practice of the execution of international treaties of the Russian Federation and agreements with foreign countries and international organizations regarding questions of cooperation in fighting crime and the development of the corresponding proposals;

study of coordinated activity of law enforcement agencies and dissemination of positive experience.

6. Coordination of the activity of law enforcement agencies shall be carried out in the following main forms:

conducting of coordinating conferences of managers of law enforcement agencies;

exchange of information on questions of fighting crime;

joint travel to regions for conducting coordinated actions, inspections and rendering of assistance to local law enforcement agencies in fighting crime and studying and disseminating positive experience;

creation of investigation-operations groups for investigating specific crimes;

implementation of joint targeted measures to disclose and interdict crimes and also to eliminate causes and conditions contributing to their commission;

mutually taking advantage of capabilities of law enforcement agencies for increasing the qualifications of workers and conducting joint seminars and conferences;

rendering of joint assistance in providing for internal security during process of the activity for fighting crime;

publication of joint orders and instructions and preparing informational letters and other organizational-executive documents;

issuing joint bulletins (collections) and other informational publications;

development and improvement of coordinated plans for coordinated activity.

The choice of the aforementioned and other forms of coordinating activity shall be determined by its participants based on the specific situation.

Material and technical support for coordinated activity shall be the responsibility of its participants.

III. Authority of Participants in Coordinated Activity

7. For purposes of providing for coordination of the activity of law enforcement agencies the procurator shall convene coordination conferences. The coordination conference shall include the procurator (chairman of the conference) and leaders of their corresponding law enforcement agencies or their deputies (members of the conference). The conference shall be convened by the chairman when necessary but no less frequently than once a quarter and also on the initiative of one of the members of the coordination conference.

Other officials of law enforcement agencies, leaders of federal agencies of state power, agencies of state power of components of the Russian Federation and their subdivisions, agencies of local self-government, agencies of military administration, public associations, scientific and pedagogical workers, and representatives of the mass media may be invited to the coordination conferences. A coordinated resolution concerning their participation shall be adopted by members of the coordination conference.

Representatives of control agencies and other state agencies may be enlisted to prepare questions to be considered at the coordination conference and participate its work.

Members of the coordination conference shall enjoy equal rights in the discussion of questions.

8. A resolution of the coordination conference shall be drawn up in written form and considered for adoption if it has been approved by the managers of law enforcement agencies responsible for its implementation. Managers of law enforcement agencies in executing resolutions of the coordination conference shall issue orders, instructions, and directives, and take the corresponding organizational-executive measures. If several law enforcement agencies participate in the implementation of a resolution, organizational support shall be provided by the agency indicated first in the resolution.

Resolutions of the coordination conference shall be signed by its chairman and the managers of the law enforcement agencies who are responsible for its implementation, and the minutes of the coordination conference—by its chairman.

Managers of law enforcement agencies who are members of the coordination conference shall provide for implementation of resolutions adopted with respect to the duties and jurisdiction of the agencies they head.

9. The chairman of the coordination conference shall:

convene the coordination conference;

order information necessary for organizing the coordination activity;

organize work groups of representatives of law enforcement agencies;

appoint from among procuracy workers an official secretary of the coordination conference who shall be in charge of the secretariat of the coordination conference.

10. Members of the coordination conference shall:

make suggestions regarding questions pertaining to coordination activity, with a justification of the need for their consideration and ways and methods of resolving them;

submit in compliance with a coordinated procedure drafts of documents and other materials requiring discussion and the adoption of a resolution;

participate in the discussion and development of resolutions regarding questions brought up for consideration;

determine the participants in work groups;

make suggestions regarding an evaluation of the effectiveness of joint resolutions that have been adopted and measures for implementing them.

11. For purposes of preparing materials and drafts of documents regarding specific issues raised for the consideration of the coordination conference, gathering and, when necessary in this connection, forwarding information to various state agencies and interacting with the mass media, work groups shall be organized.

12. The secretariat of the coordination conference shall be formed from representatives of all law enforcement agencies.

The secretariat of the coordination conference shall:

conduct current organizational work;

keep documentation of the coordination conference in compliance with requirements of secret correspondence;

notify members of the coordination conference and individuals invited to participate in it of the conference agenda with the attachment of draft documents subject to discussion and other materials;

organize the preparation and submission of proposals from law enforcement agencies regarding the plan of work of the coordination conference;

draw up drafts of plans for work and submit them for consideration to representatives of law enforcement agencies;

analyze the course of the implementation of plans and resolutions of the coordination conference and inform its chairman of the results;

carry out other instructions from the chairman of the coordination conference.

13. Drafts of documents regarding the question under consideration at the coordination conference shall be prepared by the law enforcement agency that took the initiative to submit the proposal for its consideration or a work group created for these purposes from among representatives of the corresponding law enforcement agencies.

IV. Interaction with Courts and Justice Agencies

14. For purposes of increasing the effectiveness of the coordination of the activity of law enforcement agencies there shall be interaction with the courts and justice agencies.

Interaction with the courts and justice agencies may be carried out in the following coordinated form:

mutual information about the condition of crime and the judicial system;

utilization of data from judicial statistics and materials from judicial practice when developing measures for stepping up the fight against crime;

joint work for preparing draft laws concerning fighting crime;

joint seminars and conferences and the participation of the corresponding specialists in the work of improving the qualifications of workers of law enforcement agencies;

forwarding of joint information letters, reference materials, and surveys;

participation in the preparation of decrees of the Plenum of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation and the Plenum of the High Arbitration Court of the Russian Federation.

Representatives of courts and managers of justice agencies may participate in coordination conferences of law enforcement agencies.

15. Interaction between law enforcement agencies and the courts regarding questions of fighting crime shall be provided in compliance with principles of independence of agencies of judicial power, independence of the courts, and their subordination only to the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws.

Military Issues

Russia: Yeltsin, Pak, Kokoshin Address Defense Industry Conference

MM3005132496 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 May 96 p 1

[Report by Valentin Rudenko: "Russian President Promises Support for Defense Industry"]

[FBIS Translated Text] An All-Russia Conference of Defense Industry Workers has taken place in the House of Unions' Hall of Columns. Taking part in the conference were Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Russian Federation Government Chairman Viktor Chernomyrdin, leaders of federal legislative and executive branch organs and Russia's defense-oriented regions, general directors and general designers of over 500 industrial enterprises, design bureaus, and scientific research institutes, and representatives of banks and public associations.

Russia's world position and its role as a great power are largely determined by the defense industry's very high standard, Russian President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin noted in his speech. The transition to the market has hit the defense industry badly. But in these difficult conditions it has in the main been possible to preserve its scientific and technological and production potential, which is a great achievement by labor collectives, the directors' corps, and chief designers.

The most important task now is to devise measures which will enable the defense industry to reach new heights and become a highly efficient sector of the national economy. Conversion of defense production must on no account reduce the country's defense capability. The sector's unique scientific and technological potential must be used to the maximum benefit of the country's defense capability and in the interests of producing dual-purpose output and output for peaceful purposes.

In connection with the fact that the Armed Forces are beginning a new phase of reform and a gradual transition to military service on a professional basis, it is necessary to sharply increase the effectiveness, reliability, and economic efficiency of weapons and military equipment, the president said. He named the defense industry's key problems as creating the economic conditions needed to improve military and dual-purpose technologies, increasing production of the latest weapons, and developing export potential.

Defense Industry Minister Zinoviy Pak's report talked about the specific measures which are already being taken to stabilize the economic situation in defense sectors of industry and to implement the president's edicts unconditionally. He named the most important tasks as being to impose order in the formulation and funding of the state defense order, to speed up the elaboration of a long-term weapons program, to implement measures to maintain mobilization capacities, and to develop a unique scientific and technical base for defense enterprises.

Commenting on the results of the All-Russia Conference of Defense Industry Workers, First Deputy Defense Minister Andrey Kokoshin noted that the conference was highly representative. It discussed the most important questions as regards ensuring the country's defense capability, technically equipping the Armed Forces, and structurally reorganizing the defense industry.

Given the insufficient funding of the state defense order, the main burden lies on the Defense Ministry budget. Last year the Defense Ministry's superhuman efforts made it possible to fund the state order at approximately 95 percent of the funds approved by the budget. At the same time as conversion programs were funded at 22-24 percent and the Ministry of the Defense Industry's civilian programs at less than 70 percent.

When talking about the need to increase expenditure on defense research and development, on purchasing weapons and military equipment, and on carrying out the retooling of defense production facilities, the first deputy defense minister stressed that these measures should be envisaged when formulating the 1997 federal budget. Here special attention should be paid to the comprehensive development of so-called critical dual-purpose technologies, which ensure the creation of the long-term scientific and technical foundation needed to equip the Armed Forces in the future.

Russia: Text of Yeltsin Speech to Army, Navy Leadership

MM3005192096 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 May 96 p 1

[Speech by Russian President Boris Yeltsin: "I Will Adopt All Measures To Comprehensively Support the Army and Navy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Speaking at the conference of the leadership of the Army and Navy 29 May, Russian Federation President B.N. Yeltsin made a high assessment of the military labor of Russian servicemen, and expressed satisfaction with the work of the Armed Forces leadership and the Russian Federation defense minister.

Last week was marked by a whole series of important steps on the part of Russian President B.N. Yeltsin, testifying to his special attention to the Armed Forces. The edict on transferring to a professional army by the year 2000, the Letter from the Supreme Commander in Chief to Army and Navy Servicemen, the trip to Chechnya and his direct address, with words of support and gratitude, to the servicemen there, who are performing their constitutional duty in the "hot spot".... And finally, the president's speech to the Armed Forces leadership. This whole crucial series of serious political documents, statements, and meetings expresses the president's consistent stance, which consists in the desire to strengthen the Armed Forces and to support the activity conducted in this sphere by commanders and leaders at all levels and the leadership of the Ministry of Defense.

The numerous "prophets," who had predicted that the president would announce some "sensational decisions" and carry out some cadre appointments during this particular conference of the leadership of the Armed Forces, once again found themselves disgraced. Throughout his entire address B.N. Yeltsin showed clearly that he does not intend to destabilize the situation in military collectives or the Ministry of Defense for reasons of convenience, and that it is far more important to him to point the Army at specific tasks and at the difficult and consistent work to be done in reforming the Armed Forces. The speech at the conference of the leadership of the Armed Forces constituted another component of the specific presidential program aimed at this.

The president has given support to the Army and its leadership. In their turn, many speeches during the conference repeatedly voiced words of support for the policy of the president both in the sphere of economic and political transformations in the country and in the sphere of military organizational development.

By and large, the conference clearly showed, as Defense Minister Army General Pavel Grachev noted in his concluding speech, that a collective of like-minded people, professionals, people devoted to their cause, capable of performing any tasks set by the country's leadership, has now formed in the Armed Forces leadership.

Given the policy [programmnyy] nature of the Russian president's speech at the conference of the Army and Navy leadership, we are publishing its full text.

Speech by Russian Federation President B.N. Yeltsin to the Russian Federation Armed Forces Leadership

Esteemed Comrades!

I would like to begin my speech with some words of gratitude to servicemen in the Joint Grouping of Federal Forces in the Chechen Republic. For 18 months Russian servicemen have been protecting Russia's national interests in combat conditions, they have been risking their lives and shedding blood for the unity and territorial integrity of our country. They are in the front line of the fight not just against Chechen gunmen, but against international terrorists — against everyone who is bringing death to civilians, everyone who takes hostage sick people, children, and pregnant women, and everyone who is prepared to sacrifice the entire Chechen people for the sake of selfish aims. The heroic servicemen have broken the resistance of the gunmen, and have worn out and demoralized them. Russian servicemen have protected the Stavropol area, Krasnodar Kray, the whole of the North Caucasus, and the whole of Russia against the wave of terrorism. In the Chechen Republic they have once again displayed military valor and steadfastness, loyalty to their oath, and love for the fatherland.

The peace talks have begun thanks to their efforts. An agreement on a complete cease-fire and the cessation of combat actions as of 0000 1 June 1996 was reached with Yandarbiyev in the Kremlin 27 May. I demand that this be drawn up in an order and carried out unconditionally. Every shot will be investigated to find out the reason why it occurred. We have agreed to release within two weeks all who are being forcibly kept captive. A peace agreement has de facto been signed in Moscow. The combat task set for the Joint Grouping of Federal Forces has been carried out. The federal forces have protected the integrity of the state's territory, and ensured the reestablishment of constitutional order in the Chechen Republic.

But I must honestly admit that the authorities, politicians, and the military leadership have made mistakes. Lack of coordination in their actions, or simply unprofessionalism, have sometimes led to substantial losses both among the troops and among the civilians. Blunders in state policy in Chechnya and swings from one extreme to another have frequently put the Army in an ambiguous position.

Undoubtedly the lack of experience in settling such conflicts within the country had a big influence here, and it is now necessary to create the conditions for the complete disarmament of the unlawful armed formations and the phased withdrawal of the troops from the Chechen Republic. It is important not to repeat last year's mistake, and not to let the gunmen recover following severe defeats.

Unfortunately, not everyone in Chechnya is accepting the peace. Uncoordinated groups, such as the small groups of the hard-line opposition, will not lay down arms straight away. Any attempts to resume terrorist activity must be countered by tough retaliatory measures.

Yesterday, when I was visiting Chechnya, I was able to see the difficult conditions in which our servicemen have managed to achieve such a positive result. There, in the "hot spot," you can perceive the weak points of our Armed Forces and the need for radical military reform particularly keenly.

But it is not only the Chechnya experience that is forcing us to draw this conclusion. Despite the considerable reduction in international tension, the problem of military security continues to exist for the Russian Federation. The countries of the West and the United States are continuing the line of consolidating their world leadership and are trying to use the changes in the international situation in their own interests, moving the NATO war machine to the East.

By 1992 we were already convinced that a revision of approaches to military organizational development was necessary. Russia needs a modern, combat-capable, mobile army capable of ensuring the state's defense and security. It is also necessary to take account of the fact that the danger of a large-scale war being unleashed has lessened significantly. The changes in Russia's geopolitical position demanded the creation of new groupings on the basis of strategic sectors. A unique redeployment of troops from the territory of other states was carried out in a short space of time. Approximately 1,200 people, tens of thousands of pieces of combat equipment, and strategic stockpiles of arms and military property were withdrawn to Russia in less than three years. The world had never seen anything like it. Service under contract has become a reality. A considerable amount has been done in solving social problems. A program to build housing for servicemen has been launched. It envisages the commissioning of more than 120,000 apartments in 1996-1997.

On the whole I am satisfied with the work of the Ministry's leadership personnel and the minister of defense. At the same time it must be admitted that not everything is going well in the organizational development of the Armed Forces and other Russian Federation troops. The transformations have proved to have a high price for the Russian Army. In a number of most important sectors of military organizational development the situation remains difficult to this day. I talked about this yet again in my letter to Armed Forces personnel. There is an acute disparity between the requirements for maintaining them and the country's real potential. The reduction of the Russian Armed Forces by more than 1 million servicemen has not reduced the total personnel strength of the state military organization, as we had hoped. There is some lack of integration in the development of power structures and disunity and lack of coordination in their activity.

I am profoundly convinced that all these problems cannot be solved by individual, partial measures. I repeat, military reform is needed. In the middle of last year I adopted an edict which determined the directions of military organizational development in the Russian Federation. This is essentially the first program document concerned with the implementation of military reform. Its main objective is to create a professional army enjoying the people's support, provided with everything it needs, and at the same time affordable by society.

Let me turn to the Chechen experience again. Surely it cannot be normal for poorly trained first-year conscripts to be fighting against professional mercenaries who are experienced and adult? No, this should not be. Instead of several hundred divisions, most of which exist only on paper, we need a few dozen divisions. But they must be fully manned by professionals.

You know that in May I adopted an edict on the transition to a professional army by the spring of the year 2000. Possibly some of you were skeptical about that decision. I was told that in the assessment of a number of military experts a transition to only a 50-percent professional army would be possible in that time. But this essentially depends on how much the state is prepared to spend on defense. I take as my starting point economic predictions which are more optimistic. And I would put it this way: Unless you set a task people will try to prove that it cannot be fulfilled. But if you set a guideline people — although they will find it difficult and hard going — will succeed.

An inseparable part of military reform is the structural reorganization of the country's defense industry. Today I was at a conference of defense plant leaders and set them tasks. Decisions on support for the defense industry have already been adopted and will be unswervingly implemented. I have just chaired a military-industrial complex conference and set the task of formulating measures which will enable Russia's defense industry to scale new heights and become a highly efficient sector of the economy. Conversion of military production must not reduce the country's defense capability in any way. The transition to a professional army will require a sharp increase in the efficiency, reliability, and cost effectiveness of arms and military equipment.

You know that I have signed an edict on priority measures to support defense complex enterprises. Under it the defense sector receives support which it has never had in all the years of reform. To improve the efficiency of defense industry management the State Committee for the Defense Industry has been transformed into a ministry. You must cooperate consistently with this department.

The biggest burden in fulfilling the tasks of military organizational development in the Russian Federation comes in the period through the year 2000. In this period it is necessary to complete the creation of the statutory and legal base for military organizational development, including the organizational development of the Armed Forces and other Russian Federation troops; create a precise system of state and military command and control of the country's defense; switch to a new structure, new makeup, and new territorial system of leadership and backup for the Armed Forces and other troops; improve the mobilization preparation of the country's economy; and include the use of the Armed Forces and other troops in planning, proceeding from the need to safeguard and reliably protect the country's national interests. The Ministry of Defense must ensure maximum equipment and manning levels for combined units and units in the most important sectors of the Armed Forces' activity. The way to achieve this is by cutting the number of cost-inefficient and undermanned units, structures, and formations. They add little to the country's defense might.

I consider that the following are the priority tasks for the next five years.

Task one. Maintaining and improving the grouping of strategic nuclear forces. It is necessary to take account of Russia's international commitments and retain the number of warheads which is necessary and sufficient for guaranteed nuclear deterrence.

Task two. Optimizing the authorized personnel strength and, in the process, taking account of the positive changes in the international situation and the country's economic potential. The transition to manning the Armed Forces and other Russian Federation troops on a professional basis will require you to make changes to existing plans.

Task three. Equipping the Armed Forces with modern models of weapons and military equipment and improving the purchasing system. Within the framework of overall defense expenditure it is necessary to increase the proportion of resources allocated to research and development, the modernization of arms and military equipment, and combat and operational training.

We have increased expenditure on research and development first from 8 to 10 percent in 1995 and now to 12.5 percent of the overall budget. But experience now and the situation show that even this is not enough. I believe that the Ministry of Defense must perform the role of purchasing agency for arms and military equipment for the Armed Forces and other Russian Federation troops.

And, finally, task four. Improving the system of command and control of the Armed Forces and other troops. I have adopted a decision to make the General Staff responsible for coordinating the elaboration of and agreeing plans for the organizational development of the Armed Forces and other troops. The solution to the problems of the organizational development of the Armed Forces and the safeguarding of Russia's security is inseparably linked with the broadening of military cooperation with all states, particularly within the framework of the CIS.

In the very near future I intend to send a message on national security to the Federal Assembly. We must hone military doctrine on its basis. Its fundamental provisions, which were approved in 1993, before the adoption of the new Constitution, are currently operating in our country. The message on national security will become the basis for further work on military doctrine.

Esteemed comrades! As supreme commander in chief I assure you that I for my part will take all measures to comprehensively support the Army and Navy. The government has just informed me that the federal budget debts to the power ministries and departments for 1995 have been paid off in full and that pay and allowances for the months of 1996 which have elapsed have been paid. This required 5.1 trillion rubles [R] to be found over and above budget expenditure. In May alone R2 trillion in budget funds, R420 billion in promissory-note credits, and R5.25 trillion in treasury tax exemptions have been allocated. The main thing now is to check that these funds reach their destination. I will continue to demand that the Army's needs are at the center of the state's attention.

At all times Russia's might has been linked with the power of its Armed Forces and the strength and staunchness of the morale of servicemen. This sacred truth will always be in the minds of our people, the minds of the state leadership, the mind of your president.

I wish you health, success in the cause of strengthening Russia's defense capability, and the best to you all.

Russia: Grachev Launches 'Counterattack' Against 'Ill-Wishers'

MK3005130696 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 30 May 96 p 1

[Report by Yuriy Golotyuk: "Pavel Grachev Stays on as Head of Military Department for the Moment"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] In Moscow yesterday there was an All-Army Conference attended by all persons in top positions of the Russian Army: commanders of arms and branches of the armed forces, of military districts, and of fleets and flotillas; and representatives of military groups and groupings. Although the previously announced theme of the conference — taking stock of the winter combat training and determining tasks for the summer period — promised no sensations, the questions discussed by the generals far transcended its bounds.

Despite numerous forecasts heard of late on the possible imminent replacement of the Russian Federation defense minister, the conference demonstrated in no uncertain way that Pavel Grachev will not concede this position to anyone. What is more, Mr. Grachev launched a counterattack against his ill-wishers, stating that some generals who artificially keep at a boil rumors of personnel changes in the military department are "plotting" his downfall. Without naming names, the minister characterized these generals as "having no honor." However, the personal composition of the "plotting generals" is rather easy to figure out. At least the name of the one of them who, according to Mr. Grachev, met with the president during the minister's tour of the Urals, Siberia, and the Transbaykal area and offered him a program for reforming the army and expressed a readiness to realize these plans if he were appointed defense minister. The head of the Russian military department exposed the unnamed colonel general, citing the fact that the "proposals handed to the president were a plan drawn up by the General Staff," which the treacherous general "procured in some way and passed off as his own." Mr. Grachev naturally had in mind his deputy and longtime (back from the days of the Afghan campaign) opponent, Colonel General Boris Gromov, who many observers predicted would replace the defense minister. [passage omitted]

Having been convinced that for the time being Mr. Grachev remains in the driver's seat of the Russian Armed Forces, observers are analyzing with special attention his assessment yesterday of the military-political situation that is taking shape. Certain fears were raised by the defense minister's statement on "a continuing outside threat" and on the fact that "some countries are ignoring Russia's interests." Criticizing the possible expansion of the North Atlantic alliance toward the East, Mr. Grachev expressed the view that the joining of NATO by Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia would "exceed the established limit by almost 15,000 pieces of combat equipment." "The deployment of tactical weapons in Eastern Europe might result in a cold peace if not a Cold War," the defense minister warned. In accordance with Mr. Grachev's statement, one can sense of late attempts by "a number of states" to obstruct the integration processes of the Commonwealth and to decrease Russia's influence in the area of the Black Sea and the Transcaucasus. Moreover, "there is no letup in the attempts to turn the states of Middle and Central Asia and the Transcaucasus into countries hostile to Russia."

Russia: Grachev Remarks to Army Leaders Viewed

MM3005162896 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 May 96 p 1

[Report by Vladimir Maryukha: "Army General Pavel Grachev: 'In Four Years We Have Learned Not Only To Discuss the Army and Navy's Problems but Also To Solve Them Autonomously'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Before the start of the summer training period for troops and naval forces the traditional conference of leading Armed Forces personnel at which the results of the past half-year were summarized and short- and long-term plans were outlined was held yesterday at the Defense Ministry. Opening the conference, Army General Pavel Grachev, Russian Federation defense minister, noted that the fulfillment of tasks relating to Armed Forces organizational development and operational and mobilization training is taking place in difficult conditions. There is still an external threat to Russia's security, which is manifesting itself above all in the changed nature of certain countries' policies and in disregard for the Russian Federation's interests. "The North Atlantic bloc's leadership has repeatedly declared its readiness to establish special relations with Russia, but we have every reason to believe that NATO's understanding of them is highly idiosyncratic. In the political respect the North Atlantic bloc is trying to become the nucleus around which a long-term continental security system is supposed to take shape. In the military respect the bloc intends to advance its borders eastward and build up military potential by admitting new members. Through NATO's admission of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia alone the bloc's quantity of conventional weapons in the five categories stipulated by the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe will exceed the prescribed limit by almost 15,000 items of combat equipment." According to the defense minister, talk of stationing tactical weapons in East European countries is becoming increasingly clearly defined, which "threatens to take us back if not to the Cold War, then to a very 'cold peace'."

Army Gen. Grachev stressed that Russia's fundamental position on the question of NATO's eastward advance does not mean that we "are turning our backs on the alliance": "Russia is ready to develop relations with NATO in a constructive, businesslike key in the interests of all-European security." Citing the example of cooperation in settling the conflict in Bosnia, the defense minister noted that the world community by no means needs an enlarged NATO in order to solve the most complex problems.

Instability also persists on Russia's southern borders, where conflicts of varying degrees of intensity are taking place — in Tajikistan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia. Territorial claims are also being made against us in the Far East. According to the defense minister, the attempts by a number of West European countries and Turkey to hinder the integrative processes within the Commonwealth of Independent States are being felt increasingly keenly. Strategic aims are being pursued here: to curb Russia's efforts, to reduce its influence in the Black Sea, Transcaucasus, and Central Asian areas, and to prevent the unification around it of former Soviet republics. Even more than that — to turn these republics into states which are hostile to Russia.

"In these conditions the maintenance of the Armed Forces' combat readiness and combat capability at a level that guarantees the Russian Federation's military security is our most important task." Events in the Chechen Republic graphically illustrated how the violation of our motherland's territorial integrity can turn into a real threat. Grachev noted that when Russian President Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin met with our soldiers in Chechnya he rated the troops' actions very highly and expressed his gratitude to everybody — the Defense Ministry, the General Staff, the district, and the Army. "The Armed Forces have done all they can to stop the shooting, and especially combat operations, as of 1 June and to switch to a new, peaceful life and the restoration of what has been destroyed in the Chechen conflict."

According to the minister the populist slogans and promises of certain political figures, which do not have any real economic basis, are inflaming what is already a not entirely positive situation in people's sentiments. "In this situation our action program," Army Gen. Grachev stated, "has been set out in the Supreme Commander in Chief's Letter to Armed Forces Personnel."

How best to implement it was the main theme of the conference of leading Army and Navy personnel. Commanders in chief of the branches of service and other officials delivered reports on the state of affairs. Grachev himself stated that it had not been possible do much of what had been planned, above all because of insufficient funding — of both the Armed Forces and the defense complex. Nevertheless "in the last four years," the minister said, "we have learned not only to discuss the Army and Navy's problems but also autonomously to search for ways of solving them."

Noting that these searches have not always been optimal, Army Gen. Grachev stressed that the results achieved encourage hope and that "if the political policy of democratic transformations in society is maintained we have in our hands a powerful lever to radically improve the state of the Armed Forces and enhance their standing in society. It is from these positions that we must now assess the state of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and make plans for the future."

Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin delivered a speech at the conference of leading Armed Forces personnel. The speech will be published in the next issue of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA.

Russia: Grachev Again 'Triumphs' Over Those Awaiting His Dismissal

MK3005130596 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 30 May 96 p 1

[Report by Pavel Felgengauer: "Grachev Triumphs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] All last week Moscow pundits were unanimous in "burying" the defense minister. "Reliable sources" in the presidential staff told journalists that "the president has already signed an edict appointing former Deputy Defense Minister Gen. Boris Gromov the new minister." The Defense Ministry, the General Staff, and the main headquarters of the armed services and branches froze in expectation of early and substantial changes within the military department. Furthermore, the majority of officers and generals not linked with Pavel Grachev by personal friendship or other "informal relations" quite agree that "it would be good for the common cause" to dismiss the incompetent and extremely unpopular incumbent defense minister, and the sooner the better.

Meanwhile Army Gen. Grachev traveled in the remote parts of Siberia and the Transbaykal region and dared not respond to his enemies in public because he did not know Yeltsin's actual mood, which could be ascertained only in a personal meeting. On Monday, however, Grachev accompanied the president to Chechnya, was warmly praised for the organization of the visit, and so decided to show to all doubters that he is master of the military department.

An all-arms conference designed "to sum up results and define tasks," which drew generals and admirals from all districts, fleets, groups, and contingents of the armed forces, is the best conceivable audience for such a triumph. The military respects victors, while it is not at all important by what margin victory was won. The generals and admirals for the most part are not going to resign, and if the president believes that they must serve under Grachev, it is not their business to object or protest. It is only in private conversations, in the conditions of guaranteed anonymity, that honest servicemen, who constitute the majority in the military establishment, can talk about corruption in the upper reaches and that "the Kremlin does not allow criminal charges to be pressed against some influential generals."

Yet whereas the military keeps silent, society is under no obligation to do the same. In February Yeltsin said that without a peace settlement in Chechnya "I have no hope of ever being reelected to a second term: The people will not support me." Now that some progress has been achieved in Chechnya, somebody should explain to the president that he might also not be reelected with Grachev thrown into the bargain. Many in the country will have trouble bringing themselves to vote for Yeltsin knowing that at the same time they will be voting for Grachev.

Clearly Gen. Grachev quite suits Boris Yeltsin. Disliked by everybody except his overindulged inner circle, the defense minister is all the more obedient and manageable the less popular he is in the military and in society. It is also clear that Yeltsin does not want to dismiss Grachev "over Chechnya." Many in the military will not like that: The officers who served in Chechnya will think that by punishing Grachev, Yeltsin by implication also rebukes them. Even so, both the military, where the May wages are again being delayed, and society expect that all corruption charges against the Defense Ministry will finally be investigated. Evidently, if President Yeltsin supports his military minister on all counts, he therefore assumes responsibility for all the outrages in the Defense Ministry.

Russia: Presidential Aide Kuzyk Cited on Arms Trade

MK3005131896 Moscow KOMMERSANT-DAILY in Russian 30 May 96 pp 1, 3

[Excerpt from Boris Kuzyk's interview boxed within Sergey Zhikharev report: "President in 'Oboronka [Defense Industry]' Goes on Offensive"]

[FBIS Translated Text] From KOMMERSANT-DAILY Interview With Boris Kuzyk, Russian Federation Presidential Aide for Military-Technical Cooperation With Other Countries [headline to boxed text]

If one is to analyze the state of the world arms market as a whole and Russia's position in it, not all is so simple there. One has to speak now not only about the winning of new markets, but also of regaining lost positions. We have only the extremely active and persistent actions of arms exporters, their knowledge, experience, shrewdness — if you will — to thank for the many successes in the area of military-technical cooperation with other countries in recent years. In short, the policy of aggressive marketing.

Now, however, we have achieved the first changes for the better. First of all, put in place and operating is an orderly state system of military-technical cooperation with other countries, headed by the president. The effectiveness of the operation of its mechanisms is [evidenced by the fact] that Russian arms export in the past year grew by 65 percent. Next to be passed is a law on military-technical cooperation, which would regulate many aspects.

The creation of a legislative base, however, is not the whole story. It is necessary to gradually move forward to what is called in the West a policy of state protectionism. Under our conditions, in matters of arms trade, this can be interpreted as the state's all-out political assistance to arms exports and certain economic privileges. This is done with the sole objective of increasing the maximum profit from the defense sector under conditions of a shrinking market.

Russia: Edict Seeks To Enhance Status of Civil Defense Troops

MK3005132496 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 30 May 96 p 8

[Unattributed report: "Conscripts Will Be Sent to Civil Defense Troops Beginning This Year"]

[FBIS Translated Text] An edict of the Russian president places new responsibilities on the Russian Federation Civil Defense Troops, which are being considerably beefed up.

MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS has learned that, from now on, it will be the job of Civil Defense specialists to defuse aerial and high-explosive bombs. The Ministry of Emergency Situations will also purchase special military equipment for technical reconnaissance. Henceforth, Civil Defense troops have been tasked with conducting radiation, chemical, and bacteriological reconnaissance of stricken areas.

Furthermore, Civil Defense servicemen will protect the country's economic facilities against high-precision weapons and carry out camouflage and concealment measures in cities and on lines of supply and communication [kommunikatsii].

The president also issued instructions launching a reorganization of Civil Defense troops, which is planned to be completed by the year 2000. The authorized strength of servicemen will practically double, reaching 50,000 men organized in separate brigades.

Starting this year, the manning of Civil Defense forces will be based on conscription. They will be manned by conscripts with the first and second degree of medical fitness for service. That is to say, civil defense units will receive conscripts which were earlier considered fit for service in artillery, tank, engineer, rear service, motor transport, and construction units.

The insignia of civil defense servicemen will consist of a light-blue equilateral triangle in an orange circle. Civil defense servicemen have been put on the same footing as Defense Ministry officers with regard to allowances and pension and social privileges.

Regional Affairs

Russia: Text of Yeltsin Edict on Chechnya Treaty Draft

MM3005151996 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 31 May 96 p 4

[Edict of the Russian Federation President No. 789 on the Draft Treaty "On the Delimitation of Subjects of Jurisdiction and Powers Between the Russian Federation Organs of State Power and the Chechen Republic Organs of State Power," signed by Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin in Moscow on 28 May 1996]

[FBIS Translated Text] With the aim of ensuring civil peace and interethnic harmony in the Chechen Republic I decree:

1. That the Russian Federation President's Commission on the Delimitation of Subjects of Jurisdiction and Powers Between the Federal Organs of State Power and the Organs of State Power of the Federation Components should draw up and promulgate (publish in he mass media) by 1 June 1996 a draft treaty "On the Delimitation of Subjects of Jurisdiction and Powers Between the Russian Federation Organs of State Power and the Chechen Republic Organs of State Power (attached), reflecting in the draft treaty the specifics of the status of the Chechen Republic.

2. By 30 June 1996 a national discussion of the draft treaty is to be held in the Chechen Republic and the finalized draft of the treaty is to be submitted to the Russian Federation president.

[signed] Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin

[dated] Moscow, the Kremlin, 28 May 1996
No. 789

Russia: Text of Chechnya Draft Treaty Published

MM3105104296 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA Weekend Edition in Russian 31 May 96 pp 4-5

["Draft Treaty on the Delimitation of Subjects of Jurisdiction and Powers Between the Russian Federation Organs of State Power and the Chechen Republic Organs of State Power" — ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA headline; from the 'Documents' section]

[FBIS Translated Text] We, the authorized representatives of the Russian Federation organs of state power and the organs of state power of the Chechen Republic,

proceeding from the need to delimit subjects of jurisdiction between the Russian Federation organs of state power and the organs of state power of the Chechen Republic,

proceeding from the universally recognized right of peoples to self-determination and the principles of equal rights, free consent, and the freedom of peoples to express their will, and the safeguarding of their observance;

with the aim of ensuring the territorial integrity of the Russian Federation and the unity of its economic space;

and ensuring civil peace, interethnic concord, and the security of peoples;

rejecting the use of force or the threat of force for the solution of any questions;

ensuring the priority of basic human and civil rights and liberties irrespective of nationality, creed, place of residence, or other differences;

promoting the preservation and development of historical and national traditions, cultures, and languages;

expressing the aspiration of peoples to consolidate mutual understanding and trust and to preserve and develop their friendly relations;

taking account of the fact that the Chechen Republic as a state is united [obyedinena] to the Russian Federation by the Russian Federation Constitution and the present Treaty;

and guided by the Russian Federation Constitution and the Agreement "On the Basic Principles of Relations Between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic";

have concluded the present Treaty on the following points:

Article 1.

With the aim of enshrining and implementing the special status within the Russian Federation of the Chechen Republic as a sovereign, democratic, rule-of-law, social state the Sides have agreed on the delimitation of powers between the organs of state power of the Russian Federation and the organs of state power of the Chechen Republic set out below.

Article 2.

The Chechen Republic has its own Constitution and its own legislation and possesses supreme state (legislative, executive, judicial) power on its territory beyond the limits of the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the powers of the Russian Federation organs of state power transferred by the Chechen Republic to the Russian Federation.

The delimitation of subjects of jurisdiction and the mutual delegation of powers between the Russian Federation organs of state power and the organs of state power of the Chechen Republic is carried out in accordance with the Russian Federation Constitution, the Chechen Republic Constitution, and the present treaty.

The territory and status of the Chechen Republic cannot be altered without its consent.

Article 3.

The following come under the jurisdiction of the Chechen Republic:

1. The safeguarding of human and civil rights and liberties and the rights of national minorities; the safeguarding of legality and law and order, and public safety on the territory of the Chechen Republic;

2. The adoption and amendment of the Chechen Republic Constitution and Chechen Republic laws;

3. The establishment of the system of organs of state power of the Chechen Republic, the procedure for their organization and activity, and the formation of the organs of state power of the Chechen Republic;

4. The administrative and territorial structure of the Chechen Republic;

5. The Chechen Republic budget, republic extrabudgetary funds, the establishment of the Chechen Republic's general principles of taxation, republican taxes, and imposts;

6. Questions of the ownership, the use, and disposal of land, minerals, water, timber, and other natural

resources, and also state enterprises, organizations, and other movables and real estate situated on the territory of the Chechen Republic that are the exclusive assets and property of the people of the Chechen Republic, with the exception of federal-owned facilities.

The delimitation of state ownership is carried out by means of a separate agreement between the Russian Federation government and the government of the Chechen Republic;

7. The state property of the Chechen Republic and the management thereof;

8. Decisions concerning questions of the judicial system, the legal profession, and the system of notaries' offices in accordance with the legislation of the Chechen Republic and the Russian Federation;

9. The legal regulation of administrative, family, and housing relations and relations in the sphere of environmental protection and the use of natural resources;

10. The pardoning of persons convicted by Chechen Republic courts;

11. Resolving questions of republic citizenship;

12. The organization of alternative, civilian service on the territory of the Chechen Republic for persons having the right under federal law to perform such service in the place of military service; the establishment of a special procedure for the performance of military service in military training institutions and military construction detachments set up on the territory of the Chechen Republic, including for the purpose of rebuilding the economy and social sphere of the Republic;

13. The determination of the education system taking into account the national and historical traditions of the peoples living on the territory of the Chechen Republic;

14. The establishment and maintainance of economic, cultural, and other relations and the conclusion of treaties and agreements with other Russian Federation components;

15. Participation in international and foreign economic relations; participation in the activity of international organizations and funds; the conclusion of international treaties and agreements that do not contravene the Russian Federation Constitution, the Russian Federation's international obligations, or the present Treaty;

16. The creation of a National Bank under a separate Agreement between the Government and the Central Bank of the Russian Federation and the organs of state power of the Chechen Republic;

17. The state service of the Chechen Republic;

18. The solution according to procedures established by a separate Agreement between the Russian Federation organs of executive power and the organs of executive power of the Chechen Republic of questions relating to conversion at enterprises in the state ownership of the Chechen Republic;

19. Establishing state awards and honorary titles of the Chechen Republic;

20. Other subjects of jurisdiction not assigned to the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation or the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic.

Article 4.

Republic laws and other statutory legal acts are adopted on questions under the jurisdiction of the Chechen Republic.

The laws of the Chechen Republic are liable to state protection and are applied by the courts in accordance with their competence as established by the legislation of the Chechen Republic and the Russian Federation.

Article 5

The following come under Russian Federation jurisdiction:

1. The adoption and amendment of the Russian Federation Constitution and federal laws and the monitoring of their observance;

2. The federative system and territory of the Russian Federation;

3. The regulation and protection of human and civil rights and liberties; Russian Federation citizenship; the regulation and protection of the rights of ethnic minorities;

4. The establishment of a system of federal organs of legislative, executive, and judicial power, the procedure for their organization and activity; the formation of federal organs of state power;

5. Federal state property and its management;

6. The establishment of the principles of federal policy and federal programs in the sphere of state, economic, environmental, social, cultural, and national development in the Russian Federation;

7. The establishment of the legal principles of a single market; financial, currency, credit, and customs regulation, the issue of money, the principles of price policy; federal economic services, including federal banks;

8. The federal budget; federal taxes and imposts; federal regional development funds;

9. Federal energy systems, the nuclear power industry, fissile materials, federal transportation, roads and railroads [puti soobshcheniya], information and communications; activity in space;

10. Russian Federation foreign policy and international relations; Russian Federation international treaties, questions of war and peace;

11. Russian Federation foreign economic relations;

12. Defense and security; defense output; the determination of the procedure for the sale and purchase of weapons, ammunition, military hardware, and other military property; the production of fissile materials, toxic substances, and narcotics, and the procedure for their use;

13. The determination of the status of the Russian Federation state border, the territorial sea, the air space, the exclusive economic zone, and the continental shelf and their protection;

14. The legal system; the prosecutor's office; criminal, criminal procedure, and sentencing legislation; amnesty and pardon; civil, civil procedure, and arbitral procedure legislation; the legal regulation of intellectual property;

15. Federal law on conflict of laws;

16. The meteorological service, standards [standarty, etalony], the metric system, the calculation of time; geodesy and cartography, the naming of geographical objects, official statistics and accounting;

17. Russian Federation state awards and honorary titles;

18. The federal state service.

Article 6

The following come under the joint jurisdiction of the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic:

1. Ensuring that the Constitution, laws, and other normative legal acts of the Chechen Republic correspond to the Russian Federation Constitution and federal laws;

2. The protection of human and civil rights and liberties and the rights of ethnic minorities; the safeguarding of legality, law and order, and public safety; border zone arrangements;

3. Questions of the ownership [vladeniye], utilization, and control [rasporyazheniye] of land, mineral resources, and water and other natural resources;

4. The delimitation of state property;

5. The use of nature; environmental protection and the ensuring of environmental safety; specially protected natural territories; protection of historical and cultural monuments;

6. General questions of upbringing, education, science, culture, physical fitness, and sport;

7. The coordination of health-care issues; the protection of the family, motherhood, fatherhood, and childhood; social protection, including social provision;

8. The implementation of measures to combat catastrophes, natural disasters, and epidemics, and the elimination of their consequences;

9. The establishment of the general principles of taxation and imposts in the Russian Federation;

10. Administrative, administrative-procedural, labor, family, housing, land, water, and forestry legislation, and legislation on natural resources and environmental protection;

11. The personnel of judicial and law-enforcement organs; the legal profession and notaries;

12. Protection of the age-old homelands and traditional way of life of numerically small ethnic communities;

13. The establishment of general principles for organizing the system of organs of state power and local self-government;

14. The coordination of the Chechen Republic's international and foreign economic relations in line with federal legislation and the agreement between the Chechen Republic and Russian Federation Governments;

15. The implementation of the Russian Federation's international treaties;

16. The resolution of the question of the formation of free customs zones in the Chechen Republic. Decisions on the formation of a special economic zone, as well as free customs zones and their borders and customs arrangements, are made by the Russian Federation Government following a proposal from the Chechen Republic Government;

17. The protection of the Russian Federation's sovereignty and territorial integrity;

18. General citizenship issues and those covered by a conflict of laws;

19. The determination of the Chechen Republic's administrative borders;

20. The coordination of budgetary, financial, fiscal, monetary, credit, and prices policy; the conclusion of intergovernmental budgetary agreements; the formation of regional development funds;

21. The creation of common funds to finance joint programs;

22. The ensuring of the mobilization preparation of the national economy; the functioning of defense complex enterprises located in the Chechen Republic, as well as participation in selling their products, with the exception of issues relating to the production of armaments and military hardware or the conversion of these enterprises;

23. Questions of the coordination and functioning of federal and republic power generation, transportation (including pipeline transport), and communications systems, including questions of the utilization of arrangements for the unimpeded and duty-free movement of transport, freight, and produce by air, sea, river, rail, and highway, as well as by pipeline in line with the separate agreement between the Russian Federation Government and the Chechen Republic Government;

24. The assessment in line with state and international standards of the quality of the environment; the protection of the environment and the implementation of measures to restore it; the safeguarding of environmental safety;

25. The implementation of a unified policy in the social sphere: employment, pay, migration processes, and social protection, including social security;

26. Ensuring legality, law and order, and public safety; cooperation between judicial and law-enforcement organs; the elaboration and implementation of targeted crime-fighting programs;

27. The resolution of issues relating to the deployment and siting on Chechen Republic territory of corresponding military subunits;

28. The implementation of the measures stemming from the provisions of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Replublic] law "On the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples" as regards the Chechen Republic population;

29. The implementation of an agreed personnel policy in exercising the jurisdiction and powers defined by this treaty.

Article 7

With a view to restoring historic justice, eradicating the consequences of the illegal deportation and the violations of the Chechen people's rights that were committed, and implementing the RSFSR law "On the Rehabilitation of Repressed Peoples," the Russian Federation Government in conjunction with the Chechen Republic Government implements a range of measures to provide state support for the political, social, and spiritual revival of the Chechen people, and to restore the rights of citizens who were illegally repressed and subjected to political reprisals for ethnic or other reasons.

Article 8

With a view to delimiting powers between Russian Federation executive power organs and Chechen Republic executive power organs in respect of subjects of joint jurisdiction laid down by Article 72 of the Russian Federation Constitution and Article 6 of this treaty, the Chechen Republic Government concludes corresponding agreements with the Russian Federation Government.

The agreements on the delimitation of powers in respect of subjects of joint jurisdiction are an inalienable part of this treaty.

The agreements on the delimitation of powers in respect of subjects of joint jurisdiction between Russian Federation and Chechen Republic organs of executive power may be concluded at any time once this treaty has come into force.

Article 9

With a view to implementing this treaty Russian Federation organs of state power:

1. Elaborate, with the participation of Chechen Republic organs of state power, and adopt federal laws and other normative legal acts on matters defined by this treaty;

2. Ensure that federal organs of executive power' normative acts are brought into line with this treaty;

3. Elaborate, with the participation of Chechen Republic organs of state power, ratify, and implement federal targeted programs for the socioeconomic development of the Chechen Republic, including programs to compensate the republic's population for damage suffered, and to restore housing, the economy, and social facilities, and measures to ensure the accelerated development of the Chechen Republic's mountain regions and to create the necessary jobs to provide employment for the able-bodied population;

4. Resolve, by agreement with Chechen Republic organs of state power, the question of the formation of a special economic zone and free customs zones, and the establishment of customs, tax, and other concessions to promote the restoration of the Chechen Republic's economy and social sphere;

5. Implement powers in respect of subjects of joint jurisdiction, including via the territorial subdivisions of federal organs of executive power;

6. Coordinate with Chechen Republic organs of state power the candidates to lead federal enterprises, institutions, and organizations located on Chechen Republic territory, unless otherwise stipulated by federal law.

Article 10

With a view to implementing this treaty Chechen Republic organs of state power:

1. Implement legal regulation in respect of subjects of joint jurisdiction as defined by this treaty in accordance with federal legislation;

2. Ensure that the normative legal acts of the republican organs of executive power are brought into line with this treaty;

3. Take part in the development and implementation of federal targeted programs on Chechen Republic territory;

4. Take part in the resolution of personnel issues during the appointment of the leaders of federal enterprises, institutions, and organizations located on Chechen Republic territory.

Article 11

In the absence of any federal laws or other federal normative legal acts in respect of individual subjects of joint jurisdiction, the Chechen Republic implements its own legal regulation.

Following the adoption of a corresponding federal law or another federal normative legal act, Chechen Republic laws and other normative legal acts are brought into line with federal legislation. Chechen Republic laws and other normative legal acts which are not brought into line with the federal legislation will not be liable to application.

Article 12

In the event of the federal organs of executive power unilaterally adopting subordinate federal normative legal acts that run counter to this treaty, the norms of this treaty shall apply.

In the event of there being any contradiction between Chechen Republic laws or normative legal acts and this treaty, the norms of this treaty shall apply.

Article 13

The transfer by federal organs of executive power of some of their powers to Chechen Republic organs of executive power in line with Article 78 of the Russian Federation Constitution can take place by agreement in all instances, provided the Russian Federation Constitution or federal law does not directly prohibit the transfer of the exercise of the powers in question.

In the transfer of the exercise of specific powers the corresponding agreement makes provision for the necessary conditions for the transfer and exercise of these powers.

Article 14

Legal documents issued in line with federal legislation by Chechen Republic organs of power, institutions, and officials within the purview of those organs, institutions, and officials as laid down by this treaty are recognized throughout Russian Federation territory.

Article 15

Chechen Republic organs of state power are entitled to contest in the relevant court and to submit to the Russian Federation president or Government proposals on the repeal or suspension on the republic's territory in part or in whole of Russian Federation ministerial or departmental legal acts which:

regulate issues under the jurisdiction of the Chechen Republic;

do not correspond to the powers of federal organs of executive power in the sphere of joint jurisdiction by the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic;

unilaterally redistribute the Chechen Republic's subjects of jurisdiction and powers laid down by the Russian Federation Constitution and this treaty.

In the event of the Russian Federation Government, within one month of proposals being submitted by Chechen Republic organs of state power, failing to repeal or suspend the Russian Federation ministerial or departmental legal acts referred to in the first part of this article, such legal acts shall not be enforced by Chechen Republic organs of state power until such time as a ruling has been handed down by the relevant court.

Article 16

Chechen Republic organs of executive power can be invested with the powers of territorial subdivisions of federal organs of executive power under agreements concluded by the Chechen Republic Government with the Russian Federation Government or authorized federal organs of executive power.

Article 17

Questions of the ownership, utilization, and control of facilities that are Chechen Republic state property are regulated by republic normative legal acts in line with federal laws.

The Chechen Republic independently determines the system of republic organs of state power in administering Chechen Republic state-owned facilities.

The delimitation of natural resources on Chechen Republic territory into natural resources of federal and republic status is covered by a separate agreement.

Article 18

The Chechen Republic independently establishes and introduces republic taxes and imposts in line with federal and republic legislation.

The composition and size of the income received by the republic budget in the form of funds from federal taxes are determined by an agreement between the Russian Federation Government and the Chechen Republic Government, if they are not directly fixed by federal law.

Article 19

The Chechen Republic is an independent participant in international and foreign economic relations, if this does not contravene the Russian Federation Constitution or the Russian Federation's international agreements, and it concludes corresponding treaties (agreements) with the components [subyekty] of foreign states, the administrative-territorial formations of foreign states, and the ministries and departments of foreign states.

Russian Federation organs of state power coordinate the Chechen Republic's international and foreign economic relations in line with this treaty.

Article 20

With a view to effectively implementing this treaty Russian Federation organs of state power and Chechen Republic organs of state power can set up joint commissions and other working organs on a parity basis.

Article 21

Disputes and differences arising in the course of the implementation of this treaty, as well as disputes about powers between Russian Federation organs of state power and Chechen Republic organs of state power in respect of subjects of joint jurisdiction, are settled through conciliation procedures or under the procedure laid down by the Russian Federation Constitution.

Article 22

Russian Federation organs of state power and Chechen Republic organs of state power can have their own missions in Groznyy and Moscow respectively.

Article 23

This treaty or its individual provisions cannot be unilaterally repealed, amended, or added to.

Additions and amendments are made to this treaty by joint agreement between the parties by means of additions to this treaty or the conclusion of a new treaty.

Article 24

This treaty shall be published in official publications and comes into force from the time it is published.

Article 25

From the time this treaty comes into force federal and republic legislative and other normative legal acts operate insofar as they do not contravene this treaty.

Russia: Army Paper Cites Yeltsin Remarks in Chechnya

MM3005135196 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 May 96 p 1

[Report by Anatoliy Stasovskiy: "Federal Troops in Chechnya Have Done Their Duty. They Have Protected the Russian State's Territorial Integrity"]

[FBIS Translated Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already reported that Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin visited the Chechen Republic 28 May. During his stay there the Russian head of state visited the settlement of Pravoberezhnoye, where he met with local inhabitants and conversed with the servicemen of a Russian Federation Internal Affairs Ministry [MVD] internal troops subunit, and addressed the personnel of the 205th Motorized Infantry Brigade stationed in the area of Severnyy Airport....

The Russian head of state told the servicemen about the results of the talks with Chechen separatist leader Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, which were held in the Kremlin Monday and ended with the signing of an accord on the 1 June cessation of hostilities. The president observed that a peace agreement had effectively been signed in Moscow. And this became possible, Boris Yeltsin stressed, only after the destruction of the largest bandit formations and the elimination of centers of banditry and terrorism in Chechnya. The Russian president sincerely thanked the federal servicemen in the Chechen Republic, adding here that "The federal troops have done their duty. The hardships and deprivations which you have borne throughout have not been in vain. You have protected your motherland and its sovereignty. Had it not been for you, the bandits would have taken hostages in Rostov, Nizhniy Novgorod.... You have prevented the disintegration of the Russian state. You have protected your homes, your mothers, and your children. You have acted legitimately, executing the order of your supreme commander in chief and the defense minister. You are under the protection of the Constitution and the president."

However, Boris Yeltsin did state that the cessation of combat operations in no way means that all the bandits will simultaneously surrender their arms. The small bandit formations which refuse to surrender their arms must be destroyed, and this will be carried out by the internal troops, the president said.

Boris Yeltsin stated that we are a large, multinational country but that we have been able to tackle all our problems by peaceful means everywhere except Chechnya, where we have been forced to adopt extreme measures. According to the president, the Chechen problem has to be solved in order to protect the republic's population, to restore law and order and peace on its territory, to achieve calm in the North Caucasus, and to preserve the unity of Russia. The head of state acknowledged that "it has not been possible to avoid mistakes and serious miscalculations when carrying out these tasks." "I do not absolve myself, either," Boris Yeltsin remarked, "I am not going to shift the blame for the political mistakes on to the Russian military because it is they who have played the decisive role in suppressing the rebels."

The Russian president is certain that it is a most important task now to prevent any repetition of the gross error made last year — the bandits must not be allowed to recover again after suffering telling defeats. The head of state remarked that politicians have no right to leave the Russian Army and civilians exposed, they cannot be the hostages of ill-considered decisions.

Addressing the servicemen of the brigade, the Russian head of state stressed that the events in Chechnya allow a number of conclusions to be drawn on both the perfection [sovershentsvo] of certain provisions of Russian legislation and the need for radical military reform. "It is time for a professional army," Boris Yeltsin said. "Untrained soldiers must not be pitted against mercenaries. It is better to have just a few dozen divisions fully manned by professionals who are used to and familiar with military service."

After addressing the 205th Motorized Infantry Brigade Boris Yeltsin presented a Hero of the Russian Federation medal to former gun chief and First Sergeant Kanti Abdurakhmanov. Two posthumous Hero of the Great Patriotic War awards were also made: These were to squad leader Magomed Uzuyev and rifle company commander Novoi Umarov. The awards were presented to their brothers. The Russian Federation president stressed that the life stories of these three sons of the Chechen people were yet further evidence of the indissoluble fraternity of the peoples of our country.

However, complete calm is still a long way off in Chechnya. Lieutenant Colonel Vasiliy Panchenkov, our freelance correspondent and staffer of the Russian Federation MVD Internal Troops Press Office, informed us that 12 armed attacks on federal troop subunits and militiamen had been carried out by separate gangs of gunmen in the previous 24 hours. Fire had been returned by federal subunits in a number of cases.

An alarming situation has developed in the Vedeno area, where up to 1,000 gunmen have gathered, according to available information, since Bamut was taken by federal troops.

Russia: Chernomyrdin Names Negotiators for Chechnya Talks

LD3005134296 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1331 GMT 30 May 96

[By Artyom Protasenko]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 30 (Itar-Tass) — Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, who is also chairman of the commission on the Chechen settlement, named the members of a working group due to meet for consultations with representatives of separatist leader Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev in Makhachkala, Dagestan, spokesman for the commission Sergey Slipchenko told Itar-Tass on Thursday.

The following is a list of the working group members: Vyacheslav Mikhailov, Minister of Nationalities and Federative Relations (appointed head of the group); Viktor Zorin, chairman of the State Duma committee for nationalities; Vyacheslav Tikhomirov, commander of Russian troops in Chechnya; Sergey Stepashin, former counterintelligence chief and secretary of the state commission for the Chechen settlement; parliament deputy Nikolay Bezborodov; and Nikolay Fedosov, Russian government's plenipotentiary in Chechnya.

Russia is currently expecting Yandarbiyev to confirm the date of the meeting tentatively fixed on June 1, Slipchenko said. He also said that the commission intends to coordinate the ceasefire agreement mechanism with the separatists and solve the POW's issue.

According to Slipchenko, Tikhomirov is in charge of military issues while Bezborodov will negotiate for the release of prisoners.

Meanwhile, Tikhomirov is seeking a face-to-face meeting with rebels' military commander Aslan Maskhadov to work out measures to control the implementation of the ceasefire agreement.

"The federal administration has granted the separatists a number of concessions but they are still not using the opportunities for a compromise, which are aimed at a peaceful settlement in Chechnya," Tikhomirov said.

Russia: Negotiator Expects Treaty on Wide-Ranging Chechen Autonomy

MK3005130396 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS in Russian 30 May 96 p 1

[Interview with Vladimir Zorin, chairman of the State Duma's Nationalities Policy Committee, by Andrey Stepanov: "No Peace Treaty Has Been Signed Yet. But No Shots Were Fired in Groznyy Last Night. There Has Been Nothing of the Kind for a Long Time" — place and date not given]

[FBIS Translated Text] A war is more difficult to start than to finish. What you need to start a war is just a wish. In order to conclude a durable peace, however, you also need to have immense patience. Virtually no one cherishes any particular hopes yet — the Chechen war has already twice ended in "peace talks."

Nothing has yet been displayed except for good intentions. No papers, apart from the agreement on exchanging prisoners of war, have been signed either. What remains is to wait and hope that the two sides will not endlessly deceive each other, preparing to plant a bomb to assassinate yet another general and to grab at each other's throats with renewed vigor.

Your MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS correspondent has attempted to learn what can be expected this time from Vladimir Zorin, chairman of the State Duma's Nationalities Policy Committee, who participated in the talks.

[Stepanov] How realistic is the Tatarstan option with regard to Chechnya?

[Zorin] A draft treaty on the delimitation of authority with the Chechen Republic will be published in the very near future. For this reason it would be improper for me to disclose the content of this document in advance. The question of Chechnya is really a special case, and talking about a Tatarstani or a Yakutian option would not be quite appropriate. What is at issue is a draft that must take account of the realities of the past five years and the mentality of the Chechen people and, what is particularly important, provide for legal guarantees that the tragedies of February 1944 or December 1994 will not recur in Chechnya. These points will undoubtedly be taken into account.

[Stepanov] But Yandarbiyev and other Chechen leaders insist on their own Constitution, which will not necessarily be in line with the Russian Constitution.

[Zorin] By and large, we have not yet touched on this subject with the Yandarbiyev delegation.

[Stepanov] Does Yandarbiyev represent a fairly large group of Chechen leaders?

[Zorin] This is an interesting question, but it is difficult to answer as it is formulated. He represents the people who have arms in their hands. This distorts considerably the alignment of forces. The actual alignment can only be revealed in an election attended by all real political forces of the Chechen Republic.

[Stepanov] That is, had Moscow not considered him a representative of serious forces, there would have been no talks with him, would there?

[Zorin] Naturally. His candidacy was approved by the council of field commanders, and this is of crucial importance. In addition, as you know, his delegation included field commanders, who were present there as experts, and his national security adviser. This does not mean, however, that Yandarbiyev has no difficulties at all.

[Stepanov] And what portion of the Chechens could remain outside the political dialogue?

[Zorin] Only the future can tell. But there is an important factor in his favor: The armed forces of the opposition would lose their political weight and voice without Yandarbiyev. They are interested in him. He is a civilian, who has not been directly involved in combat operations.

[Stepanov] Is the incident of the Chechen delegation's canceled news conference symptomatic at all? Could Yandarbiyev continue saying one thing in Moscow and something diametrically opposed in the Caucasus?

[Zorin] Any negotiations mean a compromise. On the part of the federal center the very agreement to hold this meeting is a very considerable compromise. The State Duma is currently considering a draft resolution, which was initially entitled "On Amnesty" and now "On the Legal Guarantees of Nonpersecution of Participants in the Armed Conflict in Chechnya." You see the difference. On the part of the Yandarbiyev delegation there were somewhat fewer compromises, but they withdrew their demands on preconditions for talks to start. As for the news conference, I think that we will be able to agree on coordination in such cases. When we were parting, we discussed this question and agreed that we would not divulge information regarding the substantive part of the talks.

[Stepanov] What is the difference between the current situation and the situation that existed three years ago? It seems that, except for Dudayev's absence, nothing has really changed.

[Zorin] If we take the scope of demands that were put forward by the Chechen side at the time and now by the Yandarbiyev delegation, unofficially, of course, it does not transcend the limits of the treaties with Tatarstan or Yakutia.

[Stepanov] Upon returning to the Caucasus, the expression on Yandarbiyev's face and his gestures showed his displeasure with some aspects of the president's visit to Chechnya. Boris Nikolayevich said, for instance, that we have achieved victory and so forth.

[Zorin] But Yandarbiyev himself uttered the same words....

[Stepanov] What impact will this have on the continuation of the talks?

[Zorin] I think that the most important thing is not something that is declared at the beginning or even in the course of negotiations, but the real documents that are signed in the end.

[Stepanov] What negative aspects will, for instance, Chechnya's admission to the OSCE have for Russia?

[Zorin] None at all. After all, Belarus and Ukraine were members of the United Nations (in the Soviet era — MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS). This will simply be yet another guarantee that this agreement will be complied with and will give the Chechen people an extra right to use the international rostrum. [end of Zorin interview]

Nationalities Minister Vyacheslav Mikhaylov revealed some details of the talks at the INTERFAX press center. He said Moscow expects to receive from Yandarbiyev a list of all the illegal armed formations that report to him. The armed groups that will not be on the list will be deemed to be bandit formations and mercilessly eradicated. Furthermore, during his meeting with the Chechen separatists the Russian president promised them "a political future in the event that a reasonable compromise is found." This partly explains the subdued sentiments of Yandarbiyev and his group.

Russia: Kulikov Says Chechen Rebel Units Number 4,000 Members

LD3105084696 Moscow INTERFAX in English 0821 GMT 31 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MOSCOW, May 31 (Interfax) — The strength of Chechen separatist units does not exceed 4,000, Russian Interior Minister Anatoliy Kulikov told members of the commission for Chechnya of the Council of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly in Moscow Friday.

He said the units have 500-800 irreconcilables, about 200 foreign mercenaries and up to 3,000 volunteers. "Many of them stay in the units in mountainous areas of Chechnya and fight against the federal troops under the armed pressure of the irreconcilables," said the minister.

By early December 1994 the armed forces of Chechnya-Ichkeria had 15,000 well-trained and armed soldiers. There were also up to 15,000 Chechen volunteers, said Kulikov.

"At that time the Chechen troops had about 100 medium tanks of the T-62 and T-72 type, 150 artillery guns and mortars, 260 training-combat aircraft and several helicopters, some 100 air defense launchers, 18 Grad mobile rocket launchers and 60,000 pieces of fire arms. All this materiel has been practically destroyed," said the minister.

A total of 16,000 gunmen have been killed during the combat operations in Chechnya, he noted. The separatist units are split and lack a single command and communication, said Kulikov.

He also said Chechen separatists do not have a common stand. "We are not sure whether Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev fully controls the separatists. We hope, however, that the Moscow agreement on termination of all hostilities in Chechnya will be fulfilled," said the minister.

He thinks there is only one way to achieve settlement in Chechnya, and that is a peaceful one. "This is our stand," stressed Kulikov.

Russia: Yeltsin Signs 'Powers-Sharing' Agreement With Perm Region

LD3105102596 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1015 GMT 31 May 96

[By Leonid Bagdatyev and Andrey Shtorkh]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] PERM, May 31 (Itar-Tass) — Russian President Boris Yeltsin, currently visiting here, today signed a powers-sharing agreement between the Federal Government, on the one hand, and Perm Region and the Komi-Permyak Autonomous District — on the other. The document was also signed by Governor of Perm Region Gennadiy Igumnov and Head of the Komi-Permyak Autonomous District Nikolay Poluyanov.

Taking the floor the signing ceremony at the local Drama Theatre, Yeltsin said that the agreement "gives scope, on the one hand, to creative initiative and independence, and, on the other, enhanced the responsibility of the territorial administration for the results of its economic and social policy".

The president stressed that "life has convincingly shown that agreements of this type tend to strengthen Russian statehood". "The purpose that we have pursued by signing powers-sharing agreements with the subjects of the federation," Yeltsin said, "was to grant the regions a measure of independence that they can shoulder, to give sufficient scope for their creative efforts for the good of the population of their regions, for the good of all of Russia, instead of issuing commands and orders, instead smothering the local initiatives". The president recalled that Perm Region was among the initiators of such agreements, which are now being signed throughout Russia.

Economic Issues

Russia: Chernomyrdin: Government To Decree Indexation of Capital

LD3005204896 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1945 GMT 30 May 96

[By Yevgeniy Tkachenko and Gennadiy Yezhov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] CHELYABINSK, May 30 (Itar-Tass) — The Russian government will decree the indexation of operating capital of enterprises in the end of the second quarter, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin said.

Chernomyrdin is on a working tour of the Chelyabinsk region.

Visiting the Chelyabinsk steel plant on Thursday, he said the Russian Finance Ministry had been already ordered to change accounting rules to this effect.

A member of the delegation accompanying Chernomyrdin told Itar-Tass that in conditions of inflation Russian enterprises practice the writing off of operating fund spending using as an expedient raw material acquisition prices.

This artificially boosts up profit, with drain of operating capital.

In effect, raw materials or products idle in ware-houses, while the price is going up. The price is written off as production using acquisition price figures.

Under the new rules, the proportion of the price for raw materials in the total cost of the product will be reported with indication of the latest purchase of raw materials.

Production spending, including for operating funds, will be also subject to reporting.

The new measure is to abolish the so-called profit tax, with an appreciable saving of corporate funds.

Russia: Central Bank Seeks To Enhance Reliability of Banks

MK3105104096 Moscow OBSHCHAYA GAZETA in Russian No. 21, 30 May-5 June 96 (signed to press 29 May 1996) p 2

[Report by Rustam Taktashev: "Banks Have Been Divided Into 'Clean' and 'Unclean'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Recently, the Central Bank prepared a draft concept of its activity. The document is aimed at stabilizing the financial situation in the country and enhancing the reliability of banks. The Central Bank defined which financial structures will now be considered "problematic" (that is to say, unreliable) and which, quite the contrary, will be granted the most favorable treatment. Your OBSHCHAYA GAZETA correspondent asked Aleksandr Turbanov, deputy chairman of the Central Bank, to elaborate on the draft.

"The draft concept has arrived in a timely manner. According to the Central Bank, there are at present approximately 300 financial structures operating in Russia the reliability of which is in serious doubt. Therefore we sought to work out a kind of an early response system. It defines criteria for classifying a bank as a problem bank. They [the problems] will be subdivided into three groups as follows: loss-making operations over a period of one month will be punishable by a fine; when a bank shows no profit for three months, the Central Bank recommends that its management be replaced or appoints its own temporary management; and finally, if a financial structure has developed signs of bankruptcy (no profit for a year), it will lose its license.

"The Central Bank intends not only to toughen its policy toward unreliable banks, however. Those structures that are temporarily in a difficult situation, but that play a key role in the country's financial system, will receive assistance. (That is to say, they will be helped out of their crisis.) The Central Bank defined five criteria for identifying those banks that are vitally important to the national economy — for instance, if a bank's assets constitute more than 1 percent of the assets of the aggregate financial system, or if a bank's investments in the economy exceed 1 percent of the overall investments.

"It should be noted that it is enough for a bank to meet at least one criterion. Thus far there are 35 such banks in the country (I shall not name them so as not to place them in a preferred position). These financial structures will be constantly overseen by the Central Bank. We are even ready, should there be an urgent need, to support them with budget money. To this end we shall set up a special subdivision (tentatively called OPERU-2) which will provide settlement and cash services to elite banks. It will also supervise their activity."

Russia: Consumer Price Movement Suggests Promising Outlook

MM3005141596 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 29 May 96 p 3

[Report "based on Russian Federation State Committee for Statistics figures": "Cheery Economic Outlook"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Over the past week the consumer price index stood at 100.3 percent, including 100.4 percent for foodstuffs, 100.3 percent for nonfood goods, and 100.3 percent for paid services to the population.

If things continue in this vein, the consumer price index for the month could total 101.5 percent. And if the current, May price growth is maintained until the year's end, the consumer price index in 1996 could stand at 127 percent.

In foodstuffs the fastest risers were vegetables. Thus, cabbages were up 5.5 percent, and carrots 2.3 percent. Alcoholic beverages were up 1 percent on average. Brandy was up most (by 1.6 percent), while beer was up 1 percent and vodka slightly less (0.9 percent). Vegetable oil, animal fat, margarine, milk, dairy products, sugar, mayonnaise, apples, eggs, potatoes, beet, tangerines, and oranges fell by 0.1-1.2 percent across Russia as a whole.

The cost of the basket of 19 basic foodstuffs averaged 256,300 rubles 20 May.

Russia: Budget Arrears To Be Covered by Selling Blue Chips

MK3005130996 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian 30 May 96 p 2

[Report by Olga Romanova: "Privatization Has Been Adjourned Till the End of the Year"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Vladimir Malin, deputy chairman of the Russian Federal Property Fund, failed to clarify yesterday how the budget target regarding privatization revenues was going to be attained. Let us recall that the total treasury receipts from privatization in 1996 should amount to 12 trillion rubles.

Outwardly, everything looks good: In the fourth quarter, Russian blue chips will start to be sold at auctions and competitions. As a result, the federal budget will receive 3-4 trillion rubles. Naturally, the peak of sales is likely to fall on the end of the year. There are seven lambs aimed for the slaughter: Rosgosstrakh [Russian State Insurance (Company)], YeES Rossii [Russian Integrated Power Grid], Rosneft [Russian Oil (Company)], SIDANKO [oil company, expansion not given], Sibneft [Siberian Oil (Company)], ONAKO [oil company, expansion not given], and Vostochnaya Neftyanaya Kompaniya [Eastern Oil Company]. Oil holdings will have to part with 30 percent of their shares; the YeES Rossii Joint-Stock Company, with 10 percent; and Rosgosstrakh, with "a large package."

Arrears of the plan are expected to be raised by way of a crafty budgetary maneuver whereby shares of federal enterprises are to be transferred to the Russian Federation components where they are located. By some mysterious reason, this should replenish the treasury by 5 trillion rubles, although it is known that by moving money from one pocket to another usually nothing is gained.

The deficit is planned to be covered in the most cunning way: by the settlement of the debts to the budget to be effected by the purchasers of the shares of debtor enterprises. Thus, the companies aimed for auctions and competitions can now regard themselves free from any obligations and use "unnecessary" money "to give a start" to their affiliated or friendly companies, which will later buy themselves out. The only feature distinguishing the present privatization pattern from that used last year (naturally, except the election) is a certain formal estrangement of the GKI [State Property Committee] from this process. Incidentally, General Prosecutor Yuriy Skuratov told INTERFAX yesterday that in early June official results of the audit of the privatization process in general and the GKI in particular would be made public.

Russia: Government Extends Siberian Regions' Loan Repayments

MM3005141796 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 29 May 96 p 5

[Untitled Russian Federation Government Directive No. 671, signed by Premier Chernomyrdin and dated 23 April 1996]

[FBIS Translated Text] The proposals from the Russian Finance Ministry and Russian Federation component executive organs to extend as an exceptional measure until 1 October 1996 the deadline for the repayment of budget loans in the amount of 530 billion rubles [R] — including R300 billion for the Republic of Sakha

(Yakutia), R20 billion for Maritime Kray, R150 billion for Kamchatka Oblast, R50 billion for the Koryak Autonomous Okrug, and R10 billion for the Evenki Autonomous Okrug — that were allocated in 1995 out of federal budget funds in accordance with Article 43 of the federal law "On the Federal Budget for 1995" are hereby adopted.

[Signed] V. Chernomyrdin, chairman of the Russian Federation Government
[Dated] Moscow, 23 April 1996
No. 671

International Affairs

Ukraine: 'Orthodox Zone' Proposed To Counter NATO, Russia

AU2905111996 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 24 May 96 p 5

[Article by Vitaliy Chechylo, director of the "Yevraziya" Center for Regional Studies: "Partners Among Potential... Adversaries?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Two world wars that were the bloodiest in the history of mankind swept through the territory of Ukraine as a result of the West-East confrontation in the 20th century. Those wars claimed the lives of about 20 percent of Ukraine's population and 83 percent of our country's national wealth. That is why Ukraine is doing everything possible to prevent a new pernicious confrontation between the two sides. The striving by our politicians to integrate the country into the European security structure is also understandable. However, notwithstanding the obviously positive nature of the task, the methods for its accomplishment seem to be quite dubious.

The Ukrainian security policy is now clearly pro-Western: It is hoped that through establishing close partnership relations with NATO, our country will be protected from all sort of surprises. However, the United States and its partners have totally different goals.

Not so long ago, the disintegration of the Soviet empire and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact made the world's leading analysts speak about the inexpediency of the North Atlantic Alliance's existence. Bold assumptions were made to the effect that it will first transform from a military-political bloc into a simply political one, and will eventually disappear altogether. Moreover, Germany and France advanced the idea of creating special army corps for actually expelling the American soldiers from Europe.

However, as it turned out, the "deceased" is alive rather than dead. Today, the issue of NATO's dissolution is no longer on the agenda. Instead, one can only talk of the unprecedented growth of its power and its dynamic eastward thrust. It didn't take the leaders of the European states long to become convinced that Russia remains as unpredictable as ever, and it is therefore not prudent to rush and liquidate the efficient counterbalance to Russia's imperialist ambitions. The West also strives to secure its victory in the "Cold War" through consecutive offensives, combining political means and military force. The decision on NATO's eastward expansion toward the CIS borders, the concurrent strengthening of Turkey's armed forces, and the stringent flank limitations of the Odessa Military District's combat strength in conformity with the CFE Treaty — all of this dispels any illusions about the West's peaceful intentions.

At the meeting of leaders of the CIS member countries in Almaty on 10 December 1995, the main factors of the military threat were clearly specified. They include bringing foreign troops into the territories of sovereign states, stepping up their might through establishing military-political alliances, and enlarging groupings of troops to such an extent as to alter the alignment of forces.

All of this is quite clearly visible in NATO's present actions. The ratio of NATO's armaments to those of the CIS is becoming three to one, and with eastern European countries joining NATO this ratio will reach four to one. That is why the game of yielding to the North Atlantic Alliance — staked on satisfying any of the United States' ambitions — may lead Ukraine to serious political consequences. One needs to remember that we will never become equal partners within NATO. We have a different mentality and dissimilar interests. It is only those officials and generals, actively capitalizing on this idea by making countless trips overseas, who urge joining the alliance.

At the same time one simply cannot help seeing that Russia is quite skillfully taking advantage of NATO's future eastward expansion. This enables it to find a potential adversary again, and therefore start modernizing its military-industrial complex and strengthening its power structures. On the pretext of the threat coming from the West, our northern neighbor is creating a powerful Russia-India-Iran alliance, having promised Iran to develop its nuclear technologies and India a road into space.

Unfortunately, both the Tashkent alliance, which is oriented toward Russia's priorities, and NATO do little to take into account our country's interests. It is also obvious that, while remaining at the junction of the two blocs, Ukraine will not be able to resolve the problems of its national security.

Just as the majority of civilized countries in the system of mutual relations rely upon collective armed organizations such as NATO, not only does Ukraine have the right to protect its interests in the collective security structure, but is even obliged to do so, counting upon the joint defense potential of a number of countries with similar levels of economic and historical development.

Having proclaimed itself a nonaligned state, Ukraine must nevertheless choose its partners in such a way as to avoid becoming an arena for hostilities between the West and the East. The very logic of historical development forces us to come out with the initiative of creating our own system of regional security. I mean the restoration of the so-called "Orthodox Christian zone" made up of those countries that once used to be parts of the Byzantine Empire. Such countries as Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Georgia, and Ukraine have always been drawn together by their common historical fate. Over centuries, they have remained Europe's backyard, having turned into agricultural appendages to the advanced industrial countries. More importantly, in the course of the violent struggle for their independence, these countries have designated for themselves practically the same potential adversaries and allies as those that have been tested in battle.

Today, every one of these countries faces a decision: Which empire's state patronage should it seek in order to be able to extricate itself from the crisis? Nobody can do this on his own. There is, however, a different way out — the establishment of close partnership relations among themselves, relations that would be based upon common economic and political tasks. Such interaction will enable us to remain nonaligned, and at the same time form a reliable structure of national security.

Unfortunately, balancing between the United States and Russia has become a prevailing characteristic of the Ukrainian external policy, and this can achieve us nothing but belated repentance. The Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, having focused its attention entirely upon the problem of joining the European commonwealth and establishing partnership with NATO, has ignored the question of establishing close contacts with our immediate neighbors. For them, just as for Ukraine, the expansion of NATO and the strengthening of the Tashkent pact are extremely undesirable and dangerous, as they are bound to turn us into a buffer zone. That is why the creation of an association of countries with an integrated economy and policy and capable of claiming a worthy position in the world community is becoming the most topical task for the so-called "Orthodox zone."

Ukraine: Parliament Chairman on NATO Expansion

LD3005155396 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1336 GMT 30 May 96

[By Mikhail Melnik and Raisa Stetsyura]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] KIEV, May 30 (Itar-Tass) — Ukrainian parliament chairman Oleksandr Moroz met President of the Austrian National Council Heinz Fischer on Thursday to discuss NATO's expansion to the East.

"Ukraine is not interested in NATO's expansion to the East. I am not going to change my position until a new system of European security is worked out," Moroz told Fischer, who is heading an Austrian parliamentary delegation, which is currently in Ukraine on an official visit.

An international conference on European security may be held in Kiev next year, Moroz said. He was the one who initiated the conference, and some countries have already joined the idea, he said.

Fisher, for his part, said that Austria considers that the issue of NATO membership concerns only the countries themselves and NATO.

On Thursday, Fischer is expected to meet Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma and government members.

Ukraine: Recent Turns in Relations With Russia Viewed

WS3005120596 Kiev ZERKALO NEDELI in Russian 25-31 May 96 p 2

[Article by Yuliya Mostova: "Viktor Chernomyrdin: 'Boris Yeltsin's Readiness To Visit Kiev Is Higher Than Ever Before'"]

[FBIS Translated Text] A Russian advance team, which arrived in Kiev the day before a visit by Russian Federation Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, comprised 56 people. Approximately half of them were lawyers, economists, and state officials in charge of politics. Viktor Stepanovich brought another 15 people with him on 23 May. Initially, it was planned to hold meetings of four bilateral working groups on issues concerning the division of the Black Sea Fleet, compensation for the tactical nuclear weapons withdrawn from Ukraine in 1992, and economic cooperation, as well as to discuss the accommodation of foreign missions and division of property located abroad.... All day long all of the Russian experts, except for a few of them, admired the view of Hrushevskyy Street from the windows of the Cabinet of Ministers building: There was virtually no meeting of experts, but the protocol time reserved for a tete-a-tete between [former Ukrainian Prime Minister] Yevhen Marchuk and Viktor Chernomyrdin became a two hour conversation, and a meeting with the Ukrainian president, in which National Security Council Secretary Volodymyr Horbulin and Dmitriy Ryurikov, President Yeltsin's foreign policy adviser, also participated, lasted three hours.

No documents were signed at Mariyinskyy Palace. The prime ministers did not even countersign the uncontroversial agreement on trade and economic cooperation between Russia and Ukraine in 1996. "Give me a document, and I will sign it," Viktor Chernomyrdin said in Moscow on 17 May, thus expressing the Russian side's readiness to give Ukraine $450 million as compensation for the withdrawn nuclear weapons. In Kiev, Viktor Stepanovich said that the document was actually 99.9 percent ready, and confirmed the sum which should be deducted from Ukraine's debt to Russia as a result of signing the agreement. However, the Russian Federation prime minister promised that the document would be signed on the first possible occasion. In principle, it is unclear what made it impossible to sign the document in Kiev. Despite the fact that official Moscow denies that the problems of the Black Sea Fleet and compensation for the tactical nuclear weapons have bogged down, once can assume that "10 percent" of the issue of $450 million is connected with the Black Sea Fleet problem. It was not difficult to presume that agreements on parameters, conditions of stationing, payments, and terms of lease of the Russian Black Sea Fleet would not be signed either.

The lack of tables for signing at the Mariyinskyy Palace protocol room enhanced many journalists' assumptions that the talks had been unproductive.

But perhaps one should not draw such hasty conclusions. To clarify what Viktor Chernomyrdin took back with him, it would be advisable to understand why he came here. Moreover, what kind of "emerging domestic problems" made Viktor Chernomyrdin arrive in Ukraine a day ahead of schedule? It is only clear that this hasty visit was not caused by a willingness to delight the Ukrainians with reducing their debt by $450 million. Of course, the Russian prime minister did not come to Kiev to attend the ceremony of handing over an agrement (permission to work in a country) to Yuriy Dubinin, new extraordinary and plenipotentiary ambassador to Ukraine, by the "humbled" Ukrainian side. One can suppose that Viktor Chernomyrdin arrived in Kiev with one goal: To help President Boris Yeltsin win the presidential elections, both financially and morally.

In Moscow's top political circles there is talk that the Russian special services have presented to Boris Yeltsin information about sponsoring the left-wing press by Gazprom in certain Russian oblasts. There are rumors that, in this regard, Viktor Chernomyrdin, who oversees the entire Russian gas empire, had a few unpleasant minutes during a conversation with the president. Gazprom President Rem Vyakhirev had equally unpleasant minutes during a meeting with Chernomyrdin, as a result of which he urgently flew to Ukraine, where he presented the Russian side's persistent demand (or request) to pay for delivered gas not in goods but hard currency. How the Ukrainian side met the Russians half-way you can read in the economic section of this issue of ZERKALO NEDELI.

As for the moral support for Russian presidential candidate Boris Yeltsin, the talk was certainly about Boris Nikolayevich's possible visit to Kiev prior to 16 June. As everyone knows, Boris Yeltsin does not want to come to Ukraine as a tourist, but as the commander of Sevastopol. This requires the Ukrainian side's consent to the Russian terms of the Black Sea Fleet's stationing. There have been reports that during the two-hour tete-a-tete between Leonid Kuchma and Boris Yeltsin during the G-7 summit in Moscow, the Ukrainian stance became somewhat softer, which naturally made the Russian prime minister's visit to Kiev possible. However, it seems that after a more comprehensive examination, the Ukrainian leadership understood that there was nowhere to retreat. As a result, everybody is sticking to their positions with regard to the Black Sea Fleet issue, even though in Moscow Viktor Chernomyrdin said that "Sevastopol will be the main base of the Russian part of the Black Sea Fleet." Additionally, the Russian Federation prime minister emphasized that "the issue of the Black Sea Fleet's future is very important for Russia."

One should not categorically say that it is impossible to hand over to Russia bays in Sevastopol which were intended for the Ukrainian Black Sea Fleet. Everything is possible in Ukraine, whose history saw Massandra [venue of meeting between Yeltsin and former President Kravchuk on the Black Sea Fleet].

Nonetheless, there are still more reasons to think that Ukraine will not make substantial concessions regarding territorial issues and terms of lease. First of all, Boris Yeltsin's presidency is not worth Ukrainian land. Second, Leonid Kuchma endures personal contacts with the current Russian president better than Leonid Kravchuk did. (It is not clear whether Kuchma is stronger than Kravchuk or Yeltsin became weaker). Third, following the two-hour conversation with his Russian colleague, Leonid Danylovych became imbued with unexplainable conviction that Boris Yeltsin will remain the president for a second term without sacrifices concerning the Fleet. Evidently, these are the origins of Leonid Kuchma's famous statement: "Whatever the results of the elections in Russia, Boris Yeltsin will be the president anyway." In principle, there is nothing humorous in this phrase, but there are reasons for observers to think about the Russian elections.

Fourth, giving up Ukrainian positions after five years of negotiations and before a constitutional referendum may cost Ukraine not only bays for 100 moorages, but also serious destabilization in society — with all the ensuing consequences. And finally, one should not forget that in this situation, international law regulating the presence of foreign troops on the territory of another country is in favor of Ukraine. These are facts, and emotional arguments presented by the Russian side — speaking about the "bones of Russian sailors" and blasphemously using this argument while exerting moral pressure on Ukraine — is certainly unsuitable for the Russian prime minister. The thousands of graves of Ukrainian soldiers along Volkolamsk highway or near Stalingrad and Kursk [sites of World War II battles] are not used by Kiev as an excuse to lay territorial claims. Moreover, to resort to similar arguments during talks with both the first Ukrainian president, whose father is buried in Belarus, and the second one, whose father died near Leningrad, is at least unethical.

From Kiev's viewpoint, one can assume in all probability that 2 June — the 11th in a row date for Boris Yeltsin's arrival in Kiev — will remain a mere proposal by experts. From Moscow, everything looks different. Moscow is preparing for the visit, evidently traditionally believing that Kiev will give in. At least, Moscow politicians have grounds to think so, because there has been no precedent of disobedience in the Ukrainian-Russian political relations. Moscow is drafting a package of documents which will be submitted for signing during the visit to Kiev. Among them, according to Chernomyrdin, there is a large-scale treaty on friendship and cooperation, a trade and economic agreement, a science and technology pact, and a deal on teamwork in nuclear power engineering. A group of Russian experts yesterday departed for Sevastopol, who, after studying the situation there once again, will also visit Kiev. People in Russia think that Leonid Kuchma, who promised to support Boris Yeltsin during the CIS summit, should display support for Russia's democratic forces in practice. And Moscow cannot see any better support than a successful visit to Ukraine.

At the same time, as for support for the Russian president, Ukraine has already displayed enough of it. It is not ruled out either that the unequivocal betting on Yeltsin's candidacy was not the most well-considered step. As it is, one should not forget that Russia's history already experienced a failed welcome of a "New Political Year" after the first Duma elections, when "Russia's Democratic Choice" which was supported within the limits of the Sadovoye Koltso [the Garden Ring — a road surrounding central Moscow] suffered an overwhelming defeat. And "Russia Is Our Home," whom everybody seemed to love, recently received a "devastating" 8 percent....

Returning to the results of the visit, one can presume that the sides managed to reach agreement on certain things, about which only the five Russian and Ukrainian politicians who locked themselves in the presidential office know. Perhaps some "semifinished" financial and political decisions were made. Whether they will take the form of "finished products" or not will become clear next week. Thus far, the sides have agreed not to comment on the results of the negotiations and have only said that they were satisfied with them. After all, they are politicians to speak in this manner. Regarding Boris Nikolayevich's visit to Kiev, one thing can be said: Ukraine has been waiting for him so long that now it can act according to the following old joke from Odessa: "Let him worry now, and you go to sleep...." Official Kiev will start to worry after the Russian elections — regardless of their results...

Ukraine: Kuchma Meets Visiting Austrian Parliamentary Delegation

LD3005195096 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1645 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev — Ukraine is interested in cooperation with Austria, considering its role in world politics, Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma said during a meeting with an Austrian parliamentary delegation led Heinz Fischer, head of the National Council, on 30 May.

Kuchma said that today Ukraine first of all needs "political support for expanding cooperation with all the European structures." I am convinced, said Kuchma, that all these issues concerning the constitutional process in Ukraine will be solved in a civilized way. The country will have its constitution in September.

Answering questions of Austrian parliamentarians on Ukraine's position toward Poland's entry into NATO, Poland being Austria's neighbor, Kuchma noted that "no country has a right to veto any other country's entry in any international organization, in this case NATO." Kuchma also stated that Ukraine opposes deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of the countries of the Central European Initiative [CEI] that aspire to join NATO. He stressed that this should be stipulated in international documents.

During the meeting the sides discussed preparations for the official visit to Ukraine of Austrian Federal President Thomas Klestil scheduled for 22-23 October.

It is expected that during a meeting of heads of member states of the CEI on 7-8 June in Poland, Kuchma will hold a working meeting with the Austrian president.

Ukraine: Japanese Companies Cooperation Plans Cited

WS3105085996 Lvov INFOBANK in English 0627 GMT 31 May 96

[From the "News Service" feature; all Japanese names as received]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, 29 May — The Ukrainian Vice Prime Minister, who also heads the Commission for Economic Cooperation with Japan, Anatoliy Kinakh, met a delegation of businessmen of the Japanese association Keidanren. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss investment projects to be offered to Japan by Ukraine, as well as the utilization of the two credit lines for the total amount of $200 million granted to Ukraine by the Japanese government in 1996. Japanese businessmen are interested in cooperation with the PivdenMash plan ("Southern Machines") and the designing bureau Pivdenne ("Southern") in Dnepropetrovsk in the aerospace sector, and in the participation in the reconstruction of the Dnepropetrovsk association DniproShyna and the Kremenchuk Oil Refinery (Poltava oblast).

The Japanese delegation was headed by the Chairman of the Ukrainian Committee of the Japan-NIS Business Cooperation Committee, Jiro Kawake. Chief representatives in Moscow offices of the Export-Import Bank of Japan (Kyota Takahashi) and the Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi (Tadashi Matsumura) held talks with Anatoliy Kinakh and other Ukrainian officials regarding a possibility to attract new Japanese credits to the Ukrainian economy.

Before the talks in the Cabinet of Ministers and a meeting with Ukrainian President on May 29, the Japanese delegation visited a number of Ukrainian chemical and metallurgical plants, the Odessa port, the Odessa port plant and the company OdesaKabel ("Odessa Cable").

According to information provided to an INFOBANK correspondent in the Cabinet of Ministers, the Japanese government relies on the association Keindanren as on an unofficial expert in large business issues. The association consists of such companies as Mitsubishi, Itochu, Nissho Iwai, NEC, Sumitomo, New Oji Paper, Marubeni, Mitsui and others.

National Affairs

Ukraine: Udovenko, Rumored To Be on Way Out, Hails New Premier

MK3005131096 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 30 May 96 p 3

[Unattributed report under the "NEGA Reports" rubric: "Ukraine"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Foreign Minister Hennadiy Udovenko met with foreign ambassadors on Tuesday [28 May]. The head of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry said that the replacement of the premier would not "alter the course of Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma toward democratic, political, and economic changes."

Describing the new prime minister, Hennadiy Udovenko noted that Pavlo Lazarenko has profound experience in carrying out economic transformations. "The Government remains, although certain changes to it are possible," Hennadiy Udovenko told the foreign diplomats.

At the same time, officials at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry have said that Hennadiy Udovenko might himself be dismissed before long. Representatives of his entourage have noted that the minister did not refute the rumors, pointing out that the post of foreign minister is "attractive to many politicians in Ukraine." Dmitriy Tabachnik, chief of the presidential administration, is said to be Hennadiy Udovenko's most likely successor. According to independent observers, Mr. Tabachnik has considerably broadened the scope of his powers while at the helm of the presidential administration, obtaining the right to carry out his own policy on behalf of the president.

Ukraine: Marchuk Dismissal Seen Based on Rivalry With Kuchma

MM3005142596 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 May 96 p 1

[Report by Nikolay Musiyenko: "His Fellow Townsman Will Be More Dependable"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Late last week Yevhen Marchuk, now former Ukrainian prime minister, held talks in Kiev with his Russian counterpart Viktor Chernomyrdin and then made a lightning trip to Sevastopol. So, he hardly expected this to be his last "tour" or that President Leonid Kuchma would issue an edict Monday 27 May relieving him of his post on a purely formal pretext: "...in connection with his exercising the authority of Ukrainian people's deputy on a permanent basis."

Since it was not just Marchuk who "held two posts" (no one is even hinting at dismissing around 50 high-ranking government and presidential staff officials, who are also deputies) one must assume that the reasons for the premier's dismissal go deeper than that. Evidently Kuchma was unhappy that Marchuk failed to display adequate firmness during his talks with Chernomyrdin — Russia is still not agreeing to the joint basing of the Black Sea Fleet and the Ukrainian Navy in Sevastopol. What is more, there is the view in the republic that Kuchma has simply gotten rid of a dangerous rival, who stood a chance of becoming the country's president in the 1999 elections. Incidentally, last week Marchuk said that both the presidential and parliamentary elections should be held after Ukraine's adoption of a new constitution, that is, within the next few months. And besides he "dared" in his address to parliamentary deputies to call for the easing of the course of economic reform.

Pavlo Lazarenko has been appointed the new head of the Ukrainian Government, having hitherto held the post of first vice premier. Incidentally, like Kuchma he began his "rise" to the heights of power in Dnepropetrovsk.

Ukraine: Dismissals of Top Security Officials 'Expected Soon'

WS3105073496 Kiev INTELNEWS in English
0223 GMT 31 May 96

[By Halya Pavlyva, INTELNEWS Staff Writer]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, May 30 — The dismissals of Security Service Chairman Volodymyr Radchenko and Interior Minister Yuriy Kravchenko are expected soon, a government source said Thursday.

Following close on the heels of President Leonid Kuchma's firing of Yevhen Marchuk — a former Security Service chief — from the post of Prime Minister, the news, if confirmed, would indicate a major shakeup of the government's security apparatus.

"The change of the leadership of the government won't lead to changes concerning the economy and the strategy. The path is the same - economic reforms," Kuchma said, calling for a change of "tactics — the speed (of reforms) and more tough finance-budget policy."

The president confirmed that personnel rearrangements will "undoubtedly" take place in the government shortly.

"The issue has been waiting to happen long ago. I repeatedly spoke about that," Kuchma said.

Ukraine: Constitutional Democrats Urge Kuchma To Head Cabinet

LD3005163296 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1247 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, May 30 (Interfax - Ukraine) — "The President of Ukraine should take personal charge of the Cabinet of Ministers, and eliminate the office of Prime Minister" in order to overcome the "paralysis of the executive authority," the Constitutional-Democratic Party of Ukraine said in a statement faxed to IF-U on Thursday.

Yevhen Marchuk's resignation as Prime Minister was designed to "oust a political rival", the Constitutional-Democratic party believes.

The Constitutional Democrats believe that the presidential administration sets the guidelines for the performance of the executive authority in conditions of a mixed parliamentary-presidential system, while remaining "non-legitimized and accountable to nobody", the statement claims.

Ukraine: PM Sets 'Bail Out' for Coal Mining; 'First' Major Problem

WS3105074696 Kiev INTELNEWS in English
0223 GMT 31 May 96

[By Natalya Petyakh, INTELNEWS Staff Writer]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Kiev, May 30 — Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko attacked his first major policy problem Thursday, promising to allocate KBV35 trillion ($189 million) this year to bail out Ukraine's struggling coal mining industry.

At the same time, he vowed to press ahead with efforts to close many of Ukraine's most inefficient mines.

In a Cabinet of Ministers meeting he attended with coal mining management and union officials and President Leonid Kuchma, Lazarenko, said that, of this money, "KBV2 trillion will soon be earmarked for paying owed wages to miners," while KBV6 trillion will be used to give the industry a shot in the arm through state coal purchases.

Coal Minister Serhiy Polyakov assured that "the shutdown of 100 mines will be carried out mainly in Donetsk and Lugansk oblasts and this process will be gradual and under the severe control from the side of the government."

According to Coal Industry Ministry data, as of Thursday, 40 of Ukraine's 200 mines are striking — the highest rate since a January nationwide strike which paralyzed production. The strikes have cost the country about two million tons of lost coal production, while miners are owed some KBV38 trillion.

According to Viktor Derzhak, coal miners trade union chairman, miners from Krasnodon and Selidov have yet to receive January wages.

On Thursday wives of SelidovVuhillia miners production association picketed the Cabinet, demanding their husbands get paid and threatening a hunger strike.

Ukraine: Government Budgets Funds To Pay Miners' Wages

LD3005215696 Kiev UT-1 Television Network in Ukrainian 1800 GMT 30 May 96

[No video available]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The government has allocated 6,000 billion karbovanets to purchase coal for the state reserve. The coal industry will also receive in the early future an additional 2,000 billion. These funds will be used to pay wages to the employees of the coal industry. This is how Pavlo Lazarenko, first deputy prime minister, began today's working meeting at the Cabinet of Ministers, which dealt with the most acute problems of the coal industry at the instruction of President Kuchma, who has recently visited Donetsk Region. A news conference was held after the meeting.

(?For May-June) alone 17,000 billion karbovanets have been allocated through commercial banks for technical restructuring of 93 lavas. The Ministry of Power Engineering has received from the budget 6,000 billion karbovanets for renewal of its resources of so-called winter stores. The money has been used for the payment of miners' wages. Altogether this year the budget is to provide to the industry 35,000 billion karbovanets. Let us add to this the World Bank credits that have started to arrive for the structural modernization of the mining facilities. The first credit of $12.5 million has already arrived. The solving of social issues, in particular transferring social sphere facilities to municipal property, is currently acquiring an important role. Lugansk and Donetsk Regions have received 6,000 billion and 9,000 billion karbovanets respectively for these purposes. [passage omitted]

Economic Issues

Ukraine: Kuchma Expects Increased Investments After New Constitution

LD3005204596 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1726 GMT 30 May 96

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature: compiled by Anna Kovaleva, Nikolay Zherebtsov, Andrey Petrovskiy, and Boris Yunanov]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] President Leonid Kuchma hopes for a greater flow of investment into Ukraine after the country adopts a new constitution.

At a meeting with Japanese businessmen in Kiev, Kuchma spoke of being certain about the adoption of the new basic law, "a key factor of any nation's sustained development," which will help towards more investment into his country.

The president thinks the Ukrainian law makers begin to realize that the blocking of the new basic law is hopeless because "any economic development is impossible without a legislative basis."

The constitutional issu[illegible]s also on the agenda of Kuchma's meeting with the leaders of parliamentary factions and groups intended to discuss the behavior of left-wing deputies who derailed the sessions on Tuesday and Wednesday by refusing to register unless house rules were changed.

The meeting blamed the obstruction on Communist and Socialist members of parliament despite open reassurances by the Communists to get registered before the start of the Wednesday session, Kuchma's press office said.

The parliamentary leaders also discussed how to overcome the latest crisis and go ahead with the constitutional debate.

IF NOTE: After repeated attempts to raise a working quorum on Wednesday, Parliament Speaker Oleksandr Moroz announced a break until June 4.

Liberal Party leader Vladimir Sherban said Kuchma might dissolve parliament if the practice of obstruction persists. But Communist MP Oleksandr Steshenko says such a decision will mark an end to the Ukrainian state.

At a meeting with the ambassadors of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, Kuchma reaffirmed commitment to economic reforms following the appointment of a new prime minister.

(Prime Minister Yevhen Marchuk was dismissed on Tuesday and replaced by his First Deputy Pavel Lazarenko instead — IF).

But Kuchma also spoke of the need for reform correctives including tighter financial discipline and credit policy. He did not rule out a further cabinet shake up with an aim of consolidating its economic section.

President Kuchma and Environment Minister Yuriy Kostenko met on Thursday to discuss the government's position ahead of a G-7 experts meeting in Kiev on June 5 to discuss the closure of the Chernobyl nuclear plant and reforming the country's energy sector.

Agreement was reached that a clear-cut mechanism must be produced for financing the reconstruction of the concrete encasement of the wrecked 4th unit and safeguarding social security nets for the plant employees.

IF NOTE: Kiev announced willing to close the Chernobyl plant more than a year ago, but linked this with western aid to help offset lost capacities, make the station environmentally safe and provide social security guarantees to its staff.

Ukraine and the G-7 states meeting in Ottawa, Canada, last December signed a memorandum of understanding binding the West to extend a $500 million grant and $1.2 billion worth of credits from international financiers and the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] to Kiev.

At the end of the Moscow nuclear summit in April, French President Jacques Chirac announced western plans to provide a $3 billion aid to Kiev to help close down the Chernobyl plant.

On the same day Kuchma met his Foreign Minister Hennady Udovenko to discuss the course of preparations for the president's foreign tours.

On Kiev's entry into the Central European Initiative scheduled in Vienna on June 1, Kuchma stressed the need for Ukraine's strict compliance with obligations to that organization.

Kuchma also met two Ukrainian economists, Ihor Yukhnovskiy and Mikahil Mikhalevich to discuss the country's economic performance in 1994 and recommendations on its technological, investment and taxation policies. The president instructed to discuss these questions at a meeting by experts from all sectors of the economy.

Ukraine: President Gives More Powers to Payments Crisis Commission

LD3005094796 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian
0850 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Kiev [no date as received] — Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma has issued a decree giving more powers to the operational interdepartmental commission for overcoming the payments crisis, and approved its new composition by introducing amendments and addenda to his decree of 14 October 1994 on the operational commission for overcoming the payments crisis and on some measures to regulate settlements and payments.

The president's administration has told UNIAN that under the decree, the commission has the right to coordinate the activities of the bodies of state executive power as well as receive information, documents and materials it requires to perform its duties from the central and local bodies of state executive power, the Crimean government, enterprises, establishments, and organizations. Decisions taken by the operational commission are compulsory for the central and local bodies of state executive power. Prime Minister Pavlo Lazarenko headed the commission.

Ukraine: Commercial Banks Engaged To Pay Miners Wages

WS3105082596 Lvov INFOBANK in English
0627 GMT 31 May 96

[From the "News Service" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] On May 29, the Ukrainian Prime Minister, Pavlo Lazarenko, and the Governor of the National Bank of Ukraine, Victor Yushchenko, sent a joint telegram to commercial banks. The telegram permitted these banks to use extra-budget funds transferred to accounts of companies under the Ministry of Coal and budget funds aimed for their technical renovation, for to the payment of wages to coal-miners. According to the telegram, this is temporary state of affairs and will expire on September 1, 1996.

Belarus

Belarus: Minister: NATO-Seekers 'Splitting', Not 'Uniting' Europe

LD3005154496 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1451 GMT 30 May 96

[From the "Diplomatic Panorama" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MINSK, May 30 (Interfax-West) — The countries seeking NATO membership are splitting rather than uniting Europe, Belarusian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrey Sannikov told a news conference in Minsk Thursday.

The NATO contenders virtually enjoy the most-favored-nation status, while others cannot even hope for that, he said.

Belarus is unlikely to deploy nuclear arms on its territory even considering the possible NATO eastward expansion and the contenders' readiness to deploy NATO warheads, Sannikov answered an Interfax question.

Belarus is tied both by international treaties and a bilateral treaty with Russia on the pullout of the remaining 18 strategic missiles by the end of this year, he explained.

Belarus: Minsk Radio Cites Syanko Warning in Riga on NATO Expansion

WS3105081796 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0700 GMT 31 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belarus is not going to join a military union with Russia in the event the Baltic countries are accepted into NATO, Belarusian Foreign Minister Uladzimir Syanko has told a news conference in Riga. At the same time, the minister expressed the opinion that if the NATO expansion takes place quickly and the alliance's forces appear at Belarus' western border, this will not only cause anxiety and alarm, but something more serious.

Belarus: Syanko: Belarus Policy Not 'Mechanical Copy' of Russia

WS3105105096 Minsk BTK Television Network in Belarusian 1800 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belarus' striving for integration with Russia should not cause concern, including attempts to interfere, on the part of neighboring states. This statement was made in Riga by Belarusian Foreign Minister Uladzimir Syanko during his meeting with Latvian Saeima [parliament] Chairperson Ilga [Kreitusi]. Uladzimir Syanko underscored that Belarus' stance, which on many issues coincides with Russia's, is in no way a mechanical copy of the Russian Federation's viewpoints.

Belarus: Lukashenka Tries To Increase State Influence on Economy

LD3005202696 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1726 GMT 30 May 96

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] President Alyaksandr Lukashenka has ordered that all unregistered businesses be registered between June 3, 1996, and January 1, 1997.

A presidential decree published on Thursday prohibits any business to be done by an unregistered firm.

An enterprise which has engaged in an activity not indicated in its founding documents, has failed to declare profits and to present accounts, has prevented inspectors from entering its premises, has had no movement of funds on its bank accounts for six months, has engaged in no economic activity for the same period or has been running at a loss can be liquidated.

The owner of a liquidated enterprise which has debts to pay to the state cannot become the owner of a newly established enterprise.

The president has also instructed the government to propose stricter economic and criminal penalties for failure to pay tax. The proposals are to be ready within two months.

The president's deputy chief of staff Petr Prokopovich said one of the reasons for the decree was "the situation where many enterprises, especially ones engaging in trading and purchasing activity, evade taxes and understate their profits under various pretexts."

"And that is done at a time when national treasury incomes have sharply gone down, which causes delays in the payment of wages to public sector personnel and in the payment of pensions," Prokopovich told reporters.

He said this situation was the result of today's legislation, which, he said, failed to stipulate for strict punishment for tax evasion. "It (the legislation) has numerous loopholes for people who put their own well-being above that of society," he said.

Prokopovich said it was an important part of the decree that it made state and private enterprises equal before the law. A local government executive body could take measures against a state-owned enterprise, up to closing it down, in the same way as it could against a private one.

Prokopovich said the decree undoubtedly meant that the state increased its influence on the economy. "But this does not at all mean that the president and his administration are going to abandon economic reforms. On the contrary. Practice has proven that market mechanisms are the more effective the more actively and single-mindedly the state carries out its regulatory functions," he said.

Belarus: Lukashenka Bodyguards To Allegedly Punish Paper for Report

WS3005150496 Minsk BELORUSSKAYA DELOVAYA GAZETA in Russian 27 May 96 p 2

[Report by Pavel Sheremet: "The President's Guards Are Anxious"]

[FBIS Translated Text] **The president's love for our newspaper is ineradicable. The head of state's comrades-in-arms cannot leave BELORUSSKAYA DELOVAYA GAZETA in peace, either. These comrades-in-arms include people in uniforms, as well.**

As we have been informed by sources close to the Presidential Administration, following our publication of the report "The President's Selected Guard" on 6 May, the Security Council instructed the KGB to begin an official investigation into the case of disclosure of state secrets, while the State Committee for Printing was charged with the task of checking the legality of the publication of materials about special services' activities.

Which of the "courteous" meditations of the "mercenary" journalists has cut the president's comrades-in-arms to the quick this time?

As is known, Alyaksandr Lukashenka's power is founded on two things: populist rhetoric and the apparatus of repression. For the claim that Lukashenka is a populist, BELORUSSKAYA DELOVAYA GAZETA received a series of blows as early as last fall; for an offense to the President's Security Service, a blow will supposedly be delivered now.

The President's Security Service, men with shaven heads — a majority of whom have undergone not an intellect, but body fitness training — had probably believed in their full autonomy. Their commander Yuryy Barodzich is surely dreaming about [chief of the Russian President's Security Service] Aleksandr Korzhakov's laurels. There are rumors that he has already written several reports about Presidential Administration officials and is now going to focus on journalists. The closeness of another commander — [Lieutenant Colonel] Alyaksandr Lushnikaw, chief of the president's bodyguard service — to Lukashenka has led to a situation where the lieutenant colonel most likely identifies his own importance with that of the president. At present, he personally takes away photographic film from correspondents.

They [Barodzich and Lushnikaw] very much want to become generals. For the time being, however, they can only aspire to the rank of "black colonels." Besides, they forget that in Belarus the distance from colonel to general and back again to officer can be covered very quickly.

The Presidential Security Service cannot be secret, at least due to the fact that this service — as an independent power structure — is illegal: It is mentioned neither in the Constitution, in any law or resolution of the Supreme Soviet, nor even in any presidential edict. Therefore, the expression "illegal armed formation" is an aptly graphic term describing the essence of the President's Security Service.

Aides are Alyaksandr Lukashenka's main misfortune. He came to power by himself and he adopts all state resolutions by himself, while his aides do everything possible to attach a trail of permanent scandals to his rule. At the same time, they rebuke the press for some reason and forget about taxpayers — who have the right to know whom they are maintaining and at what price.

Belarus: 'Radical' Anti-Lukashenka Mood Said Growing in Provinces

WS3005145496 Minsk SVABODA in Belarusian 28 May 96 p 2

[Article by Ales Arkush: "Fighting Radicals in the Provinces Is Becoming an Increasingly Complicated Task"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Despite Lukashenka's crackdown on the participants in political actions in Minsk this spring, Belarusian radicalism is making its way to rank-and-file people. In the hinterland, this process has not yet finally assumed clear contours. However, the number of people ready for radical actions is rapidly growing. All opinion surveys are showing this tendency, including those conducted by "vertical" [propresidential] sociologists. People are weary of the promised improvements, while the nationally aware part of the population was extremely angered by the beatings and arrests of participants in the "Chernobyl Path" demonstration. Active opposition against the president's tyranny is under way. Unexpectedly, the leader in staging protest actions became Vitsebsk Oblast. It is in this oblast where white-red-white [opposition] flags are permanently hoisted and "seditious" leaflets spread. Also in this oblast a local newspaper published a verse by Slavamir Adamovich, "Kill the President," which sent him to a preliminary-investigation cell, and this is surely just the beginning.

As it turned out, combating radicalism in the provinces is a more complicated task than it is in Minsk. First, you cannot send as many policemen to all the towns and villages as to the capital (no budget would sustain this). Second, the local police are in no hurry to play the role of "people's oppressors." For example, Chernobyl picketers in Polatsk were brazenly seized by special-purpose brigades whose members live in barracks (hence, they are not local people). Everyone knows their local policemen. This is why when the picketers were taken to a police station, the local law-enforcement officers handled the detainees in an emphatically polite manner. No one needs trouble — even if they may happen in the future. Obviously, the Polatsk BNF [Belarusian Popular Front] members were detained without any good reason. The court in Polatsk found nothing criminal in the protesters' actions. (Afterwards, the BNF activists filed a complaint with the Prosecutor's Office in connection with their illegal arrest).

Any provincial policeman knows that hit he makes on people's kidneys may be repaid handsomely on his way home in the dark. Or, his car could all of a sudden break down. The list of bad things is quite long. Besides, there are more and more policemen who are sympathetic to "democrats" (the police servicemen are young). So, the former Interior Minister Zakharenka was right when he said that Lukashenka should not rely on the Interior Ministry troops so heavily.

Nor should he count too much on the provincial nomenklatura, even on the dedicated [presidential] "vertical" [power chain] activists. After private conversations with enterprise managers, bankers, and executive committee officials, I understood that they do not want to be held responsible for someone else's sins or used as "scapegoats."

Yet, the strongest opposition will be mounted by nationally aware "elements." (Who would climb on top of a 100-meter chimney to fix the national, banned flag if they did not care about Belarus?) The ranks of such "elements" are growing, and it should be noted that these are not all BNF activists. For example, I recently found in my mailbox a leaflet with anti-Lukashenka contents. The local BNF branch sincerely claimed that they had nothing to do with that. This means that some new national democrats have appeared.

Last week, when I went out of town for a picnic, I saw the white-red-white flag flown on someone's house. Someone installed his own order on his land.

Belarus: 'Tension' Between KGB, Interior Ministry

WS3105094096 Minsk SVABODA in Belarusian
28 May 96 p 1

[Report attributed to SIM news agency: "The Interior Ministry and the KGB Are in Conflict"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Recently, one could observe increased tension in relations between the State Security Committe [KGB] and the Interior Ministry.

For example, a police patrol in Minsk detained recently a KGB colonel. Despite the fact that the latter showed his service identification card, he was beaten and taken to a police station. It was not until a group of KGB representatives intervened that he was released.

KGB Chairman Uladzimir Matskevich sent a letter to Interior Minister Valyantsin Ahalets asking him to look into the incident and take necessary measures to punish the guilty.

Belarus: Official Denounces Opposition Rally in Minsk

LD3005195496 Moscow Interfax in English
1751 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] MINSK, May 30 (Interfax-West) — Vladimir Zametalin, deputy chief of the Belarussian presidential administration, has described the attempts by supporters of the opposition Belarusian Popular Front [BPF] to picket the residence of President Alyaksandr Lukashenka in Minsk Thursday afternoon as "another political provocation on the part of ultra-right forces."

In an exclusive interview with Interfax he said that "a pseudo-political emigrant, BPF leader Zenon Poznyak, guided" the opposition rally and the picketing attempt from Warsaw.

Protesters demanding the release from a KGB custody facility of seven members of the Ukrainian rightist UNA-UNSO group, charged with organizing mass disorders in Minsk on April 26, and two Belarusian citizens: Slavomir Antonovich, the author of a poem titled Kill the President!, and Boris Khomaida, the editor of the Vitebsk-based Vybor newspaper which published the poem, clashed with riot police in Minsk Thursday.

According to Zametalin, Belarusian ultra-right forces stepped up their activities after they suffered a crushing defeat at the latest parliamentary elections, when not a single member of BPF was elected to parliament.

"The bankrupt politicians are using any means, including the organization of provocations, to attract public attention and create an image of fighters for freedom and democracy," he said.

Belarus: SupSov Sets Up Commission To Examine Clashes in Minsk

WS3105095396 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0900 GMT 31 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Supreme Soviet has began its proceedings with a proposal to include new issues on the agenda. In this way, the deputies will soon consider a draft law on the introduction of amendments to the laws on the procedure for entering and leaving the Republic of Belarus and on the state customs duty, as well as some legislative acts regarding destatization and privatization.

The Supreme Soviet also paid attention to yesterday's events that took place in Minsk — picketing the building of the Presidential Administration. As the clashes between participants in similar actions and the law enforcement bodies have recently become more frequent, the "Civic Action" faction proposed creating a temporary Supreme Soviet commission to examine the events that took place in Minsk on 26 April and 30 May 1996. The deputies approved the proposal.

Kyrgyzstan

Kyrgyzstan: President Lauds CIS Interparliamentary Assembly

LD2805155496 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1118 GMT 28 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BISHKEK, May 28 (Interfax) — The Commonwealth of Independent States Interparliamentary Assembly is one of the best forms of interaction between CIS countries, Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev told the leaders of the parliamentary delegations who met here Tuesday.

"Parliamentarians do not only move our laws closer to one another, but, more importantly, they move our peoples, the greatest of all forces, closer," he said.

"The presidents, governments, and parliaments of all CIS countries strive toward bringing their countries to closer economic and humanitarian cooperation," Akayev told journalists.

"We have one goal: to renew production, as fast as we can, and begin economic growth so as to achieve a real improvement in the standard of living.

"This is what we all promise our peoples, but, unfortunately, all the moves come with difficulty right now," he said.

The dropping of customs barriers between Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan last week is the "first real step toward forming the economic union we have been talking about for almost four years now," Akayev said.

Customs barriers between Russian and Kazakhstan, and Russia and Belarus have already been dropped, and now "the area of these four countries is a shared free market," he said.

"We felt it immediately when our products started going to Kazakhstan," he said, noting that trade with Kazakhstan had fallen sharply in the past few years. Trade is now expected to double before the end of 1996. There are similar expectations for trade with Russia.

"This means the revival of production; factories will start working again, economic growth will begin and the lives of our people will improve accordingly," Akayev said.

Kyrgyzstan: Representatives to CIS Antimonopoly Council Announced

LD3005193996 Bishkek Kyrgyz Radio First Program Network in Kyrgyz 1300 GMT 30 May 96

[All names as heard]

[FBIS Translated Text] A resolution of the government of the Kyrgyz Republic has appointed Esenkul Kasymovich Omuraliyev, the first deputy minister of economy of the Kyrgyz Republic and who is also director of the state department for antimonopoly policy under the Ministry of Economy of the Kyrgyz Republic, as plenipotentiary representative of the Kyrgyz Republic to the interstate council on antimonopoly policy of CIS member states. Avazbek Dzhakypovich Gapyrov, first deputy director of the state department for antimonopoly policy, has also been appointed a representative to the interstate council on antimonopoly policy of CIS member states.

Kyrgyzstan: Deputy Minister Outlines Government's Main Goals

LD3005202996 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1726 GMT 30 May 96

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The social sphere is the most complicated and explosive area for the government, Mira Dzhangaracheva, Kyrgyz deputy prime minister in charge of social issues told Interfax Thursday.

The legal framework in this sphere is very imperfect, she said. "The existing mechanisms do not fit the market environment and do not work in a transitional period," Dzhangaracheva believes.

Job creation and prevention of mass unemployment, reorganization of the social insurance and pensioning system, reform of the education and health care system are the priorities of the government's social policy, she said.

Unemployment is an acute problem in Kyrgyzstan with 76,600 people registered as jobless, Dzhangaracheva said. The State Employment Service has organized retraining of the unemployed and temporary public works while 40,300 receive unemployment payments, she continued.

A 1996-98 job creation program has been drafted, Dzhangaracheva said. The government has to keep able-bodied population employed and the number of unemployed within 96,000 to 97,000 and provide social support to the unemployed, she said. Besides, the concept of an employment policy until the year 2005 is being worked out which will suggest specific recipes for tackling the unemployment problem in the light of the evolution of economic sectors and republic's regions, Dzhangaracheva continued.

The government wants the intergovernmental agreements with CIS member nations to work under which surplus labor could move abroad, she said.

Dzhangaracheva believes that the social insurance and pensioning system should be reformed. She called for a uniform state insurance and pensioning system controlled by a social fund reporting to the government.

The poor, nearly 1,257,000 of whom have been registered, account for nearly one third of the population, Dzhangaracheva said.

The government has to tackle the refugee problem, too. The number of refugees increase in 1995 by 46.8 percent on 1994, she said. The number of registered refugees from Tajikistan alone totals 14,000. Dzhangaracheva explained that because Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan have imposed tight migration controls, most refugees from Tajikistan move into Kyrgyzstan.

The Foreign, Interior, National Security and Welfare ministries are now drafting proposals on amending the provisional guidelines on refugees which would tighten the immigration control, the rules of granting the refugee status and regulations of deportation, she said. Dzhangaracheva added that parliament is drafting a bill on refugees and displaced persons.

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan: President Karimov Calls Germany Priority Partner in Europe

LD3005203296 Moscow INTERFAX in English 1726 GMT 30 May 96

[From the "Presidential Bulletin" feature]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] President Islam Karimov received Thursday German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel.

According to the presidential press service, during the meeting Karimov emphasized that Germany is Uzbekistan's priority partner in economy and politics in Europe. He said last year trade turnover between the two countries exceeded 1 billion DEM [German marks].

Such German giants as Siemens, Mercedes-Benz and others, actively operate in Uzbekistan. Karimov said cooperation between the two countries continues to expand.

According to a well-informed source, the two sides recognized they hold similar approaches to many current political processes in the world. Tashkent recognizes the great influence Bonn has on the modern world and wants to see Germany as a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council.

During the meeting Kinkel said Uzbekistan is a key partner for Germany in Central Asia and emphasized that Germany was one of the first countries to recognize Uzbekistan's independence.

The two sides discussed the further expansion of cooperation as well as the coming presidential elections in Russia.

Kinkel met the prime minister, foreign minister and business representatives of Uzbekistan as well as members of the 40,000 strong German community.

Uzbekistan: German Foreign Minister Supports Uzbek Reform

LD3005195396 Tashkent Uzbekistan Television in Russian 1430 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov received the German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel today. They expressed satisfaction with the intensive development of bilateral relations at the meeting. [passage omitted]

German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel met Erkin Halilov, the chairman of the Supreme Assembly of Uzbekistan, and Uzbek deputies today. Confidence was expressed that this meeting will not only help strengthen interparliamentary relations, but will also open new horizons for cooperation.

Another meeting was held today at the Uzbek Cabinet of Ministers, in two stages. During the conversation, Uzbek Prime Minister Otkir Sultanov told Klaus Kinkel about the progress of economic reform and the legal foundations and guarantees established in Uzbekistan for mutually beneficial cooperation with foreign partners. Kinkel noted that, although this was his first visit to Uzbekistan, he had managed to acquaint himself with the privatization program that is being implemented successfully in the republic and that is playing a great role in the country's economy. Germany, which regards Uzbekistan as a trustworthy partner, will help it set up beneficial relations with other countries of the European Union. [passage omitted]

A meeting of the heads of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the two countries was held at the Uzbek Foreign Affairs Ministry today. Abdulaziz Kamilov, welcoming the guest, noted that the current visit by Klaus Kinkel to our republic had been awaited with special interest, because Germany is one of the states with whom relations are of an open character, and because cooperation with it has been efficient in all fields. For his part, the minister of foreign affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany, having expressed the hope that upcoming meetings and talks will be successful, said that Uzbek-German contacts were fruitful both on a bilateral level, and within the framework of the OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe]. Germany supports Uzbekistan's aim of integration in European structures, he said. The need to continue mutual consultations both on matters of bilateral relations and on international issues was stressed in the course of the meeting. [passage omitted]

Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan: Gasanov Views Meeting With Russia, Georgia, Armenia

*LD3105105096 Moscow INTERFAX in English
1030 GMT 31 May 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] BAKU, May 31 (Interfax) — Baku attaches great significance to the summit meeting of Russia, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia due in Kislovodsk on June 3, Azerbaijani Foreign Minister Gasan Gasanov told Interfax on Friday.

"Any regional meeting is always to the benefit of peace," he said.

The minister described the forthcoming summit as being long overdue because the regional states beset by troubles were interested in serious discussion.

Gasanov said Azerbaijan was working on a draft declaration to be adopted at the end of the Kislovodsk summit.

Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksey Bolshakov during a recent visit to Baku handed the draft of a similar paper drawn up by Moscow to Azerbaijani President Geydar Aliyev.

Baku has on the whole found the draft acceptable because of expressed support for Azerbaijan's interests and its territorial integrity, a senior presidential source in Baku told Interfax.

"Of course, we do not think that the Kislovodsk summit will help resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh issue the following day, but Azerbaijan relies on support from Moscow and Tbilisi for its efforts in fighting against Armenian aggression and Armenian separatism," the source said.

Azerbaijan: Milli Mejlis Speaker Views Economic Integration With CIS

*NC3005203096 Baku TURAN in English
1328 GMT 30 May 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku /30.05.96/ TURAN — Participation in the processes of deepening of the economic integration within the frameworks of the CIS is profitable for Azerbaijan, TURAN was told by the speaker of the Milli Mejlis Rasul Guliyev.

"It is profitable for Azerbaijan to join the Customs Union Russia-Belarus-Kazakhstan-Kyrgyzstan and we are going to take part in similar economic integration," the speaker noted. At the same time, he noted that the talk can be only about economic and not political integration.

Azerbaijan: Azerbaijani, Armenian Presidential Advisors Hold Dialogue

*NC3005170096 Baku TURAN in English
1345 GMT 30 May 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku /30.05.96/ TURAN — State advisor for foreign political issues Vafa Guluzade have began negotiations in Paris with his Armenian colleague Zhirayr Liparityan, TURAN was told by diplomatic sources in Baku.

According to the information, these confidential talks started in Paris the other day and should finish tomorrow. The talks between the personal representatives of the presidents of Azerbaijan and Armenia are held without mediators. As before, the purpose of the talks is an attempt to rapproach the positions of the parties on key problems of the settlement of the Armenian-Azeri conflict.

It is the third similar meeting of Guluzade and Lipartyan. The last one took place with mediation of the U.S. in Amsterdam. The main result of the two previous meetings became the statements of the parties on the intention to continue the cease-fire regime and to support contacts up to signing of Major Political agreement.

Azerbaijan: Border Agreement With Russia Criticized

*NC3005203296 Baku TURAN in English
1328 GMT 30 May 96*

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku /30.05.96/ TURAN — Press-conference of the deputy of the Milli Mejlis, Deputy Chairman of the Party PFA [People's Front of Azerbaijan] Ali Kerimov devoted to the political results of the month took place today. Kerimov said that social and political situation in the South Azerbaijan [Iranian Azerbaijan] over this period became aggravated and the publicity of Azerbaijan is concerned about this situation.

Kerimov opposed the ratification of the agreement on border question signed by the president of Russia and Azerbaijan. He was mostly concerned about the point in the document according to which working groups of bordermen of both states consisting of 5 or 6 men will operate in Azerbaijan. Deputy Party PFA considers that such groups will be able to control the activity of the border troops of Azerbaijan on the Russian, Iranian and Turkish parts of border. "In fact it mean loss of sovereignty," Kerimov said.

Azerbaijan: Repercussions of Communist Resurgence in Russia Viewed

NC3005203196 Baku TURAN in English
1328 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Baku /30.05.96/ TURAN — "Victory of communists at the forthcoming elections in Russia will become a catastrophy not only for Russia but for many other states," TURAN was told by the speaker of the Milli Mejlis of Azerbaijan Rasul Guliyev.

He noted that the situation in Azerbaijan still remains complicated and impossible to foreseen, but in case if the leadership of the country change, civil war anarchy will begin in Russia. "I think the future of Russia is connected with those who will continue the policy of the economic and political reforms," Guliyev noted.

Georgia

Georgia: Shevardnadze Views Chechen Accord

LD3005122496 Tbilisi BGI in Russian
0935 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] [No dateline as received] — The signing of an agreement on Chechnya may become the first step toward settling conflicts in the Caucasus, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze said. In his opinion, this step will give a new impulse to talks between the leaders of the Caucasus republics to be held in Kislovodsk on 3 June. Vakhtang Abashidze, press secretary of the Georgian president, said that Eduard Shevardnadze pinned great hopes on the meeting, which could take crucial decisions on establishing peace and stability in the Caucasus.

This has been reported by the Alioni program of Georgian TV.

Georgia: 'Zviadists' Declare 'Complete Solidarity' With Chechens

AU3005162096 Tbilisi AKHALGAZRDA IVERIELI in Georgian 23-29 May 96 pp 1, 3

[Report by Tamar Otiashvili: "The Zviadists Are Rallying Around Mr. T. Kikacheishvili"]

[FBIS Translated Text] "On 27 April 1992, the Georgian National Salvation Movement-Resistance Front was founded in the courtyard of the Merab Kostava Museum. In 1993, on the basis of this movement, Georgian President Zviad Gamsakhurdia restored and renewed the 'Roundtable-Free Georgia' association of Georgian political parties and organizations. At that time, the 'Roundtable-Free Georgia' predicted that 1) the legal authorities would be overthrown; 2) Georgia's territorial integrity would be violated; 3) the genocide of the Georgian nation would begin; 4) demographic expansion would be organized in Georgia," stated Moris Museridze, head of the press service, at a news conference held by the "Roundtable-Free Georgia" association of political parties and organizations. He called upon us journalists to record what they had to say: "Everything we say today will come true just as our earlier predictions came true."

At the news conference, particular attention was devoted to the fact of President Dzhokhar Dudayev's murder that, as the "Roundtable-Free Georgia" stated, occurred during the meeting of the so-called seven in Russia, which "once more confirms that an international conspiracy, in accord with the Russian empire, is again being carried out against national movements. As is clear, national movements are not convenient for world order. It wants to turn the Caucasian peoples into an easily governable mass.... Given the methods used by Russia, Dzhokhar Dudayev's murder is a purely terrorist act, and it cannot be justified." It was pointed out that the circumstances surrounding the deaths of Z. Gamsakhurdia and Dzh. Dudayev coincided, which proves that both murders "were planned and carried out by one and the same service."

Mr. Ramin Rogava, acting chairman of the Georgian National Liberal Union, read out the "Roundtable-Free Georgia" statement regarding the murder of Dzh. Dudayev, in which representatives of the "Roundtable" state that they will not allow the national-liberation movement to be destroyed in Georgia and the use of terrorist acts to eradicate national movements will fail as "when one dies, another takes his place... until the national movement is victorious throughout the Caucasus."

"Roundtable-Free Georgia" Deputy Speaker Tengiz Kikacheishvili read out an address to Zelimkhan Yandarbiyev, president of the Chechen Republic — Ichkeria, in which, on behalf of the "Roundtable-Free Georgia," he declares complete solidarity with the heroic Chechen people's struggle for freedom who have the greatest number of supporters in Georgia and calls upon the president of Ichkeria to continue to the end what has been started: "So the last war may be crowned with victory. The children of the earth should fulfill the will of the deceased!"

Jemal Gamakharia, representative of the all-Georgian national-political movement "Chqondideli," read out a statement devoted to the genocide of the Georgian nation; it also concerned the decree "on measures to settle the conflict in Abkhazia" that was adopted by "Georgia's illegal Parliament" on 17 April 1996. They have called this document just a scrap of paper as it gives no assessment of the role of the main organizer of the genocide of Georgians in Abkhazia, namely the Russian empire, the treacherous actions of the Georgian commanders, particularly the commander in chief, and so forth.... According to their statement, Georgia's illegal authorities and the Yeltsin-Shevardnadze-Ardzinba alliance, along with the separatist regime, are the instigators of the war. "Shevardnadze's speech in the so-called Parliament regarding the Abkhazian question is only a justification on his part, slander against the legal authorities, and yet another attempt to split the nation."

The "Roundtable-Free Georgia" believes that Georgia's current authorities are continuing a capitulatory pro-empire political course that is leading us to the loss of Abkhazia and Samachablo [South Ossetia] and views "the abolition of the illegal regime of E. Shevardnadze and the restoration of the persecuted legal authorities" as the way out of the prevailing situation.

After reading the statement, J. Gamakharia stated that a new conflict was being prepared in Ajaria and that Armenia had violated Georgia's state border, about which the authorities were keeping quiet. Russia's ultimate plan is to bring Armenia to the Black Sea at the expense of southern Georgia, including Ajaria.

M. Musiridze read out an appeal from Georgians deported from north Kartli in which they request the European Parliament, the International Court in The Hague, and the United Nations to discuss, with the participation of qualified experts, "the prevailing political situation in Georgia in its correct legal and ethnographical aspect." Up to 1,000 refugees have signed the appeal.

After all the points on the agenda had been exhausted, representatives of the "Roundtable-Free Georgia" answered journalists' questions.

It was pointed out at the news conference that the "Samepo Liga" [Royal League] would very soon unite within the "Roundtable-Free Georgia" association of political parties and organizations. As regards pressure on the part of the authorities, they feel this at every step; representatives of the "Roundtable" are being dicredited. They have information to hand that the authorities intend to switch to direct repressions in the not too distant future.

Asked around whom the real "Zviadists" were rallying, V. Tsagareishvili [not further specified] said that such a leader was T. Kikacheishvili. T. Kikacheishvili himself views this obligation as a heavy burden and believes the creation of "Zviadism" to be Z. Gamsakhurdia's greatest achievement: "We love Zviadi because he created 'Zviadism,' that is to say he taught all of us to struggle for freedom, and I will do everything from beginning to end in this struggle," he stated.

The "Roundtable-Free Georgia" is organizing an all-Georgian national gathering in Vake Park [Tbilisi] at 1300 on 26 May. They have sent an appeal to the foreign embassies and the foreign organizations accredited in Georgia.

It is stated in the appeal: "We hope that you will not be afraid that E. Shevardnadze's regime will violently break up our peaceful gathering."

Georgia: Tbilisi Granted Special Status at Council of Europe

LD3005163596 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1348 GMT 30 May 96

[By Tengiz Pachkoria]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TBILISI, May 30 (Itar-Tass) — The coordination bureau of the Council of Europe granted to Georgia a status of a special invitee in this prestigious international organisation, Zurab Zhvania, Georgian parliament speaker, said on Thursday.

He noted that the decision was passed in France at a meeting of the coordination bureau of the Council of Europe on the night from May 29 to May 30.

The granting to Georgia of the status of a special invitee to be announced at a meeting of the coordination bureau of the Council of Europe in June, but in view of a favourable situation shaping in Georgia and around it the decision was made to grant this status to Georgia earlier than was planned.

Georgia: Russian Passports Smuggled to Abkhazia To Rig Elections

LD3005200896 Tbilisi CONTACT INFORMATION AGENCY in Georgian 1545 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Abkhazia — An election campaign in support of Russian Communist Party leader Gennadiy Zyuganov is under way in Abkhazia. Along with the communists of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, the so-called separatist government, led by Ardzinba is taking part in the election campaign. "Guests" from Moscow are arriving in Gagra, Sukhumi, Ochamchire, and other towns. They are calling on the local population and the military to vote for the Russian communist contender in the Russian presidential elections on 16 June. A source from Sukhumi told the press service of the Supreme Council of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia that 40,000 Russian passports have been smuggled into Abkhazia. This means that the so-called holders of these passports will give an additional 40,000 false votes to their party choice.

It has also become known that a large cache of firearms has been accumulated in Novyy Afon. These arms will be used at the first signal against the current Russian leadership.

Georgia: Defense Minister Discusses Army's Development

MM3005080896 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 May 96 p 2

[Interview with Lieutenant General Vardiko Nadibaidze, Georgian defense minister, by Captain Vitaliy Denisov; date and place not given: "In the CIS Armies: We Are Creating Armed Forces in the Russian Image"]

[FBIS Translated Text] There was a time when people in the former union republics were reluctant to listen to anything but talk about sovereignty. But times are changing. And now in-depth processes of integration can be said to have become a reality not only in the political and economic spheres but also in questions of military cooperation. A realization that we have many common interests in defense policy has taken root. KRASNAYA ZVEZDA is following very carefully what is going on in the friendly armies.

Our correspondent recently met with Lieutenant General Vardiko Nadibaidze, Georgian defense minister. We are publishing their conversation.

[Denisov] Mr. Minister, you have been in your present post exactly two years now. What can you say about this period in which Georgia's national army has come into being?

[Nadibaidze] We have achieved the virtually impossible. A regular army has been created out of scattered armed formations that used to frighten ordinary folk. By summer 1994 we were faced with the highly complex task of disbanding various armed groupings, of which there were around 50 at the time. This was essential given that a terrifying crime situation had developed in the republic along with an extremely grave economic crisis. And the most terrifying thing was that the military began committing crimes.

I met and spoke with field commanders and made them think about the country's future. We succeeded in achieving the required result — over 10,000 men returned to civilian life. Those people who had expressed a desire to remain in the service were reassigned to other units and subunits and sent to military higher educational establishments for training.

The next step was to staff the national army on the basis of conscription. The first draft in spring 1994 was the hardest, but by the fall it was already far more organized. The upshot is that units and subunits of Georgia's Armed Forces are 87-percent manned today. All branches of service have gradually taken shape and developed. These forces are based on Ground Forces, which include the quantity of motorized rifle, artillery, antiaircraft-missile, and special units and subunits to enable us to perform the most complex tasks in an extensive theater of combat operations.

A full-fledged air defense structure has been recreated within a short period, which enables me to say that Georgia's air borders are reliably protected. The Air Force is also on the up. A long-term program for the organizational development of the country's Armed Forces has been elaborated.

I can firmly say that the country does have an Army. A combat- capable Army. As for our future military doctrine, which has a clearly defined defensive nature, it boils down in short to the following: We do not want what belongs to others, but we will not surrender what is ours.

[Denisov] What will the Georgian Army gain from participation in CIS military integration?

[Nadibaidze] The Georgian Army's main problem remains its lack of professional cadres. We cannot resolve that problem on our own today. That is why we asked the Russian Federation Defense Ministry leadership for help and back in fall 1994 we sent over 70 people to Russian schools and academies.

About the same number of our servicemen are studying there today. This became possibly largely thanks to the vigorous support of Army General Pavel Grachev, Russian Federation defense minister; Army General Mikhail Kolesnikov, chief of the General Staff; and the Russian Defense Ministry leadership as a whole. I am sure that this cooperation will continue in the future also.

Among the other examples of military cooperation I can cite joint command-staff training drills, operational courses, and much else besides.

As for integration with the other CIS countries as a whole, the creation of a single Air Defense system is the clearest illustration of that. This idea was first put forward by the Georgian side and this proposal, which was initially only presented in outline, has already been given real substance. With Russia's aid, Georgian Air Defense forces and facilities have virtually been restored, which has made it possible to securely seal the CIS's southern air borders.

[Denisov] Nevertheless today Georgia does not seem to have fully made up its mind on the strategic partnership question. You get the felling that the country's leadership is faced with a choice between interaction with NATO and cooperation with Russia....

[Nadibaidze] I can state unequivocally that all the accusations directed against Georgia that it is falling into "NATO's embrace" are absolutely unfounded. Today, even if we wanted rapprochement with the North Atlantic bloc, that is simply impossible. And NATO representatives do, incidentally, realize that.

We have certainly elaborated and adopted an individual "Partnership for Peace" program. This is a good and necessary program. But, globally speaking, partnership primarily means mutually beneficial cooperation. And you cannot expect that right now, given the current position of Georgia and its Army. That makes it necessary to take a realistic look at life rather than from the viewpoint of the jingoists, who see NATO as our only means of defense and salvation.

Given that most of the Georgian Armed Forces' command and leadership personnel are products of the Soviet and Russian military school, given that we have built the Army in the image and likeness of the one of which we are the product, and that we are aware and conscious of real and effective aid only from Russia and the CIS, I can say that cooperation in the northern rather than in the western sector is a priority for us, no matter how some people would like the opposite to be true.

[Denisov] It is no secret that some people in Georgia consider Gen. Nadibaidze to be Russia's protege....

[Nadibaidze] I am first and foremost my people's protege. And I am doing everything I can in my position to ensure the motherland's well-being. At the same time I am proud of the knowledge and experience that I acquired during my service in the ranks of first the Soviet and then the Russian Army. And even if for some people I am an "overly Russian Georgian general," I am devoting all my efforts and experience to the Georgian Army. Honestly, without stinting. I am not trained to live and serve in any other way.

[Denisov] Russian military bases are deployed on Georgian territory. But their status, despite the initialing of the corresponding agreement, has not so far been defined. What is more, voices can be heard in the republic demanding their removal from the country. What comment can you make on this situation?

[Nadibaidze] There must be Russian bases on Georgian territory. We will not be able to build a full-fledged army of our own for the next 20 years without Russia's military bases. And our state interests are directly dependent on the Russian military presence in the region.

People who do nothing but talk, speak of "occupation" and the withdrawal of the troops. Do such attacks offend the Russian side? Undoubtedly. Do they bother us? Of course they do. But fortunately most of the Georgian population thinks differently. The people realize better than some of their own "leaders" that Russia is our destiny, our historical predestination, and, lastly, our security.

Georgia: Human Rights Group Says Police Regime 'Raging' in Country

AU3005102596 Tbilisi AKHALGAZRDA IVERIELI in Georgian 23-29 May 96 p 1

[Unattributed report: "The Association Believes That a Police Regime Is Raging"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The All-Georgian Association for the Protection of Human Rights recently held its VI [Roman six] regular conference at which new structures were elected: Association president — Giorgi Kervalishvili; vice-president — Zaza Davitaia. They elected auditing and juridical commissions. The conference adopted the following resolution that we are publishing in abridged form:

"Against the background of the total disregard for universal human rights in Georgia, the peaceful struggle is continuing to establish true democracy. A police regime is raging in the country; they are opposed first and foremost to those who espouse views that differ from the position held by the authorities. There is disregard for the supremacy of the law, which the state structures themselves not infrequently encourage. The police, procurator's office, and the court often conduct investigations and trials in a biased manner, as a result of which the number of political prisoners has reached a certain peak: The physical and psychological abuse of people, particularly prisoners, has become a tradition. In the view of the association, all this stems from the armed coup d'etat that occurred in December-January 1991-92 as an antistate and antihuman event.

"In such a situation, the association is continuing its activities to protect human rights, expose pseudodemocracy, and establish a true civic society that corresponds to the norms determined by international law."

Georgia: Tbilisi Police on 'Red Alert' Because of Crime Wave

LD3005101396 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1005 GMT 30 May 96

[By Tengiz Pachkoriya]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] TBILISI, May 30 (Itar-Tass) — Georgia's [Deputy] Interior Minister Kakha Targamadze placed on red alert the municipal police in Tbilisi as a wave of grave crimes swept across the capital, the ministry's press office said on Thursday.

Police units attached to the ministry together with detectives will stay in barracks pending the exposures of a number of recent felonies. Head of state Eduard Shevardnadze is reportedly personally following the investigation of one of the murders committed in Tbilisi.

Georgia: NDP Parliamentary Faction Announces 'Split' From Party

AU2905142996 Tbilisi KAVKASIONI in Georgian 22 May 96 pp 1, 3

[Report by Nutsa Rukhadze under rubric "Parties": "The End of Unity — an Own Goal"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] "It is with great chagrin that I must state that the party is, in reality, facing the problem of a split. What was expected has happened. This is a great tragedy and pain for me. I think the most pragmatic thing today would be for the opposing sides to separate in a civilized manner, without any abuse being hurled. Unfortunately, we should get used to the idea that two independent organizations — with their different styles, views, and mentality — will exist on the basis of the NDP [National Democratic Party]. On account of differences of opinion on a whole number of issues, the NDP parliamentary faction has disassociated itself from the party's chairwoman [Irina Sarishvili-Chanturia] and the personality of Mamuka Giorgadze has nothing to do with this. We have been trying for some time to reach a compromise with the opposing side, but those persons who have contributed to the split will not be members of the NDP faction. I view the instigation of this split as an attempt to weaken the sole opposition force in Parliament. Unfortunately, however, we probably could not prevent this," stated Mamuka Giorgadze, chairman of the NDP parliamentary faction, at an extended meeting of the NDP parliamentary faction held in the Rustaveli Theater on 21 May.

As supposed, the NDP chairwoman and the opposing side have failed to reach an agreement. The situation has become extremely tense and the NDP has, to all intents and purposes, split. The members of the opposing camps have a multitude of arguments and views to prove the correctness of their respective positions. They blame the split on each other. Neither party believes it is to blame for the breakup of the NDP. There is but one fact — one of the strongest and most influential political parties has split. Neither camp has been able to stop this process.

Gia Kobakhidze, who was chairing the meeting, stated that the congress held on 18 May was a gross violation of party rules. The decisions adopted were illegal. The organizers of the meeting in the Rustaveli Theater discussed this fact and adopted a corresponding resolution. [passage omitted]

At the end of the meeting, Giorgi Kobakhidze read out the resolution to those present:

"In spite of repeated warnings issued by the NDP main committee to the party chairwoman, on the latter's initiative, a so-called congress was held in gross violation of party rules, which, to all intents and purposes, signifies an infringement upon the party's integrity and its split. Proceeding from this, Irina Sarishvili-Chanturia has been unable to cope with fulfilling the function of NDP chairwoman that has always been viewed as a guarantee of the party's unity and strength and, in so doing, has placed herself outside the party. On the basis of the aforementioned, the NDP main committee resolves: The NDP main committee will be in complete charge of the party until the NDP's ninth congress that is to be held on 19-20 October of this year."

As the chairman of the meeting stated, on the basis of this resolution, the NDP parliamentary faction has adopted a decision on excluding the party chairwoman from the faction. [passage omitted]

It can be said that the NDP split on 21 May. [passage omitted]

Estonia

Estonia: Foreign Minister Addresses Parliament on Ties With Russia

LD3005183296 Tallinn Estonian Television Network in Russian 1545 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The key priority of Estonian foreign policy is political and economic integration into EU structures. This is what the country's Foreign Minister Siim Kallas stated today when addressing Riigikogu members.

Characterizing the present state of Estonian-Russian relations, Siim Kallas told the deputies that from 1994 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has been systematically approaching the development of relations with Russia by applying the policy of positive involvement.

According to the minister, the policy of positive involvement meant proposing to Russia mutually beneficial cooperation in a number of vital fields and an openness to proposals that came in response from Russia. On the whole, Siim Kallas rated the present state of relations with Russia in an optimistic light. According to the minister, both Estonian and Russian diplomats are currently busy preparing 47 agreements to be ready for signing. First and foremost, Estonia intends to conclude with Russia agreements on avoidance of double taxation, on protection of investments, and on cooperation between internal affairs ministries.

As far as the border issue is concerned, according to Kallas, the conclusion of an agreement must take place at an appropriate moment from the political point of view. The minister emphasized at the same time that in order to seek a final solution to the border issue it is vital for political decisiveness to be displayed both in Moscow and in Tallinn.

Estonia: President Discusses Baltic Policies With U.S. Ambassador

WS3105072996 Tallinn BNS in English 2015 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, May 30, BNS — President Lennart Meri met U.S. Ambassador Lawrence Taylor Thursday to discuss the development of Baltic cooperation, the presidential press office said.

The meeting, also attended by Foreign Minister Siim Kallas, dealt with matters of cooperation among Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania against the background of the summit of the Baltic presidents earlier this week as well as the free trade treaty.

The U.S. ambassador expressed the conviction that Baltic unity, although maybe difficult to achieve in some points, will contribute to the Baltics' closer relations with European and trans-Atlantic organizations.

Meri gave the ambassador a copy of the letter addressed by the Baltic heads of state to U.S. President Bill Clinton during the Vilnius meeting. The original copy of the letter will be delivered to U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher by Lithuanian Foreign Minister Povilas Gylys at the beginning of June.

The three presidents in the letter express the wish of their countries to join the European structures as quickly as possible, i.e. to join both the European Union and NATO, the press office said.

The presidents say membership of the Baltic countries in NATO is necessary for protecting their independence and democracy. The Baltics are also making big efforts themselves to raise their defense potential and strengthen democracy, the letter says.

It also says that in NATO expansion, 'who' is much more important for the Baltics than 'when.'

Estonia: President Addresses Nordic-Baltic Defense Meeting

WS3005071996 Tallinn ETA in English 1408 GMT 29 May 96

["News Release"]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tallinn, May 29 (ETA) - Baltic states aim at producing security themselves, Estonian President Lennart Meri told in his speech to the joint session of Baltic states Presidents and Baltic and Nordic Defence Ministers in Vilnius on Wednesday, President's press service told ETA.

Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas and Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis pointed out the Baltic states successful cooperation in the framework of the NATO Partnership for Peace Programme.

President Meri thanked in his speech the Nordic states for defence support and stressed that the aim of the Baltic states is to start producing security themselves. Meri said that for this all possibilities offered in the framework of the PfP programme must be used, as well as Baltic states and Nordic states defence cooperation deepened.

President Meri also touched upon the NATO enlargement issue, citing the joint declaration of the Baltic Presidents of May 28: "In all of our opinion the issue of "who" is much more important than the question of "when" in enlargement of both institutions, from the point of view of our security as well as the security of Europe as a whole."

Meri and President Ulmanis also spoke about the necessity of more effective defence training, as in the Baltic states security structure primarily professional staff is lacking. Meri and Ulmanis said that the interest of the youth towards defence education is great and conditions must be created to them for this.

Danish Defence Minister Hans Haekkerup stressed that the Baltic states and Nordic states must in the next five years be ready to protect our joint democratic values.

The joint meeting of Baltic Presidents and Baltic and Nordic Defence Ministers will conclude on Wednesday.

Estonia: Foreign Minister on European Aspirations

LD3005113696 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 0900 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Foreign Minister Siim Kallas said today in parliament that political and economic integration with the European Union [EU] is of prime importance for Estonian foreign policy. Kallas noted that this is also becoming a greater priority for domestic policy as citizens become more aware of the EU as the debate advances. According to Kallas, it is clear now that Estonia will have a realistic opportunity to join the EU among the first Central and Eastern European countries. He remarked that six months ago this was in doubt.

Kallas was critical of attaching too much importance to the Baltic states competing to join the EU. He asked to make and official clarification on this subject. According to the foreign minister, Estonia would prefer that the membership talks begin simultaneously with all member candidates, with as many Baltic states as possible gaining access to the first round of membership talks. It is important that the Estonian-Latvian-Lithuanian cooperation should operate on the basis of the gentlemanly formula: one for all, all for one, regardless of how many Baltic states make it in the first round of enlargement.

Kallas added that Estonia will open embassies in Tokyo and Rome this year. The Estonian network of foreign missions is developing despite lack of resources. Opening the first embassy outside Europe and America is a sign of Estonia's world view which is broadening itself more and more. The foreign minister justified the Tokyo embassy by saying that Japan is one of the leading political, economic and financial centers of the world. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs expects this to facilitate Japanese high-technology investments in Estonia. [passage omitted]

Estonia: Foreign Minister Views 'Russian Question'

MM3005111296 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 25 May 96 p 3

[Interview with Estonian Foreign Minister Siim Kallas by Lembit Annus in Tallinn; date not given: "Estonia's Main Points of Reference"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The 47-year old Siim Kallas is Estonia's foreign minister. He is at the same time chairman of the Estonian Reform Party. We offer our readers our correspondent Lembit Annus' conversation with him, which reveals the nature of the arguments used by the leadership of one of the Baltic countries on key issues of foreign policy. And although the PRAVDA Editorial Office does not subscribe to the Estonian minister's position, it deems it advisable to inform readers of it.

[Annus] Mr. Kallas, could you briefly describe the current priorities in the Estonian state's foreign policy?

[Kallas] Estonian foreign policy today is subordinate to the single goal of ensuring national security and preserving the state. That is the most important thing, the main thing for us. As for other priorities in our ministry's foreign policy activity, these include Estonia's entry to the European Union [EU] and all other security structures in Europe. NATO, as you know, is only one part of those structures.

Needless to say, relations with Russia are also a priority area of the Estonian state's foreign policy.

[Annus] President Lennart Meri said that Estonia wants to join the EU as soon as possible and is ready to do so before Lithuania and Latvia. Does this mean that Estonia does not support the idea of the Baltic states' joint entry to the EU?

[Kallas] Each state should demonstrate its achievements and prove ready to fulfill the requirements made of EU members. That principle is the same for everyone.

However, Estonia has never backed the idea of group entry to the EU. The group principle for the admission of new members would mean that the Baltic countries would never be the first to join. In that case the states of Central Europe would most likely be the first.

Needless to say, there is nothing dramatic about this. We are not in principle opposed to the group admission of members to the EU. But in that case it is not ruled out that, when talks begin, one state in this group might be ripe for admission while another is not. So, would the other have to wait for its neighbor to make the grade? And who has said that Estonia would be the first Baltic state to join? On the contrary, we believe that there is nothing shameful in another Baltic state's being admitted before us.

Estonia has nothing against a possible decision regarding the group admission of all three Baltic states to the EU. But there is no logic in that in view of the above.

[Annus] Estonian Prime Minister Tiit Vahi said in April, on the day after UN Secretary General Javier Solana visited Tallinn, that next year his government intends to double budget funding for the Estonian defense forces. Should that be seen as the price of Estonia's entry to NATO?

[Kallas] No, no one has set Estonia such conditions. That is not the issue. This year just 532.9 billion Estonian kroon in state budget funding, or 1 percent of GNP, was earmarked for defense. And that at a time when 3 percent is considered normal.

On the other hand, how long are we going to roam the world complaining about our grim destiny, possible enemy aggression against us, and so on and so forth? And when people ask us what we ourselves are doing to strengthen our security, we will only be able to say that we are unable to spend money on defense since we have to tackle other problems. In that case the United States, Germany, Sweden, or anyone else may logically think: You Estonians are cunning guys and want our soldiers to fight for you, or else you want to arm your Army at our taxpayer's expense. In short, increasing the country's defense spending is absolutely essential. And should have been done long ago.

[Annus] Mr. Kallas, since Estonia needs the NATO "protective umbrella," that means that you assume the existence of an internal and external enemy. Do you really take seriously the possibility of Russian aggression against little Estonia?

[Kallas] The crux of the matter is that there are political circles in Russia which see Estonia as the cause of the Soviet Union's breakup. That is the first thing. Second, Estonia was more determined than the other union republics in turning toward the West. Hence, naturally, the desire for vengeance and the endeavor to hurt the malefactor at any price.

Just read Anton Surikov's articles in NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA on this, calling for the occupation of Estonia. Whereas there was an official announcement about one of them in the fall to the effect that this was not the Russian state viewpoint, I have seen no such rebuttal regarding the second. Take, for instance, the interview conducted with that selfsame Anton Surikov in April by Tartu's POSTIMEES headlined "If Estonia Joins NATO, a Russian Military Invasion Is Guaranteed." So the idea of Russian troops' invading Estonia is still lurking somewhere.

As Estonian foreign minister I have no official grounds for saying that Russia is preparing a military invasion of Estonia. But it is obvious that compared with 1992 Estonian-Russian relations have deteriorated considerably. Views hostile to Estonia are also expanding in Russia, and we cannot ignore that.

As for the creation of a Baltic military bloc, this means that if one state goes to war or comes under attack, others must also go to war. Moreover a Baltic military union would hardly be able to withstand a major war. That is why cooperation with an international military organization like NATO remains a key issue.

[Annus] As for Estonian-Russian relations, the press credits your department with the slogan "The worse they are, the better." Is that true?

[Kallas] No, it is not. In the six months that I have been foreign minister I have never heard anything of the sort at official level. What is more, by no means everything that our press writes is the truth.

As for Russia's positions, it has three requirements of Estonia. First, it is trying to secure a zero option for citizenship of the Estonian Republic. Second, it is seeking Estonia's public, absolute renunciation of NATO membership and abandonment of cooperation with Western military structures. And, third, it wants to make our state border with Russia permeable. But that will never happen.

[Annus] Minister, you make very great demands on Russia. What has Estonia itself done to improve relations with Russia?

[Kallas] A great deal. In my six months as foreign minister we have gotten the country's parliament to ratify the Estonian-Russian treaty on the Russian troop withdrawal from Estonia and the agreement on social guarantees for Russian military pensioners and their families. That was no easy matter.

And another point. Estonia has begun issuing a foreigner's passport. That is also very important. There are, after all, several hundred thousand people to whom it has been issued.

The Estonian delegation has frequently submitted various initiatives during its talks with Russia on the state border. But we will never be able to abandon our request for Russia to acknowledge the still-current Tartu Peace Treaty of 2 February 1920 as the basis of Estonian statehood. Other compromises may emerge during the talks with regard to the state border line.

In 1992 when I was president of the Bank of Estonia and Tiit Vahi was prime minister we had a wonderful relationship with Yegor Gaydar's Russian Government. Solutions were found then to all the problems between Estonia and Russia. You cannot say that now about Viktor Chernomyrdin's government. Nor are there any signs of the Russian Government's wanting to tackle anything with the Estonian Government. On the contrary, the Russian side is bombarding Estonia with demands aplenty. If we had made concessions to Russia, there would no longer be an Estonian state.

[Annus] Do you mean that Estonia is interested in improving relations with Russia?

[Kallas] Of course, and how! It would, after all, be quite absurd for the Estonian state with its population of 1.5 million to fall out with its neighbor and its 150-million population. But, let me repeat once again, we cannot agree to constant concessions for the sake of good-neighborly relations. And that must be understood.

[Annus] What can you say about the "Russian question" in Estonia?

[Kallas] It is a complex problem. The Estonian public has nothing against Russians' integration in our country. But it is somewhat afraid of them. That is primarily because the country's Russian population could be used to suppress the independent Estonian state. Russia could use the ethnic Russians to start implementing its policy in our country. We have already heard plenty of such threats from the East. Russia's desire to impose its will on the Estonian state makes Estonians take a confrontational, defensive stance. Moreover, Estonians cannot forget history.

The key to the resolution of the Estonian-Russian problems lies not in a change in Estonia's position but in a change of Russian policy. What do I mean? Russia could work more productively on creating friendlier and more respectful relations with neighboring states. At any rate it would have more friends and would better achieve its aims.

But if Russia only says that it has national interests everywhere, that just irritates and upsets its neighbors. Since national interests primarily mean taking command of neighboring independent states, among them Estonia. That is why we cannot waive to the slightest degree the principles of an independent, autonomous Estonia.

Estonia: Vahi Satisfied With Handling of Paramilitary Incident

LD2905120296 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1700 GMT 28 May 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Next, the press conference after the government sitting. Over to Mati Kirotar.

[Begin recording] [Kirotar] As is known, armed members of the Kaitseliit's [defense league; part of Estonian Defense Force] Tartu Unit occupied the Agricultural University building in the early hours of 27 May as the Kaitseliit claims that it belongs to them. [passage omitted]

[Prime Minister Tiit Vahi] One must not act like this in the state of Estonia. I am, however, pleased that the Kaitseliit's Tartu Unit understood the mistakes it had made and apologized last night in front of the public and the staff of the Agricultural University. Also, disciplinary punishment has been applied and a criminal investigation launched. I still think that the main thing is that the Kaitseliit understood its mistake and apologized and I am pleased about this.

[Kirotar] However, does the prime minister not think that at the government level the Kaitseliit's provocative action has been viewed with too much kindness? Taking into account the fact that this incident has provided fire also for the Russian mass media who are the ones who have made the Estonian Kaitseliit famous as arms dealers and handlers of arms purchases. In Prime Minister Tiit Vahi's opinion the government's evaluation of the incident was sufficiently harsh.

[Vahi] The evaluation was that their behavior was completely unacceptable. There are now men under disciplinary punishment and a criminal investigation has been opened. [passage omitted]

But the fact that the men obeyed orders quickly, however, eases matters. I received information at 0840 on 27 May and within about 10 minutes I had a discussion with [Johannes] Kert [Defense Forces commander] and the matter was resolved within about an hour and the organization apologized to the public by the evening. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Latvia

Latvia: Belarusian Foreign Minister Arrives for Two-Day Visit

LD2905180796 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1400 GMT 29 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belarusian Foreign Minister Uladzimir Syanko has arrived in Latvia on a two-day visit. He was met at Grenstale border crossing post [on the Latvian-Lithuanian border] by Latvian Foreign Minister Valdis Birkavs. Meetings with Prime Minister Andris Skele, Saeima Speaker Ilga Kreituse, and representatives of the Belarusian ethnic community in Latvia have also been planned for the guest today.

The Belarusian foreign minister will tomorrow meet State President Guntis Ulmanis and Foreign Minister Valdis Birkavs.

Latvia: Belarus FM: Integration Should Not Concern Neighboring States

WS3005131896 Tallinn BNS in English 1153 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Riga, May 30, BNS — The cooperation between Belarus and Russia should not be a cause for concern in neighbor states, Belarusian Foreign Minister Vladimir Syanko said Wednesday in Riga.

As reported, Belarus and Russia agreed last month for a closer integration within the CIS framework.

Syanko made the comment during a meeting with Latvian Parliament Speaker Ilga Kreituse.

Belarusian politicians oppose "abrupt changes in the current security structure and artificial integration into any international organizations."

Belarus, however, does not plan to boost its military potential despite the differing opinions of Russia and its neighbor states on NATO membership, Syanko said.

In Kreituse's words, Latvia wants to see Belarus as an independent and strong country that is able to settle its internal problems without upsetting neighbors.

Latvia would also like to order economic relations with Belarus, settle border issues and develop cooperation between parliaments.

Syanko agreed that "the passive period of mutual relations has completed and now it is time to commence the building of new and closer ties."

The visiting Belarusian minister has also had talks with Latvian Prime Minister Andris Skele who urged Belarus to use Latvian transit services more actively and introduced him to Latvian plans to create free ports.

In addition, Syanko met with representatives of the Belarusian community in Latvia.

On Thursday, he is expected to meet with Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis and Foreign Minister Valdis Birkavs.

Latvia: Birkavs, Belarusian Counterpart Give News Conference

LD3005174396 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 1300 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belarusian Foreign Minister Uladzimir Syanko has concluded his two-day official visit to Latvia. The news conference held by the Belarusian and Latvian foreign ministers on 30 May focussed on the possible future effect of the agreement between Belarus and Russia on their relations.

[Begin Syanko recording, in Russian fading into Latvian translation] The agreement that we concluded with Russia will not make any difference to Latvia in the political sphere. However, economically there will possibly be both pluses and minuses. Belarus, Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan now have a unified customs system. Therefore, there could of course be changes in economic cooperation.

In no way would I want to call our country, Belarus, undemocratic. Many people now reproach us for the use of force by the police against participants in the rally held on 26 April in connection with the 10th anniversary of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station. However, if the police had not intervened, the continuation of the rally in the square could possibly have resulted in tragic consequences because the people who participated should be called extremists and nationalists. Yes, this incident caused disappointment in our government.

If you ask whether a military union will be created between Russia and Belarus, then I will answer that we have not had such a plan because the creation of any military union within the former Soviet Union would in no way be able to equal the Warsaw Pact and would not be able to stand up against NATO as far as military force and equipment is concerned.

As far as NATO enlargement toward Eastern European is concerned, if NATO is at Belarus' western border with Latvia, of course, that will alarm us. However, we recognize that each country has the right to choose what it wants and what is acceptable to it. We are not in a position to reproach you for this choice, but the creation of such a system will obviously cause quite a lot of reflection in the future. [end recording]

Latvian Foreign Minister Valdis Birkavs, for his part, said that 19 agreements have been concluded with Belarus despite the fact that the Foreign Ministries of the two countries have different views on some issues.

[Begin Birkavs recording] The 14 agreements that are being drafted will considerably strengthen our legal basis and we submitted two agreements on 30 May. They are agreements on tourism and on cooperation in the customs. I was glad to find out that Belarus has moved forward considerably in examining the agreements that we have already submitted; one of them is an agreement on basic principles of mutual relations and another [word indistinct] in the sphere of oil transport.

Our positions are somewhat different on illegal immigration and on mutual travel of citizens. Our position is that these two agreements — on legal and illegal immigration — should be combined, while Belarus' position is that they should be separated. We have agreed that we will in practice assess the possibility to work in parallel on the two, so that at least things move forward and then we will see what the final result will be. [end recording]

Latvia: Polish Senate Speaker Urges 'More Active' Relations

LD3005133996 Riga Radio Riga Network in Latvian 0900 GMT 30 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A delegation of the Polish Senate headed by its Speaker Adam Struzik has arrived in Latvia on an official two-day visit. This morning Adam Struzik (?addressed our parliamentarians).

He expressed the greatest satisfaction with the development of cooperation between the two countries within the framework of various international organizations, particularly within the framework of the Council of Baltic Sea States. [indistinct passage]

Speaking of future interstate cooperation, Adam Struzik said the following.

[Begin recording] [Struzik in Polish, fading into superimposed Latvian translation] I wish to express the deepest conviction that the work of these groups will soon have to lend considerable support to relations between the Polish and Latvian parliaments. The experience of both chambers of the Polish parliament as regards foreign countries shows that bilateral cooperation between respective parliamentary cooperation groups is an important way of enriching the (?network) of international relations, which gives mutual benefit to the sides concerned.

The Polish authorities are fully convinced that we have to attempt to make Polish-Latvian relations more active. Visits by two Polish ministers, the ministers of defense and education, to Latvia this June will be practical signs of these attempts. I wish to express the hope that these visits will be followed by other activities. [end recording]

Lithuania

Lithuania: Supporters of Chechnya Say New Peace Deal 'Just a Show'

LD3005091996 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in English 2130 GMT 29 May 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The supporters of the Chechen independence in Lithuania think that the new peace agreement between Russia and Chechnya is just a show. Head of the international group of parliamentarians to support Chechnya, MP [Member of Parliament] Algirdas Endriukaitis, told reporters on Wednesday that Russia would probably keep to the peace agreement until the Russian elections are over. However, the lawmaker said, Russia's proposal for peace is very favorable to the Chechen fighters at the moment. According to MP Endriukaitis, summer is the best season for the Chechens to fight. Therefore, they will be able to have some rest and restore their potential now.

Lithuania: Baltic, Nordic Leaders View Defense, Security Cooperation

LD2905132296 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1000 GMT 29 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Baltic countries' presidents have met with the Baltic and Nordic defense ministers in Lithuania. According to the Estonian presidential press service, they discussed the prospects for strengthened defense cooperation and security of the countries on the Baltic Sea.

Danish Defense Minister Hans Haekkerup emphasized that the Baltic and Nordic countries must be prepared to defend our common democratic values within the next five years.

Estonian President Lennart Meri touched upon the NATO expansion, among other things, and cited the Baltic presidents' joint communique of yesterday which says that on the issue of NATO's expansion the question of who is of considerably greater relevance to the Baltic states than the question when. Meri emphasized that the Baltic countries' aim is to generate security ourselves. In his words, all opportunities offered by the NATO Partnership for Peace program must be used to this end and the Baltic defense cooperation with the Nordic countries must be strengthened.

Lennart Meri and Latvian President Guntis Ulmanis spoke about the need to make defense training more effective, since there is a great shortage of professional staff.

Lithuania: Baltic, Nordic Defense Ministers Give News Conference

LD2905135596 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 0900 GMT 29 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Baltic defense ministers met with Lithuanian Foreign Minister Povilas Gylys proir to meeting the presidents of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia in Vilnius today. The defense ministers of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Denmark held a news conference. Guoda Salciute reports:

[Begin recording] [Salciute] Lithuanian Defense Minister Linas Linkevicius, opened the news conference by stating:

[Linkevicius] This is a historical event indeed. Today, at the meeting with the presidents of the Baltic countries, we noted that such serious meetings are not accidental. We can be proud that this meeting is taking place in Vilnius. Not only it is symbolic: it attests to the fact that the cooperation of the Baltic and Nordic countries is really working.

In addition, our cooperation does not require new models. The one we employ is excellent, and not only in our opinion, but also in the opinion of neighboring countries, who are observing our cooperation and consider the dialogue between the Nordic and Baltic countries to be a good example of a regional cooperation, a model of political and practical dialogue. We greatly appreciate this. Such cooperation must be encouraged.

During our meetings and discussions, we spoke about specific projects, related to (?military) cooperation, the Baltic peacekeeping battalion; airspace control; the importance, and meaning and future prospects of our participation in peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions.

[Salciute] At the news conference, considerable attention was devoted to the three Baltic countries joining NATO. The defense ministers of Sweden and Finland — countries that are not NATO members — noted that they respect the determination of the Baltic countries to link their security with NATO. At the same time, they noted that NATO expansion is NATO's business and the concern of the countries interested in joining the alliance.

Concerning Russia's negative view of NATO enlargement, the defense ministers of Denmark and Norway noted that no country can pose obstacles to, or veto, NATO expansion.

However, Russia's position as part of European security is very important. For this reason, all European countries should strive to achieve good neighborly relations and cooperation with Russia.

Danish Defense Minister Hans Haekkerup said that Denmark supported the idea that the Baltic countries should be in the group of the countries to join NATO first. Nevertheless, Haekkerup noted, the door to NATO membership will remain open even after admission of the first group of countries. [end recording]

The Baltic and Nordic defense ministers meeting will end today with a farewell dinner. This is the third such multilateral meeting. Last year it was held in Sweden and in 1994 the ministers met in Denmark.

Lithuania: Belarusian Foreign Minister Pays Brief, Unofficial Visit

LD2905144796 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1300 GMT 29 May 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Belarusian Foreign Minister Uladzimir Syanko paid a brief unofficial visit to Vilnius today. The minister visited the Lithuanian Foreign Ministry on his way to Riga, where he is going for an official two-day visit.

According to a report of the Foreign Ministry's information and press department, [Foreign] Minister Povilas Gylys and his Belarusian counterpart discussed issues of bilateral cooperation and preparations for the upcoming working visit to Vilnius by Belarusian Prime Minister Mikhail Chyhir, scheduled for late June.

Lithuania: Joint Lithuanian-Polish Document To Be Presented to EU

WS3105084496 Vilnius ELTA in English 1954 GMT 30 May 96

[From "News Bulletin" No. 1021]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Rome/Vilnius, May 30 ELTA — Lithuanian and Polish diplomats are to present joint document on Thursday at the meeting of leaders of the foreign ministries political departments from EU and associated states in Rome.

ELTA news agency said the document describes proposals how to improve and intensify political dialogue of Central and East European states with European Union.

Such a move is the first one aimed at better coordination of foreign policies in the EU and associated states, in order that the associated members could get ready to join the EU foreign and security policy.

Lithuanian and Polish foreign ministries have already presented the document copies to Italian embassies in Vilnius and Warsaw last week. Now the Lithuanian and

Polish diplomats brought the document to Rome and handed directly to Italian Foreign Ministry.

The meeting in Rome is to deal with the European security architecture, Middle East peace process and problems in former Yugoslavia. The possibilities for further development of political dialogues are also to be discussed there.

Lithuanian diplomats are to meet high officials of the Italian Foreign Ministry.

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